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Abstract 
 
Terrorism has come to be considered as one of the defining crises facing the tourism industry. 
In spite of its importance, the knowledge of how to manage the terrorism crisis in the tourism 
industry is rudimentary. The main aim of this study is to narrow this gap. In particular, it 
proposes a conceptual framework applying stakeholder theory to the practical methods used 
and strategies followed in the management of crises in the tourism industry. The point of 
departure of this conceptual framework is the twofold premise that stakeholders inherently 
influence the management of an organization and that the organization should meet their 
demands and balance their claims. This task, however, is complicated by the fact that 
stakeholders vary in their salience and that they interact with one another differently. In 
addition, stakeholder management does not take place in isolation; cultural factors have an 
influence on the ways that stakeholders interact. These factors constitute the theoretical 
foundation of the proposed framework. These theoretical assumptions are then applied to the 
practical postures or strategies that stakeholders adopt in managing terrorism crises in the 
tourism industry. This conceptual framework is applied in particular to the Egyptian case of 
the bombings in Sharm El Sheikh, Dahab and Taba. The findings of the study indicate that 
because of the idiosyncratic nature of terrorism, which is regarded as raising major security 
issues, the participation of a large number of stakeholders at most stages of crisis 
management does not necessarily lead to the most effective and efficient crisis management. 
Instead, as the thesis indicates, a crisis management model in which  the crisis stage is 
dominated by police and security forces and where the recovery stage relies upon the 
participation of most stakeholders has proved to be both efficient and successful.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
There is little doubt that security crises like terrorism now constitute a primary threat to the 
tourism industry, requiring the urgent attention of academics and practitioners alike. Given its 
importance, this thesis seeks to contribute to existing knowledge of crisis management in the 
tourism industry. To take a fresh approach to the subject, it examines the terrorism crisis in 
the tourism industry from a crisis management perspective while attempting to incorporate 
insights from terrorism studies into the literature on tourism crisis management and more 
specifically to offer a conceptual framework for the study, drawing on stakeholder theory and 
considering both national and organizational culture as determinants.  
Basically, this study aims to gain a broader understanding of the terrorism crisis in the 
tourism industry and seeks to achieve the following research objectives:  
1- To examine the salience of stakeholders in tourism crisis management and the 
ways in which their salience changes at different stages of a crisis. 
2- To describe and analyse the nature of the interactions among key stakeholders in 
tourism when managing a crisis, both in a normal situation and after the crisis.  
3- To explain the role of organizational and national culture and their impact on the 
stakeholders’ involvement in crisis management in the tourism industry.  
4- To promote a deeper understanding of the crisis management techniques 
employed in managing the different stages of terrorism crises.  
5- To examine the economic and social impacts of the terrorism crisis on the 
Egyptian tourism industry. 
The occurrence of terrorist attacks on the Egyptian tourism industry serves as the context of 
the research, owing to the prevalence of terrorism crises in Egypt compared to other tourist 
destinations, as will be explained later in this chapter (section 1-2) and reinforced by the 
regional picture reported in the literature review (section 2-2-1). 
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Reviewing the extant literature on tourism crisis management, one can identify two strands: 
the first body of literature represents a tendency to explore the nature of tourism crises from 
the perspectives of consumers and buyers, including how such crises influence tourists’ 
perceptions and willingness to travel; the second draws on crisis management studies and 
discusses the methods and strategies by which organizations deal with crises. Without 
denying the merit of the first trend in the literature, it should be noted that this thesis places 
its main focus on the latter body of work. Indeed, although the perception of tourists in 
relation to crisis-affected tourism destinations is one of the key issues discussed in the 
tourism crisis management literature, the present study does not intend to examine this topic. 
An additional restriction of scope is that this thesis focuses primarily on the bombings in 
Sharm El Sheikh, Dahab and Taba, although some of the issues raised also relate to earlier 
terrorist attacks on Egyptian tourism destinations. 
In particular, although the overall aim of this study is to gain a broader understanding of 
crisis management in the tourism industry, its focus is on terrorism as a significant and 
prevailing source of crises and on the utilization of stakeholder theory and cultural 
dimensions in crisis management, because it is felt that this these are the areas where the 
main contributions can be made. This judgement is based on the fact that only limited efforts 
have been made to examine these important determinants in crisis management, as will be 
shown by the literature review chapter, which will discuss the detailed relation of stakeholder 
theory and national cultural dimensions to tourism and crisis management. Furthermore, this 
thesis reports one of a very few studies conducted to date which examine the terrorism crisis 
in the tourism industry by drawing on a variety of issues discussed within the terrorism 
literature, including specific counter-terrorism methods and those people and organizations 
involved in the prevention of terrorism.  
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In order to fulfil the research objectives, a combined approach of qualitative and quantitative 
research methods was used. Quantitative data were collected through a structured 
questionnaire survey of 130 respondents in Cairo, 52 in Taba, 97 in Sharm el Sheikh and 49 
in Dahab, while qualitative data were collected in 36 semi-structured, face-to-face, in-depth 
interviews conducted in Cairo and Sharm al Sheikh. 
This introductory chapter continues with an overview of writing on the management of 
terrorism crises in the tourism industry, allowing the identification of some gaps in the 
relevant literature and explaining how the current research narrows this gap. The rationale for 
choosing to focus on the Egyptian case is then explained and the chapter concludes with an 
overview of the structure of the thesis. 
 
1-1 Gaps in the literature and contribution to knowledge  
A review of the literature on crisis management in the tourism industry shows that an 
important advance has been the division of crisis management strategies into different phases 
or stages, creating what have since become known as ‘staged’ crisis management models 
(Faulkner, 2001; Santana, 2004; Ritchie, 2004; Evans and Elphick, 2005). These studies also 
follow a holistic and strategic approach, viewing crisis management as a circular process that 
starts and ends with the “default” stage of information gathering and monitoring—what 
Mitroff et al (1996) and Coombs (2007) refer to as “signal detection”—in order to discover 
potential crises in advance through meticulous internal and external monitoring. They also 
take into consideration the post-crisis stage, undertaking comprehensive evaluation of the 
whole range of crisis management procedures, using lessons learned to plan for the future. 
However, such proposed models can be faulted in two ways. First, they have been developed 
predominantly ad hoc, addressing each tourism crisis as it has occurred. This has produced a 
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heterogeneous body of knowledge which is largely descriptive and largely inapplicable to 
different contexts. In addition, they have paid insufficient attention to the idiosyncratic 
character of individual crises and to how these plans and procedures should be adapted to 
meet the peculiarities of each crisis or type of crisis (Robert & Lajtha, 2001). This thesis 
seeks to narrow these gaps by drawing on the wider body of management theory.  
Several studies have stressed that tourism destinations are affected by crises and that without 
the close partnership of the stakeholders in these destinations, crisis management policies 
have little if any chance of achieving their goals (Ritchie, 2004; Sheehan and Ritchie, 2004; 
Ulmer, 2001). This indicates a need for the closer application of stakeholder theory to crisis 
management efforts in the tourism industry, where it has much to offer; yet there has been a 
disconnection between these two fields of study. Although a few studies (Ritchie, 2004; 
Yeoman et al, 2005; Paraskevasa and Arendell, 2007) have identified destination 
management organizations (DMOs) as the most significant stakeholders involved in the 
management of terrorism crises, neither the significant role of other stakeholders nor the 
ways in which they interact with one another at different stages of crises have been 
adequately explored.  
In addition, there is a degree of consensus among scholars that different countries deal with 
crises differently (Elsubbaugh et al, 2004; Chandler, 2005) and that each crisis management 
plan should be made appropriate to its specific context by taking into account locally 
applicable ideas and practices (Johnson and Peppas, 2003). However, with notable exceptions 
(Schmidt and Berrell, 2007; Campiranon and Scott, 2007), few studies have systematically 
considered the national and organizational dimensions of culture in crisis planning and crisis 
response.  
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This thesis seeks to narrow this gap by the application of stakeholder theory and cultural 
concepts to crisis management studies. Another significant contribution of this thesis is to 
take into consideration strategies and methods specific to terrorism crises by drawing on the 
counter-terrorism literature, where the specific characteristics of terrorism crises are 
comprehensively discussed. The present study therefore seeks to bridge the above epistemic 
divide through the integration in tourism scholarship of previously divergent research 
traditions—terrorism studies and crisis management—and to pursue the advancement of 
knowledge by addressing the capacities and limitations of both perspectives. 
1-2 Rationale for choosing the case of Egypt  
This conceptual framework will be applied to the Egyptian case of the bombings in Sharm El 
Sheikh, Dahab and Taba. There are several reasons for the selection of Egypt as a case study. 
It is a well-known beneficiary of the tourism industry and one of the few Arab countries 
which depend heavily on tourism as the main source of foreign income and as the largest 
employer (Sakr and Massoud, 2003; Essner, 2003; Hamzawi, 2001; Rudwan, 2002). 
However, in recent years the Egyptian tourism industry has witnessed a growing number of 
terrorist attacks, apparently intended to weaken the position of the Egyptian government and 
cause damage to the tourism industry and hence to the whole economy (Richter and Waugh, 
1986; Aziz, 1995; Abdulwahed, 1998). The government has had difficulty in managing a 
fundamentalist Islamic undercurrent that uses terrorism as a tool to further its cause (Essner, 
2003: 8). The destructive terrorist attacks on tourists and tourism destinations which are the 
particular concern of the present study began in 1992, when gunmen opened fire on a Nile 
cruise ship carrying 100 German tourists. This was followed by an attack in Luxor in 1997, 
when six gunmen disguised as police officers fired randomly at tourists, killing 70 people 
including 58 foreign tourists (Essner, 2003: 9; Wheatley and McCauley, 2008).  
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More recently, a series of terrorist attacks in Dahab in April 2006 killed twenty people and 
injured eighty. A year earlier, in July 2005, a terrorist massacre in Sharm El Sheikh killed 
more than 60 people, while in October 2004, three bombs exploded in Taba, resulting in the 
deaths of 34 people. The attacks on these three towns were chosen to constitute a case study 
as they allowed for a relatively representative study of typical terrorist attacks in Egypt. They 
also appeared to be ‘information-rich’ cases which are worthy of in-depth study (Patton, 
1990). Furthermore, because of the freshness of events, significant information was likely to 
be available, although stakeholders were relatively unwilling to share it. Indeed, given the 
sensitivity of the terrorism issue in the Egyptian context, potential respondents were expected 
to be very reluctant to participate. This was the main barrier facing the researcher in 
conducting the field research. The solution adopted was to utilize an innovative research 
method appropriate to such a closed society, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
1-3 Structure of the thesis 
Following this brief introductory chapter, Chapter 2 reviews critically the literature relevant 
to the various academic strands which constitute the building blocks of this study, including 
terrorism studies. It comprises seven sections, the first of which outlines the scope and range 
of the literature review. Section 2-2 provides a general overview of terrorism incidents in the 
tourism industry in the past four decades and analyses the economic impact of terrorism on 
the tourism industry. The third section explores the strategies and methods adopted to manage 
crises and the models and frameworks explaining their application. It first seeks to clarify the 
concept of crisis and to formulate a classification within which to place terrorism. Secondly, 
it examines crisis management models by focusing on the most influential approaches that 
have emerged. Finally, it reviews the debates concerning the application of crisis 
management techniques to tourism studies. The next section draws on terrorism studies, 
examining a variety of issues including clarification of the concept of terrorism, approaches 
7 
 
to counter-terrorism strategies and methods, the agencies responsible for counter-terrorism 
operations and the way these agencies cooperate and coordinate. Section 2-5 then seeks to 
build an academic foundation on which to explore the application of stakeholder theory to the 
management of terrorism crises in the tourism industry. It begins with a brief discussion of 
the definition and classification of stakeholder theories. The rest of the section is devoted to 
the fundamental debates within stakeholder theory which constitute the building blocks of the 
framework, including the identification and salience of stakeholders, their strategies and 
management. Once these concepts have been clarified, their specific application to the study 
of tourism and crisis management are reviewed. Section 2-6 is devoted to the impact of 
national culture. It first offers a definition on the flawed concept of culture and discusses the 
differentiation between national and organizational culture, then proceeds to consider the 
cultural determinants that may shape and condition stakeholders’ management of a tourism 
crisis. The second chapter ends with a summary of gaps in the literature and a detailed 
exposition of the research questions to be addressed; this constitutes the outlining of an 
overall theoretical foundation for the research.  
Chapter 3 paints a general picture of the tourism industry in Egypt and of the terrorist 
incidents affecting it. It begins with a brief review of the Egyptian context and a discussion of 
the ebb and flow of tourism in Egypt over the last 30 years. The analysis draws on the official 
data, comparing international tourist arrivals and receipts. The chapter also offers a brief 
review of the main stakeholders in tourism in Egypt. It finally discusses the emergence, 
evolution and challenges of terrorist groups in Egypt and their engagement in attacks on 
tourist destinations. In this section, counter-terrorism strategies ranging from oppression to 
co-operation and accommodation are reviewed and the degree to which each has been 
successful is examined.  
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Chapter 4 provides an account of the research methodology adopted. It discusses why the 
most appropriate method of collecting data in this study is triangulation and how this 
methodology matches the research problem. It also spells out the conceptual framework of 
the research.  
Chapter 5 presents an analysis of the qualitative data gathered by interviewing representatives 
of key stakeholders. Its structure follows that of the interview protocol reproduced in 
Appendix 3, where each section covers a major topic: identifying stakeholders, the impacts of 
terrorism on the tourism industry, the role of culture, and crisis management practices and 
strategies. In Chapter 6, the quantitative data gathered by means of a questionnaire is 
presented, mostly in the form of tables, and analysed descriptively. The presentation follows 
the format of the questionnaire itself, which is reproduced in Appendix 1. 
The analyses offered in Chapters 5 and 6 are then drawn together in Chapter 7, which 
presents an integrated interpretation of all the data collected. This discussion addresses each 
of the research questions in turn and thus covers the following themes: the impact of 
terrorism on tourism in Egypt, changes in stakeholder salience as a result of crises, strategies 
for managing key stakeholders and communication among them, crisis management 
techniques and the effect of contextual factors. 
The final chapter summarises the findings and discusses their implications, as well as the 
conclusions to be drawn from the Egyptian experience. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2-1 Introduction 
As with any new study, it is necessary to review previous studies in order to place the present 
one in context. As indicated in the introduction, this thesis seeks to offer new insight to the 
literature by bringing together different strands of learning within the fields of terrorism, 
tourism and crisis management. It also seeks to offer a rigorous theoretical foundation for the 
study based on stakeholder theory and national cultural dimensions. As such, the research 
subject encompasses issues that span many disciplines, so there are elements of cross-over 
among all sections within this chapter, as shown in Figure 2.1. The areas that constitute the 
building blocks for this literature review include terrorism, tourism and crisis management, 
while its theoretical foundation draws on stakeholder theory and the dimensions of national 
culture. In order to obtain a richer and more holistic picture, in the following lines each main 
area of study is first discussed, then the peripheral subjects and more importantly the 
boundaries and interconnections with other areas are highlighted. It is noteworthy that the 
classification of the literature presented here is neither fixed nor definitive, but was rather 
adopted to help the researcher to navigate through the complexities encountered in the 
literature.  
Nevertheless, every attempt has been made to adopt a logical structure based upon the 
development of knowledge. The departure point for research was general crisis management 
studies. Thus, section 2.3 first explores advances in this field and spells out the conceptual 
underpinnings of some approaches to crisis management. Reviewing the related literature, 
two important variants are identified: the tactical and strategic approaches. 
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Figure  2.1: Interconnections in the literature 
Source: Author 
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Having established a general understanding of crisis management, the next step is to review 
its application to tourism studies. To do so, section 2-3-3 offers a brief review of the works 
related to managing crises in tourist destinations. It draws predominantly on scholarly 
discussion of tourism crisis management and discusses the extent to which this literature has 
kept pace with developments in the crisis management field. It first discusses the concept of 
tourism crisis and its categorization, then seeks to place security and terrorism within the 
appropriate classification. Next, it examines crisis management models by focusing on the 
most influential approaches that have emerged. Finally, it attempts to identify divergence and 
convergence between the strategies and methods developed to address the security and 
terrorism crises and those strategies and methods used to manage other crises affecting 
tourism.  
Section 2-4 turns to the second major strand: the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism. It 
defines terms and examines details of methods suggested and adopted for combating 
terrorism, with particular reference to interagency cooperation. 
Section 2-5 is largely theoretical in nature, seeking to lay a robust theoretical foundation by 
drawing on stakeholder theories and applying them to the management of crises in the 
tourism industry. It begins with a definition of terms and a brief discussion of the evolution of 
stakeholder theories. It proceeds to report the debates on types of stakeholder theory based on 
the best-known taxonomy, distinguishing normative, instrumental and descriptive theories. It 
then discusses how stakeholder theory is applicable in the public sphere and to the 
management of tourism destinations. The rest of the section is devoted to the building blocks 
of the conceptual framework of the present research, including the identification and salience 
of stakeholders, their strategies and management, while section 2-6 explores the final 
component: the impact of national culture.  
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Overall, then, the chapter lays out the theoretical foundation of the study, then discusses its 
application to the study of tourism stakeholders and crisis management. With respect to crisis 
management it is argued that the significance of stakeholders will vary during the different 
stages of crisis management. The final section of this literature review draws together the 
main strands of the preceding sections to establish a theoretical framework for the study. The 
logical order outlined in Figure 2.2 is thus followed throughout this chapter. Each section of 
this literature review also provides a scholarly basis for one of the main research questions. 
Once the related literature has been reviewed in each section, the place of the relevant 
question is spelled out and the implications for further research explored. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2.2: The logical structure of knowledge examined in this chapter 
Source: Author 
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 2-2 The impact of terrorism on tourism destinations 
This section reviews the literature on the impact of terrorism on tourism destinations. It is 
necessary to review such material before turning to the main discussion of how terrorist 
attacks on tourism destinations can be managed effectively. There is almost complete 
consensus among scholars that security incidents in the broader sense and terrorism attacks in 
particular have a very substantial negative impact on tourists, the tourism industry, the local 
community and the economy of the host country at large (Mansfield and Pizam, 2006). The 
impact of these incidents on tourists changes their perception of risk, which in turn 
determines their decisions to travel or otherwise to security-affected destinations. Such 
consequences are of great importance and extensively discussed in the literature (e.g. 
Seddighi et al, 2000; Sakr and Massoud, 2003; Lepp and Gibson, 2003; Mansfield and Pizam, 
2006), but lie beyond the scope of this study. Rather, central to this study is the impact of 
terrorism incidents on the destinations, including the economic consequences of the reduction 
of tourist arrivals. In addition, this study seeks to understand the potential impact of terrorism 
incidents on the social life of ordinary people. This section begins with a discussion of the 
critical impact of terrorism on the tourism industry, based on a review of the relevant research 
conducted in several countries, before discussing the susceptibility of the tourism industry to 
crises. As a contribution to the literature, a time series analysis with yearly aggregated data is 
presented to show how and to what extent terrorists have targeted tourism since the 1970s. 
The economic impact of terrorism attacks across the world is then examined via a focus on a 
number of case studies.  
2-2-1 Records of terrorist attacks on tourist targets 
The preferred type of terrorist target has varied in the last four decades. According to 
Mansfield and Pizam (2006: 42), during the 1960s and 1970s many aircraft were hijacked, so 
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that tourists, travellers and their destinations were targeted initially through such hijackings. 
In the 1960s, the flights involved were often from the US to Cuba, and there was no intention 
to harm passengers. However, in the 1970s, the purposes of terrorists’ actions were the loss of 
life and damage to property. Thus, they perpetrated more brutal assaults. During the 1970s, 
athletes at the Munich Olympic Games fell victim to one of the most notorious terrorist 
attacks, which marked a turning point for terrorism. In the subsequent years, the target list 
encompassed a variety of sites, including airlines, cruise ships, buses, restaurants and cafes, 
events and festivals, sporting and cultural institutions; indeed, wherever people assembled for 
leisure or any other purpose.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, a significant number of terrorist incidents occurred at tourist 
destinations. The targeting of tourist destinations by terrorists has been so frequent that 
Mitroff (2005: 34), a leading scholar in the field of tourism crisis management, states that “it 
is no longer a question of ‘if’ terrorists will strike but rather a question of ‘when,’ ‘how’ and 
‘how prepared’ the destination is to deal with them”. This trend continued towards the end of 
the 1990s, but in recent years there has been a shift in terrorist targets from tourist 
destinations. Despite this shift, the industry has remained a key target for terrorist attacks. 
The RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI),
1
 which records terrorist 
attacks on the tourism industry between January 1968 and July 2009, indicates that tourists 
were the targets of 269 of 40129 terrorist incidents. These attacks killed 684 tourists and 
injured 1191 others. As Figure 2.3 demonstrates, there were signs of a considerable increase 
in the number of terrorist incidents in the 1990s, reaching the highest point in 1993 with 
around 40 terrorist attacks on tourism destinations. Although the number fell in the 2000s, 
there were still a large number of such attacks.  
                                                 
1 RDWTI is the most comprehensive database on terrorism incidents, containing data in a wide range of 
categories including incidents in countries, the location of attacks, the groups involved, who were the key 
targets, and the tactics and weapons of attack, from 1972 to 2009. 
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Figure  2.3: Number of terrorist incidents in tourism destinations 1970-2008 
Source: Data collected from RDWTI 
Figure 2.4 is a graph of the number of tourist injuries and fatalities as a result of terrorism, 
showing that although the volume of incidents fell in the 2000s, the number of deaths and 
injuries continued to grow. The increasing number of injuries and fatalities culminated in the 
horrific attack in Bali, Indonesia in 2002. Recognized as the worst act of terrorism targeting 
tourists to date, the Bali incident killed 202 people and injured 300. Nearly three-quarters of 
the victims were foreigners and most were in the crowded bars in the tourist district. 
Australian tourists accounted for the largest group killed, at 88, while 38 Indonesians formed 
the second largest group killed; the rest were tourists from Great Britain, the United States 
and various European nations. The explosion was blamed on the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
group, which is thought to be linked to Al Qaeda. 
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Figure  2.4: Number of tourists injured and killed in terrorism attacks, 1970-2008 
Source: Data collected from RDWTI 
Another trend that can be identified from this data concerns the global locations of the 
incidents. These are shown graphically in Figure 2.5, which indicates that from 1970 to 2008, 
the most insecure regions for tourists in terms of terrorist attacks were Africa and the Middle 
East/Persian Gulf, each of which experienced 67 terrorist attacks on tourism destinations. 
(This goes some way to reinforcing the choice of Egypt as the setting for the present study, 
explained in section 1-2, as it lies geographically and culturally where these two regions 
meet.) Western Europe followed, with 59 terrorist attacks, while the most secure place was 
North America, the only tourism-related terrorist incident in the United States being in 1997, 
when a Palestinian opened fire on the observation deck of the Empire State Building in New 
York City, killing a Danish tourist and wounding an American, an Argentinean, a Swiss and a 
French tourist.  
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Figure  2.5: Numbers of terrorism incidents in tourism destinations by region 
Source: Data collected from RDWTI 
This section has offered a brief review of the impact of terrorism on the tourism industry. It 
has not merely reviewed other scholars’ ideas, as suggested by the term literature review, but 
has attempted to offer new insight into some pertinent areas of scholarship. The aggregated 
data on the number of terrorist incidents reveals that a significant number of terrorist 
incidents have occurred in tourist destinations, while recent years have witnessed a shift in 
the targets of terrorism.  
2-2-2 The economic impact of terrorism in the tourism industry 
Once it is acknowledged that terrorism is a widespread and pervasive phenomenon in tourism 
destinations, the second significant question raised is the extent to which it has affected the 
tourism industry. In the affected regions, events of this nature often have a profound impact 
on the economy and social life of residents. In some cases, tourism flows are interrupted as 
tourists seek other seemingly safer destinations. Table 2.1 offers an overview of some 
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published studies examining the impact of terrorism on tourism in several countries. These 
studies (and others) are then discussed in some detail.  
Table  2.1: Evidence of the impact of terrorism on tourism 
Study Analytical Scope Main Results 
Enders and 
Sandler (1991) 
Spain, monthly data, 1970-
1988 
Terrorism negatively affects the number of 
tourists visiting Spain. There is no evidence 
of reverse causation. 
Enders et al (1992) Greece, Italy and Austria, 
quarterly data, 1974-1988 
Greece, Italy and Austria suffered severe 
revenue losses from tourism as a 
consequence of terrorism. 
Fleischer and 
Buccola (2002) 
Israel, 1987-1999 Foreign tourism is sensitive to terrorism, 
while domestic terrorism is not. Shifts from 
foreign to domestic tourism in the face of 
terrorism cannot compensate for losses due 
to reduced international tourism. 
Llorca-Vivero 
(2008) 
Cross-sectional gravity 
model, 2001-2003 
Terrorism works as a “bad advertisement”, 
making tourism in targeted countries less 
attractive. This effect is stronger for 
developing countries. 
Aly and Strazicich 
(2000) 
Egypt and Israel, 1955-
1997 and 1971-1997 
While terrorism (along with instability and 
external war) negatively affects tourism 
flows, the tourism sector remains important, 
as tourism flows are able to recuperate after 
negative shocks. 
Pizam and 
Fleischer (2002) 
Israel, monthly data, 1991-
2001   
A high frequency of terrorism is more 
dangerous to tourism flows than the severity 
of these attacks. 
Drakos and Kutan 
(2003) 
Greece, Italy and Turkey, 
monthly data, 1991-2000 
Terrorism reduces tourist arrivals, reducing 
market shares of targeted countries. 
Terrorism also produces regional spillover 
effects, making tourism in a “terrorism 
infected” region generally less attractive. 
Adapted from Schneider (2011) 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Spain was the target of attacks by Basque nationalists and 
separatists and by other (mostly left-wing) terrorist groups. The approximate reduction in the 
number of tourists as a result of these terrorist acts was 140,000 (Enders and Sandler, 1991). 
Enders et al (1992) estimate that between 1974 and 1988, the losses of tourism profits in 
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Austria, Italy and Greece amounted to US$ 4.538 billion, US$ 1.159 billion and US$ 0.77 
billion respectively. In the same period, they state that continental Europe lost US$ 16.145 
billion because of terrorism attacks. This demonstrates the importance of tourism losses in 
Europe as a whole. Calculating these as percentages, Austria, Greece and continental Europe 
as a whole lost 40%, 23% and 21% of their revenue respectively, whereas the loss in Italy 
was only 6%.  
Outside Europe, the negative impact of terrorism on tourism has been observed in countries 
including Israel and Turkey. Fleischer and Buccola (2002) propose a supply and demand 
framework for the performance of the Israeli hotel industry between 1992 and 1998, 
estimating a 1.27% loss of total income during this period. Their evidence shows that in 
general, terrorism affects the tourism industry negatively because tourists factor in terrorism 
as a risk when planning their holidays. The findings of Llorca-Vivero (2008) add to this view, 
as the study shows that both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks enter a tourist’s 
consideration when travel choices are made.  
While the existence of an effect seems more or less universal, its timing appears to vary 
considerably, so that income and numbers of arrivals may fall almost immediately after an 
attack, or not until many months later. Thus, Enders and Sandler (1991) and Fleischer and 
Buccola (2002) report relatively rapid effects of terrorism on tourism, i.e. after two to three 
months for Spain and Israel respectively, while Enders et al (1992) found that there was a 
three to four month lag before terrorism affected tourism in Greece, whereas tourism 
remained unaffected by a terrorist incident until a full 18 to 21 months afterwards in the cases 
of continental Europe as a whole and Austria respectively. Frey and Luechinger (2005) 
explain these variations in terms of differences in the structure of terror campaigns, not just 
across countries but also across time. Differences in time lags could also stem from 
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differences in booking systems, where existing bookings are preserved, so that changes 
become apparent only in the number of new bookings.  
The research also shows that these effects, whenever they occur, tend to be transient. Aly and 
Strazicich (2000) studied annual tourist arrivals in Egypt and Israel, concluding that the 
impact on the tourism industry of acts of terrorism remained transitory, despite their repeated 
occurrence and regional instability. Conversely, Pizam and Fleischer (2002), considering the 
case of Israel, argue that the tourist industry can recover even from severe acts of terrorism as 
long as the terrorist acts are not repeated. Thus, when acts of terrorism (whether of high or 
low severity) occur at high frequency and regular intervals, tourism demand will constantly 
decrease, until eventually the destination’s tourism industry will come to a standstill. It is 
interesting to note that the frequency of attacks seems to influence tourism demand, while 
their severity does not appear to do so.  
Indeed, while tourism demand, arrivals and income do clearly suffer the negative effects of 
terrorism, the findings show that the terrorist acts at Luxor, Cairo and Bali, the PKK attack in 
Turkey or the Basque nationalist and separatist attacks in Spain have not halted the long-term 
growth of international tourism. The destinations targeted by terrorist attacks have largely 
regained the lost tourist arrivals within a few months or years, because potential visitors 
forget such incidents and demand returns to normal relatively soon after the occurrence of 
such shocking attacks (Freyer and Schröder, 2005).  
2-2-3 Summary and implications for further research 
The main argument put forward in this section was that terrorism has often imposed 
significant costs on the tourism industry in certain countries, yet tourists continue to travel to 
such destinations. What has been overlooked in these studies is the potential impact of 
terrorism incidents on the social life of the community at large. Indeed, the emphasis of most 
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of the literature has been on the macroeconomic effect of these incidents on the host 
countries. Although Fuchs and Pizam (2011) have recently underscored the importance of 
this issue, they do not go further, to clarify and expand it adequately. The present study seeks 
to examine this issue in the context of Egypt. Overall, this section has thus provided a 
conceptual base from which to address one of the main research questions, concerning the 
various effects of terrorism incidents in Egypt, in a social as well as an economic context. 
After this brief review of records of terrorism incidents in the tourism industry and their 
broad economic impact, the next section turns to the main body of literature of interest to this 
study: on crisis management and its contribution to the management of terrorism incidents in 
the tourism industry.  
2-3 Crisis management  
This section seeks to offer some insights into the evolution of the crisis management (CM) 
field of study, which constitutes the subject of the main body of literature referred to in this 
thesis. To understand better this field of study it is essential to make sense of the main issue 
that it was established to deal with: that of crises. Thus, this section first seeks to clarify the 
concept of crisis by reviewing several attempts to define the term. Having done so, it reviews 
the definition of crisis management to offer an overall view of this field. However, the main 
concern of this section is to trace the evolution of CM by discussing critically and analysing 
the main approaches adopted since its inception.  
2-3-1 Crisis and crisis management defined 
One of the significant issues in crisis management studies which has remained unresolved is 
the definition of what constitutes a crisis. To date, numerous authors have attempted to 
address this need, but as with many other concepts in social science, it has proved difficult to 
offer an unequivocally valid definition of the term ‘crisis’. A significant source of ambiguity 
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comes from the diverse terms and concepts typically used synonymously with it. For 
example, the terms ‘disaster’, ‘negative event’, ‘catastrophe’, ‘problem’, ‘turning point’, 
‘risk’ and ‘chaos’ have all been used interchangeably with crisis, which has also been 
associated with vulnerability or the absence of safety and security (see, for example, Pforr 
and Hosie, 2008; Prideaux et al, 2003; Pizam, 1999; Faulkner, 2001; Glaesser, 2003). 
Santana (2004: 307) concludes that “the literature provides no generally accepted definition 
of crisis and attempts to categorize types or forms of crises have been sparse”.  
Glaesser (2006) and Pauchant and Douville (1993) trace the word back to its Greek origin, 
which means ‘differentiation’ or ‘decision’. Likewise, Darling (1994: 5) describes a crisis as 
a “turning point for better or worse”, a “decisive moment”, or a “crucial time”. Smith and 
Elliot (2006) argue that the term is often used in literature to describe events and situations 
that are not easy to deal with, even if they do not cause damage. Pearson and Mitroff (1993: 
49) define a crisis as “an incident or event that poses a threat to the organization’s reputation 
and viability”. It is also described by Mitroff et al (1996) as an occurrence or event which is 
usually unexpected, happens at short notice and causes damage. An earlier definition related 
to business is that of Fink (1986: 15), who defines a crisis as:  
a situation that runs the risk of i. escalating in intensity; ii. falling under close 
media or government scrutiny; iii. interfering with the normal operations of 
business; iv. jeopardising the positive public image presently enjoyed by a 
company or its officers; and v. damaging a company’s bottom line in any way. 
Pforr (2006) identifies two approaches to crisis definition: generalized and precise 
definitions. He argues that the generalized approach is taken by those who tend to offer 
relatively vague definitions; for instance, Ritchie et al (2004: 202) state that “crises are 
indefinite, numerous, unexpected and unpredictable”, while Prideaux (2004: 282) notes that 
“history tells us that disasters and crises are usually unforeseen, occur regularly, act as a 
shock to the tourism industry and are always poorly handled”. An example of a precise 
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definition is that of Faulkner (2001), who makes a distinction between a crisis and a disaster. 
For Faulkner, a crisis is a situation “where the root cause of an event is, to some extent, self-
inflicted through such problems as inept management structures and practices or a failure to 
adapt to change”, whilst a disaster can refer to a situation “where an enterprise … is 
confronted with sudden unpredictable catastrophic changes over which it has little control” 
(p. 136). Similarly, McKercher and Hui (2003) regard disasters as either natural events such 
as floods, typhoons and earthquakes or as human-induced events (e.g. war and terrorism). In 
the context of tourism, Coles (2004: 175) adds that these events:  
unfold at a variety of spatial scales that impact on local tourism sectors and can 
cause temporal market disturbances of varying duration … Such events take a 
variety of forms from natural landscape disasters to episodes of famine, disease 
and pestilence to wars, terrorist atrocities and political instability.  
 
Santana (2004: 318), however, argues that a “crisis is not an event. It is a process that 
develops in its own logic”.  
A practical solution to make sense of crisis is to differentiate among crises by classifying 
them into different typologies. Taking into account different criteria allows a range of 
classifications to be constructed. The most straightforward criterion is the magnitude of the 
crisis. Based upon this criterion, Comb (1999) places crises on a continuum. At one extreme 
there are small-scale organizational issues, including crises regarding the health and 
behaviour of staff, such as illness and breakdown, while at the other extreme are severe ones 
such as natural disasters and terrorist incidents.  
Another approach—and perhaps the most common one—is the classification of crises 
according to their causes. The broadest distinction based upon this criterion is between 
naturally occurring and human-made crises (El-Khudery, 2003), where the second category 
includes technical disasters, economic and political crises, conflicts, riots and terrorist 
actions. The most common alternative general classification recognizes three main 
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categories: natural disasters, organizational crises and political upheavals. Natural crises 
include earthquakes, floods and volcanic eruptions, while the second category comprises 
unintended consequences of human activities, such as industrial explosions and pollution, and 
the third covers deliberate acts such as political activities and terrorism (Lynch, 2004).  
As with the definition of crisis, that of crisis management is not free from difficulty. Different 
scholars have defined crisis management differently. Table 2.2 lists some of the definitions of 
crisis management given in the literature.  
Table  2.2: A selection of definitions of crisis management 
 
In light of these definitions and as its very name implies, CM constitutes a series of strategies 
and gestures undertaken to combat a crisis and to mitigate its actual damage. As Coombs 
(2007) puts it, crisis management seeks to prevent or mitigate the negative outcomes of a 
crisis and thereby protect the organization, stakeholders and industry from harm. Thus, it 
appears as a strategy to concentrate on the issue of instability that results from the crisis and 
to develop strategic objectives to overcome the problems. As is discussed in greater detail 
later in this section, crisis management can be divided into two main phases: proactive and 
Author Definition 
Rosenthal 
and 
Pijnenburg 
(1991) 
Crisis management involves efforts to prevent crises from occurring; to prepare for 
better protection against the impact of a crisis agent; to make for an effective 
response to an actual crisis; to provide plans and resources for recovery and 
rehabilitation in the aftermath of a crisis.  
Scherler 
(1996) 
Measures of all types which allow a business to cope with a suddenly occurring 
danger or risk situation in order to return as quickly as possible to normal business 
routines. 
Santana 
(2004) 
An ongoing integrated and comprehensive effort that organizations effectively put 
into place in an attempt to first and foremost understand and prevent crisis, and to 
effectively manage those that occur, taking into account at every step of their 
planning and training activities, the interests of their stakeholders. 
Glaesser 
(2006) 
Crisis management is understood as the strategies, process and measures which are 
planned and put into force to prevent and cope with crisis.  
Coombs    
(2007) 
Crisis management seeks to prevent or reduce the negative outcomes of a crisis and 
protect the organization, stakeholders and industry from harm. 
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reactive. Proactive crisis management occurs at the pre-crisis stage and comprises measures 
that should be taken to prevent crises from happening. In contrast, reactive crisis 
management refers to the post-crisis phase or actions that must be taken when a crisis has 
occurred, to mitigate and control its effects (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). All these 
definitions involve common features of crisis management, such as all the procedures that 
should be undertaken before, during and after a crisis to prevent it or to minimize its impacts.  
Some writers differentiate between crisis management and risk management. As argued by 
Barton and Hardingree (1995), risk management often focuses on the identification of 
potential problems, whereas crisis management is concerned with the management of the 
critical event itself. There are different types of crisis management. For example, functional 
CM is the modification of tasks and processes in response to a crisis, while institutional CM 
refers to groups of persons who are responsible for crisis management activities (Glaesser, 
2006). To avoid falling into a definitional trap, this thesis will adopt the following 
comprehensive definition proposed by Santana (2004: 308):  
Crisis management can be defined as an ongoing integrated and comprehensive 
effort that organizations effectively put into place in an attempt to first and 
foremost understand and prevent crisis, and to effectively manage those that 
occur, taking into account in each and every step of their planning and training 
activities, the interest of their stakeholders. 
This definition seems appropriate for this research, as it is widely accepted and often cited in 
the tourism crisis management scholarship (Henderson, 2007). Rather than extending 
unnecessarily and unproductively the discussion of its definition, the focus is now on 
approaches to CM, which should be of more value to this research. 
2-3-2 Genesis and evolution of crisis management  
Although dealing with crises has long been one of the main concerns of humankind, CM as a 
field of study is a new endeavour, rooted in earlier research into natural disasters such as 
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earthquakes, fires and floods, which largely dealt with how organisations and social groups 
responded to such crises once they occurred. The fundamental premise of this strand of 
research was the idea that disaster prevention is impossible because such disasters are nothing 
but acts of God and thus inevitable in essence (Smith, 1990; 1995). However, certain 
terrifying technological crises of the late 1970s and 1980s, including the Tylenol poisonings 
(1982), the Chernobyl disaster (1986) and the Bhopal tragedy (1984), along with substantial 
increases in the incidence of global terrorism, political upheaval and major criminal activities, 
made it evident that many such incidents were caused by industrial or socio-political 
processes resulting from the acts of leaders and managers—rather than acts of God—and thus 
possibly preventable (Elliott and Smith, 2004).  
In response, a number of scholars drew attention to the causes and dynamics of these crises 
and to ways of minimising the harm and damage caused. Against this backdrop, the current 
field of crisis management emerged. For the most part, this new strand of academic activity 
draws on business and management studies, particularly on public relations, emergency 
planning, risk management, safety and political science. Revisiting the development of 
scholarly works on CM, two distinct approaches can be identified: tactical and strategic 
approaches. During the 1980s, CM practitioners largely sought to offer tactical advice in the 
form of specific plans and checklists. Then, in the 1990s, CM scholars began to place more 
emphasis on strategic issues, highlighting the effects of contingency and uncertainty and the 
possibility of compound outcomes (Gilpin and Murphy, 2008). These approaches are 
discussed in turn, in greater detail, in the following subsections.  
2-3-2-1 The tactical approach 
As noted above, the early studies in CM were largely in response to a series of man-made 
crises. Most scholars trace the origin of CM to the Tylenol case, in which the Johnson & 
Johnson Company was able to launch a public relations programme in order to save its 
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reputation after seven people had died on suspicion of poisoning by their product (Fearn-
Banks, 2007; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; Murray & Shohen, 1992). Despite Johnson & 
Johnson’s success, the company had lacked a specific crisis plan before the incident. The 
subsequent academic studies paid specific attention to the need for comprehensive planning. 
Several initial works (Brewton, 1987; Ramée, 1987; Smith, 1979) focused largely on the 
crisis communication plan, or crisis management plan. In response to strong public concern 
as to crises, these works emphasized the communication aspects of planning, such as 
information distribution, media relations and the necessity of developing meticulous press 
releases, collecting media contact lists and training spokespersons as integral components of 
CM efforts (Fugel, 1996; Hearit, 1994; Murray & Shohen, 1992; Shell, 1993; Spencer, 1989).  
One of the most significant contributions to this approach is that of Turner (1976; 1978), who 
argues that organizations can ‘incubate’ the potential for crisis as a function of relatively 
routine management processes. Turner identifies a series of factors shaping the precautionary 
norms that an organization seeks to put into place to control its activities. These norms and 
assumptions may well lead to a gap between the task demands generated by a crisis and the 
controls that are in place. It is this gap between assumptions and controls, and what can be 
described as ‘emergent’ properties within a crisis, which generate the potential for crisis 
incubation. Turner highlights the strategic nature of crisis and points to the manner in which 
decisions taken elsewhere within the organization can help to shape the emergence of a crisis. 
He was also amongst the first to recognize the importance of organizational learning within 
crisis management. His contribution to the crisis literature has influenced a significant 
amount of subsequent research in the field, which divides crisis management strategies into 
different phases or stages, creating what have since become known as ‘staged’ crisis 
management models. 
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Inspired by Turner, Fink (1986) developed a four-stage model, adopting a medical illness 
metaphor to set out four phases in the crisis lifecycle: (1) prodromal: the initial signs of crisis 
begin to emerge; (2) crisis breakout or acute: a triggering event occurs, along with the 
attendant damage; (3) chronic: the effects of the crisis linger as efforts to clean up the crisis 
progress; (4) resolution: there is some clear signal that the crisis is no longer a concern to 
stakeholders—it is over. Fink’s approach was one of the first to treat a crisis as an extended 
event. Of particular importance to his model is that warning signs precede the trigger event. 
The duty of crisis managers goes beyond traditional tasks and becomes more proactive when 
they come across such signs. Therefore, well-prepared crisis managers do not just enact a 
crisis management plan when a crisis hits (being reactive); they are also involved in 
identifying and resolving situations that could become or lead to a crisis (being proactive). In 
addition, Fink (1986) divides the crisis event into three stages. A crisis does not just happen, 
it evolves. It begins with a trigger event (acute phase), moves to extended efforts to deal with 
the crisis (chronic phase) and concludes with a clear ending (resolution). The different stages 
of the crisis lifecycle require different actions from the crisis manager. Thus, crisis 
management is enacted in stages and is not a single simple action. 
2-3-2-2 The strategic approach 
Although the early explanations of staged crisis management models made a great 
contribution to the development of the CM field, they can be faulted in that they tend to view 
the lifetime of each crisis as linear and finite, so that with the post-crisis stage, the CM 
function ends (Fink, 1986). Recognising this shortcoming, subsequent scholarly works in CM 
shifted their attention to a continuous, cyclical approach to crisis. Particularly since the early 
1990s, CM scholars began to consider the crisis plan alone as inadequate to ensure a 
company’s reputational and tangible assets. Rather, they emphasized a strategic approach 
which views CM as a cyclical process where each cycle starts and terminates with the default 
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stage of intelligence collecting and monitoring, or what Mitroff et al (1996) and Coombs 
(2007) call “signal detection”, intended to discover probable crises at an early stage by means 
of careful internal and external monitoring. This approach also takes into consideration the 
post-crisis stage, focusing on post hoc evaluation to spell out the lessons learned and 
incorporate them into the plan for future use (Fishman, 1999; O’Rourke, 1996; Smallman & 
Weir, 1999).  
In a broader sense, this new trend in crisis management can be seen to represent a more 
strategic approach than the tactics-driven one of the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Pauchant 
and Mitroff (1992) divide CM into five phases, as illustrated in Figure 2.6: (1) signal 
detection, where new crisis warning signs should be identified and acted upon to prevent a 
crisis; (2) probing and prevention, when organization members search for known crisis risk 
factors and work to reduce their potential for harm; (3) damage containment, where a crisis 
hits and organization members try to prevent the damage from spreading into uncontaminated 
parts of the organization or its environment; (4) recovery, as members of the organization 
work to return to normal business operations as soon as possible; and (5) learning, when 
members review and critique their crisis management efforts, thereby adding to the 
organization’s memory.  
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Figure  2.6: Sequential representation of the stages of crisis management 
Source: Adapted from Pauchant and Mitroff (1992: 13)  
While the similarities between the Fink (1986) and Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) approaches 
are apparent, the differences are strong. Pauchant and Mitroff’s stages reflect Fink’s crisis 
lifecycle to a large degree. Signal detection and probing can be seen as part of the prodromal 
phase; the difference is the degree to which Pauchant and Mitroff’s model emphasizes 
detection and prevention. While Fink’s model implies that crises can be prevented, the 
Pauchant and Mitroff model actively identifies them, seeking to prevent them. There is a 
strong correspondence between the damage containment and crisis breakout stages and 
between the recovery and abatement stages. Both damage containment and crisis breakout 
focus on the trigger event, when the crisis hits; however, Pauchant and Mitroff’s (1992) 
model places greater emphasis on limiting the effects of the crisis. Augustine (1995) and 
Ammerman (1995, in Barton, 1995) both highlight the need to limit the spread of a crisis to 
healthy parts of the organization. The recovery and chronic stages reflect the natural need to 
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restore normal operations. In fact, one measure of the success of crisis management is the 
speed with which normal operations are restored (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). Pauchant and 
Mitroff’s model emphasizes how the crisis management team can facilitate recovery, while 
Fink’s (1986) model simply documents the assumption that organizations can recover at 
varying speeds. 
The essential difference between the Fink (1986) and Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) models is 
revealed by comparing the final phases: Pauchant and Mitroff’s is active and stresses what 
crisis managers should do at each phase, whereas Fink’s is more descriptive and stresses the 
characteristics of each phase. This is not to say that Fink does not offer recommendations to 
crisis managers. Rather, the Pauchant and Mitroff model is more prescriptive than Fink’s. 
Fink is concerned with mapping how crises progress, Pauchant and Mitroff with how crisis 
management efforts progress. Early models tended to be descriptive, so this essential 
difference is not unexpected.  
Reviewing the above literature, it is evident that although more recent contributions to CM 
have proposed a proactive and strategic approach, the methods are still largely prescriptive in 
nature and inadequate in terms of the implications for different contexts. Indeed, their main 
weakness is that they ignore the idiosyncratic character of individual destinations (Carlsen 
and Liburd, 2008) and different types of crisis. By and large, CM traditionally focused on 
plans and procedures rather than the adaptive capabilities of the organisation adopting them 
in accordance with the peculiarities of context and the nature of each crisis (Robert & Lajtha, 
2001). These shortcomings call for a reorientation of crisis management and in response, 
more recent CM studies have begun to focus on the interaction between stakeholders within 
and outside organizations, on cultural determinants that affect CM and on the specific 
requirements of each crisis (Gilpin and Murphy, 2008). For instance, Acquier et al (2008) 
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have utilized the rich literature in stakeholder theories to remedy the perceived inadequacies 
of earlier approaches, developing an extensive discussion of the operational importance of 
stakeholder frameworks for crisis management. Schmidt and Berrell (2007) discuss how 
national and organizational factors influence the way CM is undertaken in non-Western 
contexts. These new strands of empirical study and their theoretical underpinnings are 
discussed in greater detail in the subsequent sections of this chapter.  
2-3-3 Crisis management in tourism 
In spite of increasing concerns about tourism crises, as noted earlier, there are still few works 
on crisis management specifically in the field of tourism. In fact, prior to 2000, the studies 
tended to consider particular events or issues, such as the impact of crises on specific sectors 
of the tourism industry, including hotels, restaurants, tourism agencies and most importantly, 
airline companies. As Steene (1999: 15) observes, “Very little has been done when it comes 
to concrete research and publications concerning risks within the service sector in general and 
tourism and travel in particular”. To capture this literature scarcity, Ritchie (2004: 680) notes 
that 
a small but growing body of research on crisis and disaster management has 
been conducted in the tourism industry. This may be due, in part, to the chaotic 
and complex nature of these incidents and an inability by some managers and 
researchers to understand such phenomena.  
It was not until the early 2000s that scholars began to consider specifically the issue of crisis 
management in the tourism industry. This section seeks to review this scant literature. It 
begins by offering a typology of tourism crises, then reviews the application of CM in 
tourism studies. Given that the main issue of this research is the management of terrorism 
crises in tourism, the main focus of the section is to shed further light on studies concerning 
security and terrorism crises in the tourism industry.  
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2-3-3-1 A typology of tourism crises 
As with the mainstream CM literature, the initial concern of the scholars whose work is 
reviewed here was the nature of crises in the tourism industry, therefore they sought to define 
and classify tourism crises. Faulkner (2001: 136), for instance, notes that crises or disasters 
can be defined as “sudden challenges which might test the organization’s ability to cope”. 
Faulkner (2001: 138) reviews the work of a number of authors and points out that the key 
elements of crisis situations are:  
• a triggering event, which is so significant that it challenges the existing structure, routine 
operations or survival of the organization, 
• high threat, short decision time and an element of surprise and urgency, 
• a perception of an inability to cope among those directly affected, 
• a turning point, when decisive change, which may have both positive and negative 
connotations, is imminent, 
• characterised by ‘fluid, unstable, dynamic’ situations. 
The decisive innovation made by Faulkner (2001) is the distinction between a crisis and 
disaster: as explained in section 2-3-1 above, a crisis results from organizational malfunction 
or inability to respond, whereas a disaster is an abrupt event that takes the organization by 
surprise. Following the mainstream literature, Faulkner begins by discussing the classification 
and analysis of crises. As he notes, crises range from slight issues such as staff illness through 
to natural disasters (e.g. floods), terrorist incidents and those causing severe disruption to 
business and everyday activities. 
Fuchs and Pizam (2011) offer a very straightforward alternative classification and definition 
of tourism crises, which they divide into security and safety incidents. Security incidents are 
defined as those crises where “tourists suffer harm as a result of deliberate actions of others”, 
while safety incidents are conceptualized as those in which “tourists are injured accidentally 
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and without malice aforethought” (pp. 300-301). According to them, four generators of 
security accidents are crime, terrorism, war and civil/political unrest. They also group safety 
incidents into four clusters, namely: (i) destination management-related incidents, which 
range from incidents such as problems caused by infrastructure (e.g. poor sanitation), safety 
measures in tourism establishments (e.g. fire. construction errors) and traffic accidents to 
infectious diseases; (ii) nature-related incidents such as detrimental change in weather 
conditions; (iii) incidents related to tourists practising hazardous sports and leisure activities 
such as skiing and diving, plus accidental falls, cuts and burns; and (iv) natural disasters such 
as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and volcanic eruptions. They argue that nature-related 
incidents or natural disasters are difficult to prevent, while other incidents can be avoided or 
mitigated (ibid: 301-303).  
2-3-3-2 The development of crisis management studies in tourism  
Again in line with early CM scholarship, the majority of CM studies set in the tourism 
industry were initially context-based and prescriptive, thus less likely to generate models and 
theories. For instance, scholars such as Ketelhohn (1989), Murphy and Bayley (1989), Cohn 
(2000), Beirman (2003), Glaesser (2003) and Lynch (2004) have set forth guidelines, case 
studies and a practical manual for crisis management in the tourism industry. Such studies 
often focus on the role that communication and information management can play in 
recovery after a crisis has occurred. In addition, they have favoured reactive crisis 
management as opposed to proactive planning. To be sure, literature that considers the issue 
systematically and holistically has until recently been scarce. Impressed by the development 
of mainstream CM literature, however, during the 2000s some scholars began to incorporate 
the holistic and strategic approaches taken in CM into tourism research. Thus, Faulkner and 
Russell (2000) suggest a systems approach to the analysis of the topic and have applied chaos 
theory to the study of disasters. They maintain that the classic Newtonian, positivist 
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methodology of tourism research is more appropriate to unchanging systems than to the 
dynamic nature of change caused by tourism crises. They argue that to understand such a 
turbulent context for tourism practitioners, a more multifaceted and holistic research 
paradigm is required to appreciate the both the immediate and follow-on effects of crises.  
Since the above study, some authors (Faulkner, 2001; Santana, 2003; Ritchie, 2004; Evans 
and Elphick, 2005) have taken a strategic approach to tourism crisis management, offering a 
comprehensive framework to understand and respond to crises in a structured and ordered 
way. Faulkner (2001: 146) reminds readers of the need to create a rigorous framework “to 
structure the cumulative development of knowledge about the impacts of, and effective 
responses to, tourism disasters”. Similarly, Ritchie (2004: 12) stresses the need for “proactive 
planning, effective implementation of strategies as well as the monitoring and evaluation of 
outcomes”. In this context, Faulkner (2001) offers a proactive and strategic approach to crisis 
management, the so-called Tourism Disaster Management Framework, which appears to be 
applicable to diverse contexts. Ritchie (2004) later refined and improved this model. Due to 
their importance, these two approaches will now be reviewed in more detail.  
Faulkner (2001) brought together many previous contributions to the field to develop a 
strategic and holistic model, which was further refined by Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) and 
applied to many cases of tourism crisis. The model incorporates insights derived from the 
general analysis of disaster and crisis management strategies and from the more specific 
examination of tourism disaster strategies, to produce the first tourism-specific disaster 
management framework, which is applicable with minor modifications to diverse cases. 
Specifically, this model combines risk assessment and disaster contingency plans as principal 
elements of disaster management strategies, while recognizing specific components that have 
to do with each stage of the crisis lifecycle.  
36 
 
In short, Faulkner’s comprehensive framework consists of five phases in the disaster process: 
pre-event, prodromal (disaster imminent), emergency, intermediate and long-term recovery. 
Each is associated with elements of the disaster management response (precursors, 
mobilization, action, recovery, reconstruction, reassessment and review) and with the main 
ingredients of disaster management strategies (risk assessment and disaster contingency 
plans). For instance, in the pre-event phase, contingency plans are designed and possible 
assessments are undertaken. At this stage it is possible to mitigate or prevent a disaster before 
it reaches the prodromal phase, when there is little chance of preventing the crisis and all that 
can be done is to put into action the contingency plans developed earlier. In the emergency 
phase the disaster’s effects are felt by stakeholders and priority is given to those actions that 
help protect tourists and property in tourism destinations. The most urgent needs of tourists, 
including rescue and health treatment, should be dealt with by the appropriate stakeholders in 
the intermediate phase, during which the role of the media communication strategy is also 
crucial. In the recovery phase a longer-term approach is needed to reconstruct the affected 
areas and damaged infrastructure in order to return the situation to normal. Finally, in the 
resolution phase, what has been done during the crisis is evaluated and the shortcomings 
addressed in order to ensure future improvement.  
Faulkner’s model is assumed to be applicable to other businesses. However, it can be 
criticized on the ground that, in reality, events do not always proceed in such a consistent 
sequence and that this leaves too little time to prepare well to deal with the crisis. 
Nonetheless, Faulkner sets out a suitable framework for analysing complex crisis 
management strategies to combat natural and man-made crises in the tourism sector. Miller 
and Ritchie (2003) applied this framework to the 2001 foot-and-mouth outbreak in the UK. 
Their findings indicate that although the framework can be applied holistically to special 
cases, it hardly enables tourism stakeholders to affect the course of crises significantly. 
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However, they point out that this ineffectiveness is due to the nature of the outbreak as a 
farming crisis and its “ripple effect” on the tourism industry (Miller and Ritchie, 2003: 169). 
In short, many of the crisis management phases are incorporated into Faulkner’s (2001) 
framework for tourism disaster management and make it a revolutionary model, since it was 
developed specifically for crisis management in the tourism industry.  
Ritchie (2004) has distilled Faulkner’s model in an attempt to produce a comprehensive 
model of a strategic approach to crisis and disaster management in public and private sector 
organizations. Ritchie (2004) proceeds to outline a strategic framework within which to 
manage tourism crises in a predictable way. He argues that developing an organizational 
strategy could help destinations to limit the severity of change induced by crises or disasters. 
Strategic planning is usually concerned with four main elements: strategic analysis, strategic 
direction and choice, strategy implementation and control, and strategic evaluation and 
feedback. The classification also recognises three stages, which are prevention and planning 
(proactive planning and strategy formulation, scanning to planning); strategic implementation 
(strategic evaluation and strategic control, crisis communication and control, resource 
management, understanding and collaborating with stakeholders) and resolution, evaluation 
and feedback (resolution and normality, organization learning and feedback).  
Mistilis and Sheldon (2006) enrich this approach by utilising a knowledge framework to 
examine how different sorts of knowledge and information can be applied to cope with 
tourism crises. They highlight the importance of the continuous recognition, processing and 
sharing of strategies and knowledge by stakeholders in the tourism industry. Given this 
reality, it is plausible to argue that the development of literature on CM in tourism studies has 
kept pace with the equivalent development in broader CM studies. The next subsection 
discusses the degree to which these studies address the particularities of terrorism and 
security crises in the broader sense. Thus, the chapter continues its examination of theorising 
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related to tourism crisis management and seeks to set forth a rigorous theoretical framework 
for CM in the tourism industry.  
2-3-4 Strategies for the management of security crises in tourism  
In line with their proposals for a more proactive and strategic approach (Faulkner, 2001; 
Ritchie, 2004) to crisis management in the tourism industry, scholars began paying further 
attention to the specific requirements of different tourism crises. The security crises initially 
attracted less attention than safety crises, but in the mid-1980s, terror attacks on tourist 
destinations in Western Europe and some Middle Eastern countries triggered interest in 
putting the issue of security on the research agenda. This trend was intensified by the 
consequences for global tourism of the 1991 Gulf War. In 1995 an international conference 
on tourism, safety and security was held in Östersund, Sweden, where academics discussed 
for the first time the relationships between tourism, security and safety. The issue has also 
been a central concern of international organizations such as the World Tourism Organization 
(UNWTO). The first guidebook on how to deal with the safety and security challenges to 
tourism destinations was published by UNWTO in 1996; however, it failed make a clear 
distinction between security and safety crises (UNWTO, 1997). The first effort to put both 
theoretical and practical characteristics of security crises at the forefront of academic 
literature was made by Mansfield and Pizam (1996), who, as editors of Tourism, Crime and 
International Security Issues, concluded that a comprehensive crisis management approach 
was required for the successful management of security incidents in tourism destinations. 
This and other studies (e.g. Pizam, 1999; Mansfield and Pizam, 2006; Fuchs and Pizam, 
2011) argue that despite several commonalities, there are distinctive differences among the 
strategies adopted to manage safety and security crises in tourism. In particular, they maintain 
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that in the earlier stages of crisis management, the strategies developed for tourism security 
crises differ substantially from those applied in safety crises.  
Mansfield and Pizam (2006) identify several strategies specific to tourism security incidents 
at different stages of crisis management, listed in Table 2.3. 
Table  2.3: Effective strategies as to stakeholders’ reactions to security incidents in 
tourism (Simplified and Classified) 
Preventive strategies 
Strategies specific to the security sector 
Housing tourists in gated all-inclusive resorts to separate them from local residents 
Maintaining many visible security measures 
Increasing the presence of uniformed officers in tourist zones 
Training police officers in tourism issues 
Making police visible, accessible and friendly to tourists 
Working closely with the community and tourism industry representatives 
Advising and training tourism industry employees in crime prevention techniques 
Assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks on employees 
Encouraging tourism enterprises to adopt crime prevention/reduction practices (installation of 
electronic room locks, surveillance cameras, room safety deposit boxes, employing full-time 
security officers, etc.) 
Establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the 
community at large and the tourists themselves. 
Strategies specific to government 
Formulating regulations that impose serious legal consequences and penalties for crimes against 
tourists 
Introducing social changes and reducing social gaps by creating local jobs in the tourism industry 
Strategies specific to the private sector 
Incorporating the principles of crime prevention through environmental design  
Considering the function of security important to the success of their business 
Allocating a significant portion of their financial and human resources to security 
Using crime prevention/reduction methods, such as security hardware and security policies 
Strategies specific to tourists 
Making tourists aware of the possibility of becoming victimized by criminals and instructing 
them in crime prevention methods 
Developing and implementing tourist education programmes aimed at reducing the risk of being 
victimized 
Strategies specific to local citizens 
Offering rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those who commit 
serious crimes against tourists 
Educating citizens on the serious impact that crime against tourists can have on their 
communities 
Engaging citizens in neighbourhood watch schemes   
Establishing a partnership between local community leaders and national and local governments 
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Recovery strategies 
Information dissemination 
Establishing a mechanism for sharing information and coordination of publicity and PR activities 
aimed at creating positive public opinion among the media, local community and customers 
Reassurance campaigns 
Undertaking intensive marketing campaigns to convince the general public that things are back to 
normal 
Encouraging area residents within a short drive of the affected destination to visit their region or 
hometown by appealing to their sense of local patriotism 
Marketing schemes 
Appealing to domestic tourists 
Identifying and developing new market segments abroad 
Scheduling of special events to attract local residents and out-of-town tourists 
Reducing prices and offering a variety of incentives (e.g. package deals) 
Undertaking comprehensive marketing campaigns initiated by Ministry of Tourism in 
cooperation with other NGOs and governmental agencies 
Financial measures 
Offering financial assistance (grants, tax holidays, subsidized loans, etc.) from local, state and/or 
national governments 
Providing governmental grants for financing the promotion of their destination 
Reducing operational costs by laying off a proportion of their employees 
Postponing major expenditure on maintenance and renovation 
Source: Mansfield and Pizam (2006: 19) 
The extensive list of strategies in Table 2.3 can be divided into two categories, in line with 
crisis stages: prevention and recovery strategies. The former can in turn be categorised under 
five broad headings: (i) strategies specific to government, including conventional 
punishment, such as the formulation of laws that impose serious legal penalties for crimes 
against tourists, and public protection, such as introducing social changes and reducing social 
gaps by creating local jobs in the tourism industry; (ii) strategies specific to the security 
sector, such the establishment of distinct police units that are trained to support and watch 
over tourists and the tourism industry; (iii) strategies specific to the private sector, including 
the enhancement of private sector security initiatives such as training staff members in 
security issues, improving security devices (secure locks, CCTV) and incorporating the 
principles of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED); (iv) strategies 
specific to tourists, including advising and educating them by offering security awareness 
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brochures or by providing instructions that direct them to safe pathways; and (v) strategies 
specific to local citizens, such as raising their awareness by informing them of the serious 
harm done to the community by violent acts against tourists, and soliciting their help in 
reporting suspected cases to the police (Pizam, 1999; Mansfield and Pizam, 2006).  
Four categories are also identifiable regarding recovery strategies: information dissemination, 
reassurance campaigns, marketing schemes and financial assistance programmes. Information 
dissemination includes acknowledgement by the government that problems exist and a 
commitment to resolve them quickly. The authorities should report on a regular basis to the 
media, tourism industry in the country and tourism generating markets abroad, reassuring all 
stakeholders that the destination is back to normality. They should also establish a 
mechanism consisting of coordinated public relations activities adopted to generate positive 
public opinion and reassure people that things are back to normal (Pizam, 1999; Mansfield 
and Pizam, 2006; Rittichainuwat and Chakrahorty, 2009). Marketing schemes are those 
initiatives that seek to encourage new and former customers to travel to crisis-affected 
destinations by offering extra benefits in the competitive market, ranging from reduction of 
prices and sales promotion to packaging (i.e. all-inclusive vacations) and product 
repositioning (Pizam, 1999; Mansfield and Pizam; Rittichainuwat and Chakraborty 2009). A 
promising marketing scheme which can contribute to the recovery of a destination is the 
identification and development of new market segments such as domestic tourists, who can 
be encouraged to travel by cutting prices, arranging special events and soliciting their sense 
of patriotism (Mansfield and Pizam, 2006; Paraskevas and Arendell, 2007). Finally, recovery 
measures often come at a price and thus their success depends heavily on the availability of 
adequate finance from local and national governments (Mansfield and Pizam, 2006).  
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Apart from the above studies, which largely seek to identify and list specific strategies, some 
scholars have taken the initial steps towards formulating a tourism security theory by offering 
a typology, concepts, propositions and empirical generalizations that are broadly applicable 
to security incidents in the industry (Mansfield and Pizam, 2006; Paraskevas and Arendell, 
2007). While this initiative should be welcomed and utilized by those who adopt a positivist 
research methodology, it is nonetheless evident that a general set of theories on this issue is 
problematic, largely because security crises such as terrorism are geographically, 
demographically and temporally discrete, which considerably blurs the boundaries of study. 
For example, the September 2001 terrorist attacks undoubtedly provoked a global crisis, with 
consequences for all sectors of national economies, including tourism. The array of research 
methods and approaches for understanding the impacts of this event would be very different 
from those needed to research the impacts of terrorism attacks on tourism sites in Egypt, for 
instance. As such, there is always a need to modify the boundaries of the framework to suit 
the event being researched. Indeed, regardless of several commonalities, the effects of 
security incidents in the tourism industry certainly vary for discrete locations, types and 
magnitudes of crises. Mansfield and Pizam (2006) themselves indicate that their work is not 
definitive, because these building blocks will require refinement once the proposed 
generalizations are confirmed or refuted by further case studies. Indeed, what Mansfield and 
Pizam (2006: 12) seek to achieve is merely to take the initial steps towards what they call 
“the paradigmatic basis for a confirmed tourism security theory”.  
2-3-5 The management of terrorism crises in tourism  
Given that terrorism is one sort of security crisis, broader research into managing security 
crises in tourism can provide a foundation for the management of terrorism crises more 
particularly, but the latter must differ from the former in at least some salient respects. 
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Reviewing the existing literature, it appears that few studies which specifically consider 
terrorism crises in the tourism industry have yet been conducted. This is partly because the 
issue of the security concerns related to terrorism make the authorities reluctant to involve the 
traditional tourism stakeholders, especially before and during any terrorism crisis. This 
amounts to a major barrier to the disclosure of information and to the development of the 
field of study. In spite of this obstacle, however, there exists a small but growing body of 
studies in this field.  
Among other things, to prevent terrorist attacks on tourist destinations, political 
breakthroughs and international resolutions are recommended, but those concerned should 
bear in mind that no amount of security measures can provide certain protection from the 
horrors of terrorism (Pizam, 1999). Nonethless, Pizam (2002) maintains that the tourism 
industry should adopt specific actions to reduce the possibility of terrorist attacks at tourism 
destinations and to help it to recover quickly from their negative effects. He specifically 
makes a number of suggestions to both private and public sector organisations. With respect 
to the private sector, Pizam (2002) proposes close relations between tourism employees and 
security officers, who should train them in security prevention and emergency operations, 
recommend the establishment of committees to ensure that tourism stakeholders follow 
security standards, and emphasise the necessity of formulating crisis plans to reduce the 
negative image acquired by the destination as a result of any terrorist attack. Pizam’s (2002) 
suggestions to the public sector are to consider undertaking several activities, such as 
enhancing security measures on all public modes of transport and their terminals, training 
citizens to be aware of the possible occurrence of terrorist attacks in their communities, and 
setting up tourist police units to work closely with tourist stakeholders. He also recommends 
effective international cooperation to minimise the negative effects of terrorist attacks on 
tourism destinations. 
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Another significant study in this regard is the work of Yeoman et al (2005), who utilized a 
scenario planning methodology to incorporate terrorism into the context of tourism, assessing 
the extent to which a terrorist attack could cause disruption to Scotland and how it would 
connect to other mitigating factors such as economics and consumer behaviour. They 
predominantly focus on the role of destination management organizations in three areas: 
setting forth communications and contingency plans concerning terrorist events, outlining the 
marketing strategies to deal with consumers’ risk-averse behaviour, and designing and 
practising a number of simulated exercises to construct an issue-reaction model. Yeoman et al 
(2005) tested four different scenarios and ultimately make several recommendations for 
amendments to Visit Scotland policies. Without denying the merits of this model, it should be 
noted that it adopts a reactive approach to dealing with a terrorist event.  
Paraskevasa and Arendell (2007) conducted a study to examine the key role of DMOs in co-
ordinating counter-terrorism measures within a given destination and to offer a holistic 
framework by which one can develop, implement and assess anti-terrorism strategies in a 
given destination. Their results offer useful insights into the issues and challenges that such 
an endeavour would face. The findings indicate that the major obstacle to be overcome is “the 
mentality of territorialism” among destination stakeholders and that there is a need to move to 
an ‘interoperability’ mode. Central to this framework is the flexible role of DMOs: when 
terrorism causes a crisis, this must change from being merely promotional and managerial to 
an extremely active role, taking the lead in coordinating initiatives such as the development 
of contingency plans depending upon collective action, mutual trust, transparent 
communication and pragmatic expectations. The expert insights offered by participants led 
the authors to develop the destination anti-terrorism strategy framework. Paraskevasa and 
Arendell (2007) call for the application of counter-terrorism studies to enrich the study of 
managing terrorism crises in tourism industry. Inspired by these studies, their framework 
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spells out in some detail the key components of a terrorism crisis management strategy, 
focusing on the development of specific measures aimed at identifying threats, securing 
targets, constraining terrorist access and defending the destination against attacks. In 
particular, they place emphasis on the centrality of specific preventive counter-terrorism 
strategies such as ‘exposure analysis’, aimed to assess the potential targets susceptible to 
terrorist attacks, and ‘impact analysis’, intended to consider the effect of attacks on possible 
targets. They maintain that these concepts are consistent with that of risk assessment 
proposed in tourism crisis management studies by Faulkner (2001). They also highlight the 
role of the DMO in persuading all destination stakeholders, be they private or public, to 
develop contingency plans before, during and after a terrorist attack, while taking a catalytic 
role in connecting central government to destination stakeholders, especially through the 
allocation of scarce resources. Yet, the issue of how DMOs can fulfil this role and the extent 
to which other stakeholders appear cooperative or pose obstacles to the DMO remain 
unanswered. In addition, considering the DMO to be the most powerful and legitimate 
stakeholder for fulfilling this role is unduly simplistic. Finally, they place adequate emphasis 
on the practice of organizational learning and feedback; this includes the constant validation 
of the strategy by making the best use of advanced technology, desktop exercises and 
simulations, as well as the documentation of best-practice crisis management strategies 
against terrorism attacks, based on information taken from other countries and international 
tourism bodies.  
2-3-6 Summary and implications for further research 
This section has outlined recent advances in crisis management and their implications for the 
management of tourism crises. It was indicated that despite these advances, serious 
shortcomings apply to studies in this field. In particular, these studies fail to offer a 
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comprehensive theoretical framework capable of meeting the requirements of different 
contexts and to a large extent fall short of addressing adequately the peculiarities of terrorism 
crises. There is therefore a clear need to formulate a rigorous conceptual framework for the 
development of crisis management models to enable them to meet the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of different contexts. This represents a major gap in the current literature and 
the manner in which this theoretical framework is being developed is discussed in sections 
2-5 and 2-7.  
A key issue that has emerged from this literature review is that specific strategies and 
methods have been used to combat security crises in the tourism industry. It was also found 
that there are many commonalities among the strategies adopted to manage terrorism crises 
and other sorts of security incidents. In particular, in the recovery stage, the strategies used in 
mitigating the negative impacts of terrorism attacks bear a close resemblance to those of other 
sorts of tourism crises. The most significant difference lies in the importance of prevention 
and mitigation techniques used predominantly by security agencies, such as exposure 
analysis. Furthermore, these studies (e.g. Pizam, 2002) put special emphasis on the crucial 
role of security and police forces and how they interact with other stakeholders, especially 
their cooperation with DMOs. The role of the security sector has been discussed in greater 
detail in a related field, namely counter-terrorism studies. Therefore, the next section offers 
an overview of counter-terrorism studies and discusses the value that they can add to this 
research.  
2-4 Terrorism and counter-terrorism  
Given that the terrorism issue constitutes an integral part of this thesis, it is imperative to 
review the related literature in the field of terrorism studies. In recent years, the academic 
world has produced a plethora of such literature (Ganor, 2009), amongst which the most 
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relevant to this research are those studies that have to do with counter-terrorism strategies. 
Yet before proceeding with a discussion of counter-terrorism strategies, this section first 
seeks to set the scene by offering some definitions of terrorism. It then reviews at some 
length the strategies and methods used in counter-terrorism efforts. Next, it considers 
agencies and people responsible for combating terrorism and the issue of interagency 
cooperation in counter-terrorism work as an integral and essential element of such efforts.  
2-4-1 Terrorism defined 
Despite the frequency of terrorist attacks throughout the world today, there has been little 
consensus among scholars on the concept of terrorism itself. LaFree and Dugan (2009) 
attribute the difficulty in reaching agreement on a definition of terrorism to its controversial 
and extremely politicized nature. They maintain that the USA was unwilling to consider the 
attacks by Contra insurgents in Nicaragua as terrorism, while regarding nearly all violence in 
Iraq and Afghanistan as such. More than two decades ago, Schmid and Jongman (1998) had 
already enumerated 109 definitions of terrorism suggested by scholars in the field. Some 
scholars argue that it is impossible to find, or even pointless to seek, an internationally agreed 
definition of terrorism. Those who adopt this view often refer to the cliché “one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” to demonstrate how subjective is the definition of 
terrorism. Others maintain that terrorism and national liberation can be placed at the two 
extremes of a continuum legitimizing the use of violence. Those struggles alleged to seek 
national liberation are placed at the positive and justified end of the violence continuum, 
while terrorism is at its unjust and negative extreme.  
In defining terrorism it is also important to make a distinction between terrorist acts and 
other, non-political criminal activity. One such distinction is to view terrorist actions as acts 
of war, so that the countermeasures mounted against it would be conducted in accordance 
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with the norms and laws of war rather than criminal legal norms. Wedgwood and Roth (2004) 
argue that the criminal law may be inadequately powerful to counter terrorism, since 
destroying terrorist infrastructure and networks requires a combination of diplomacy, the use 
of force and the criminal law. They add that the restrictions associated with a criminal justice 
system are applicable to civil society, where its integral element is deterrence, but this may 
not be suitable in a fight against a highly networked terrorist organization. Hoffman (2006) 
points to a fundamental difference between a criminal and a terrorist, maintaining that the 
former seeks personal material goals, while a terrorist usually views himself as an altruist 
struggling for and on behalf of many others. Therefore, a terrorist would pose a greater threat 
through his actions, since he is significantly more prepared than a criminal to sacrifice his 
personal interests and safety to accomplish his goals. Tarlow (2001) argues that dealing with 
criminal acts requires a well trained police force, while terrorism is more warlike in nature 
and cannot be addressed by police actions alone. Rather, it needs cooperation among many 
stakeholders. In addition, the goals of terrorists are to gain publicity and cause massive 
economic damage through victimization, causing loss of life.  
Since the extent to which terrorism challenges governments and threatens civilian 
populations varies considerably, it is possible to constitute a typology based on which one 
can compare different types of terrorism. One approach is to differentiate between domestic 
terrorism, restricted to the territory of one country, and international terrorism, which affects 
the citizens of more than one country. However, this distinction proves to be confusing in 
practice, as most terrorist groups have links to people abroad (Chalk, 1996). A more elaborate 
typology categorizes groups in terms of their primary motivations. Based upon such criteria, 
Peters (2002) places terrorists in two broad categories: practical and apocalyptic. The 
demands of practical terrorists are restricted to changing a state and its society without 
destruction of the whole society; what its followers have in mind is to eradicate what they see 
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as a political evil. A prime example is anti-abortion terrorism in the United States. 
Apocalyptic terrorists are very different: their ultimate goal is to destroy completely the 
current system and build an entirely new order.  
Notwithstanding the definitional difficulties and differences already alluded to, it is evident 
that the effectiveness of apparatuses in charge of countering the terrorist threat is dependent 
upon a clear, broad and objective definition of terrorism that can be accepted internationally. 
Descriptions of typical terrorist acts and their common features are often included in 
proposed definitions of terrorism—particularly in those that address the fear and anxiety 
created by terrorist operation. In such definitions, terrorism is depicted as a form of violent 
activity that intends to terrify a group of people beyond the immediate victims (Horgan, 
2005: 1). Revisiting the evolution of the definition of terrorism and examining a wide array of 
definitions, Hoffman (2006: 40) reaches the following conclusion:  
We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation 
and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit 
of political change… [T]errorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching 
psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist 
attack… . 
Based on this definition, if an act is not violent, does not deliberately target civilians, or does 
not attempt to achieve a political goal, then it is not a terrorist attack. Adding the element of 
fear and anxiety to the definition significantly changes the term’s application. If an attack 
which would otherwise be considered an act of terrorism does not aim to frighten, but rather 
seeks to achieve only concrete, tangible objectives—such as the release of prisoners or the 
assassination of a leading political figure—then it will not be considered to constitute 
terrorism.  
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2-4-2 Combating terrorism 
Having clarified the concept of terrorism, the next fundamental question is how to combat the 
terrorism phenomenon. The traditional approaches to fighting terrorism were overwhelmingly 
militaristic, based on suppression and criminalisation (Guelke, 2006: 195). A prime example 
of this approach is the counter-terrorism strategies developed in the 1970s and 1980s and 
applied in Northern Ireland. It became evident that strategies based on such traditions risked 
escalating the terrorism that they sought to suppress (Horgan, 2005), resulting in long-term 
adverse consequences for police-community relations (Pickering et al, 2008). The 
contemporary work of leading scholars offers two alternative frameworks through which 
current challenges to counter-terrorism strategies and community engagement can be 
understood. The best known new approach is the community intelligence model of counter-
terrorism, which has been very popular in Europe and North America. Increasingly 
encouraged by the work of Innes (2004; 2006) and Skogan (1990), this approach gives 
priority to the importance of community-police interaction to meet police requirements. 
Another recent approach, called ‘enhanced belonging’, has emerged from the application of 
Loader’s (2006) writing on increasing a sense of political community through an explicitly 
rights-based approach to democratic policing, which seeks to overcome the undesirable 
consequences of police-community contact, specifically to avoid the dominance of police-
community interactions by the most vocal and robust members of society. Pickering et al 
(2008) argue that a combination of the elements of the enhanced belonging and community 
intelligence models would help counter-terrorism agencies and authorities to build trust and 
legitimacy between the community and themselves. The bottom line of these new approaches 
is the continued and effective interaction and involvement of security agencies with as many 
stakeholders as possible, especially within the local community.  
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Coupled with these approaches, which provide a general basis for making sense of counter-
terrorism strategies, the literature identifies a number of specific methods and techniques 
which governments across the world have used to combat terrorism. These consist of a mix of 
public and foreign policies formulated to constrain acts of terrorism and to protect the public 
at large from terrorist attacks (Omelicheva, 2007). A number of lists and classifications of 
such policies have been proposed by various practitioners and academic scholars (van 
Dongena, 2010). The taxonomy proposed by the European Council to determine such policies 
within the EU (EU, 2008) is of special importance because it covers a wide array of counter-
terrorism policy choices, as well as offering a clear-cut understanding of such policies and 
their goals. Based upon the European Council framework, four main sub-categories are 
identified: protection, prevention, response and pursuit policies (EU, 2008). This framework 
will be used to discuss counter-terrorism methods here.  
Protection policies are those intended to protect citizens (EU, 2008). Examples are those 
policies that enhance border security, related infrastructure and the intelligence apparatus to 
ensure security and—in case of a terrorist plan—the reinforced system to identify and 
mitigate the threat. It is argued that terrorists are adaptable to the different obstacles they face 
and can either change their targets or alter their tactics altogether. For example, a 
strengthening of security measures by installing more sophisticated airport security apparatus 
(e.g. metal detectors and x-ray scanners) was recently circumvented in the attempted 2009 
Christmas Day attack, where a man boarded Northwest Flight 253 headed for Detroit and 
attempted to set off plastic explosives sewn into his underwear. Thus, a protection-oriented 
policy, by itself, cannot necessarily eradicate the terrorist threat.  
Prevention refers to a strategy whereby states take measures to prevent vulnerable groups 
from resorting to terrorism (EU, 2008). This can be as simple as providing alternative options 
for would-be terrorists such as jobs in a security force. Ideally, the terrorist socialization 
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process is not abrupt but incremental, so combating the ideology via contact with youths 
potentially at risk will reduce the terrorists’ support base (Nacos et al, 2010).  
Response policies are those aimed at addressing the aftermath or immediate consequences of 
a terrorist attack in order to restore order in the midst of such chaos and to quell the fear 
instilled in the civilian population. Examples of this group of policies would be the 
deployment of damage control teams and working with the media to counter terrorist 
publicity. These measures do not directly reduce or deter the terrorists’ activities, but send a 
message to them that they come at a cost (Pape, 2003).  
The final significant category of counter-terrorist policy that contributes considerably to 
reducing terrorism attacks is pursuit. These policies are predominantly aimed at pursuing 
terrorist groups and disrupting financial and human networks (EU, 2008). This is the most 
crucial policy area, undertaking by law enforcement and other security agencies with the 
cooperation of intelligence networks (Nacos et al, 2010).  
2-4-2-1 Agencies and people responsible for combating terrorism 
Whatever policies are adopted and irrespective of their categorisation, a significant question 
is who has responsibility for counter-terrorism. In particular, is counter-terrorism allotted to 
specialised agencies or to the police? How are such bodies organized to carry it out? Is it 
assigned to a special unit or carried out by all staff, along with their other tasks? Most 
countries have specialized agencies entirely separate from the police that engage in counter-
terrorism abroad. Such agencies rarely have exclusive authority for intelligence gathering 
abroad, but are supported by the military as well as other civil agencies such as embassies. 
Some of these specialized foreign intelligence agencies are controlled by the military, as in 
Italy (SISMI) and Sweden (MUST). Although these agencies are important in counter-
terrorism strategies, they are outside the scope of this study because they have little to do 
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with the tourism industry. The most relevant ones for the purpose of this study are those 
which fall within the responsibility of the police. Bayley and Weisburd (2009) reviewed 
national models of counter-terrorism in several countries and note that the responsibility for 
counter-terrorism is distributed domestically in three ways: (1) to a national agency 
specializing in counter-terrorism, to one or more national police services, or to all police 
agencies at any governmental level.  
Each of the countries in their review has established an agency in charge of collecting 
domestic intelligence about possibly violent subversion; examples are Australia (ASIO), 
France (DST), Israel (Shin Bet), Japan (PSIA) and the United States (FBI). At the same time, 
these agencies differ in their powers to take pre-emptive action. Some do intelligence 
collecting only, such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Shin Bet and 
Britain’s MI5 (Bayley and Weisburd, 2009: 35). They will not, then, fall within the typical 
definitions of a police organization, which involves the application of constraint to 
individuals, as in arresting. Undoubtedly, many of these services also undertake clandestine 
action to disrupt potentially violent subversion without invoking the power of arrest or 
detention. Information about these activities and their legal status is limited. A crucial topic 
for future research into comparative counter-terrorism is the degree of visibility required 
under law with respect to proactive counter-terrorism actions. 
The review also states that some national counter-terrorism agencies delegate the whole of 
their powers to the police, who are authorized to detain, arrest and refer for prosecution, 
examples being India’s Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Italy’s Intelligence and 
Democratic Security Service (SISDE), Japan’s Public Security Investigation Agency (PSIA), 
Spain’s National Intelligence Centre (CNI) and Sweden’s National Security Service (SAPO). 
As such, it is police forces that specialize in counterespionage. Having said that, in all 
countries, centralized police services are responsible for counter-terrorism, with the exception 
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of Sweden, where it is the sole responsibility of SAPO (Bayley and Weisburd, 2009: 36). 
With this notable exception, the centralized counter-terrorism agencies of national 
governments are created within the police structure. However, their activities may be 
accompanied by those of specialized military counter-terrorism ‘strike forces’, such as the 
UK’s Special Air Service, America’s Delta Force, Canada’s Task Force 2, France’s Groupe 
d’intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN), Germany’s Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG-
9) and Spain’s Grupo Especial de Operaciones (GEO). 
All countries that have established police forces at subnational, decentralized levels authorize 
them to carry out counter-terrorism operations. Indeed, all subnational counter-terrorism is 
undertaken by the police. Thus, the police in all federal systems have counter-terrorism 
responsibilities. The police in centralized systems may also delegate counter-terrorism 
functions to subordinate levels of command for reasons of operational effectiveness. This is 
the case in France, Japan and Israel. The UK is a peculiar case. It does not have a federal 
system of government, nor does it have a national police force, but its 43 territorial police 
forces have a single dedicated intelligence capability (Special Branch) and, since 2004, a 
Counter Terrorist Security Advisor (Bayley and Weisburd, 2009: 37). 
In sum, according to the research of Bayley and Weisburd (2009) in the above countries, 
different agencies at different levels of the state are authorized to engage in counter-terrorism 
strategies in all of them. These agencies, acting within and outside police organizations and 
their jurisdictions and responsibilities, often overlap. The resultant maze of agencies with 
common responsibilities raises another important question, as to how they coordinate their 
shared duties. This is discussed in the next subsection.  
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2-4-2-2 The success of counter-terrorism strategies and interagency cooperation  
There is a degree of consensus among counter-terrorism scholars and practitioners that the 
principles which encourage interagency coordination and cooperation are an integral element 
of any strategy to combat terrorism (Behm and Palmer, 1991). In fact, a terrorist attack, 
particularly one that targets various sites, requires a prompt and coordinated response from 
the diverse agencies whose responsibilities are explained in the previous section. The extent 
of this response requires practical coordination and deliberate planning of resource allocation, 
communication methods, training and networking (Strom and Eyerman, 2007). In essence, 
coordination problems arise when agencies share identical policy responsibilities for the same 
set of problems (Downs, 1966). Rivalry over the control of the policy can lead to confusion 
among agencies and to parallel, redundant and costly systems (Peters, 1981). Besides, 
agencies in a shared policy environment turn into opponents once they seek finance from the 
same restricted sources. Where such coordination problems arise, solutions should be sought 
through cooperative policymaking (Downs, 1966).  
Hearne et al (2004), considering the United States’ counter-terrorism strategies, maintain that 
it is extremely difficult to achieve sustained coordination among the agencies involved. They 
argue that the difficulty largely lies in the fact that the agencies’ jurisdictions and 
responsibilities overlap in several instances. They conclude that budgetary concerns and 
miscommunication among the responsible agencies are the main obstacle to efficient counter-
terrorism strategies in the United States. Behm and Palmer (1991) suggest that there are two 
main performance indicators against which coordination arrangements can be assessed: 
streamlined organizational structures as the test for efficiency, and positive personnel 
attitudes as the test for effectiveness.  
Strom and Eyerman (2007) examine interagency coordination, including barriers and 
solutions to the coordination problem in the USA, the UK, Canada and Ireland, and argue that 
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previous collaborative experience was a significant factor in interagency coordination. Those 
agencies that had been forced to work jointly in the past were proved generally better at 
working together, because they were fully aware of each other’s roles. The authors also 
identify other factors affecting interagency coordination. They stress, for example, that a lack 
of clarity as to the chain of command is a major obstacle to coordination as it creates 
confusion regarding who is in charge. Interestingly, they argue that limited budgets, although 
burdensome, appear to enhance coordination, because the circumstances push agencies to get 
together to deal with problems. They also found that the size of a country or jurisdiction 
shaped the coordination which was practised. In their sample, Ireland, the UK and Canada all 
enjoyed the advantage of a small number of agencies requiring coordination; in contrast, the 
USA had to coordinate not only across the responsible agencies, but also at federal, state and 
local levels. They finally recommend that the most inexpensive and readily available solution 
to the coordination problem is to involve as many responsible agencies as possible in joint 
discussions. The authors believe that this process could be smoothed by creating a standing 
committee that regularly holds meetings to address topics relevant to preparedness for and 
response to terrorism attacks. 
In a similar vein, Chandler (2005) argues that to combat transnational terrorism nothing is 
more crucial than good interagency cooperation and coordination, which in turn depends on 
the timely and precise sharing of intelligence and information, therefore on a reliable means 
of communication. However, he contends that joint activities, which bring all the diverse 
agencies together under one roof, need sufficient human and technical resources, which many 
countries have difficulty in providing. He finally suggests that the exchange of liaison 
officers between agencies can provide a relatively cost-effective choice from which both 
sides benefit.  
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2-4-3 Summary and implications for further research 
In light of the above discussion, it can be concluded that a variety of methods and strategies 
are at the disposal of governments to combat terrorism. These range from protection by 
focusing on security measures and instruments, via preventive general policies such as 
reducing poverty, to responding by taking emergency action in the midst of chaos and to the 
pursuit, arrest and prosecution of terrorists. Overall, this section has shed light on the specific 
strategies which are appropriate to combating terrorism crises. Although these strategies 
overlap in many ways with those proposed by CM scholars, there are some significant 
differences between these two types. The most obvious differences are identifiable in 
prevention and pursuit policies. It is also notable that the success or failure of counter-
terrorism strategies depends largely on the way states have structured and organised their 
various agencies to combat terrorism and the extent to which they involve a wide array of 
stakeholders in their efforts. Indeed, the issue of deciding counter-terrorism strategies has 
much to do with stakeholders’ interaction and their importance in organizational and 
management studies. The relevance of this assertion is highlighted in the next section, where 
stakeholder theory is examined and applied to terrorism and tourism studies.  
2-5 The application of stakeholder theory to the study 
It has been shown that the most significant challenge faced by CM models in tourism studies 
is the lack of a rigorous theoretical framework that allows them to meet the requirements of 
application to different contexts (section 2-3-6). Some scholars have suggested that applying 
stakeholder theory to these models would contribute to narrowing this gap. This section seeks 
to lay such a theoretical foundation by drawing on stakeholder theories for the management 
of crises in the tourism industry. It is organized as follows. It begins with a definition of 
terms and a brief discussion of the evolution of stakeholder theory, before raising the debate 
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as to types of stakeholder theory based on the taxonomy proposed by Donaldson and Preston 
(1995), which identifies normative, instrumental and descriptive theories. It then discusses 
the applicability of stakeholder theories to the public sphere and particularly to tourism 
destinations. The rest of the section is devoted to the building blocks of the conceptual 
framework for the present research, including the identification and salience of stakeholders 
and the strategy of stakeholder management. Once the theoretical issues have been debated, 
their application to tourism and crisis management studies is considered.  
2-5-1 Stakeholders defined 
The origin of the term ‘stakeholder’ in management literature is traceable to an internal 
memo published by the Stanford Research Institute in 1963 (Freeman, 1984). Some authors 
trace the principle underlying stakeholder theory as far back as the eighteenth century, in 
Adam Smith’s writing, or to the early twentieth century work of Follet (1918). Whatever its 
origin, the concept of the stakeholder has grown in popularity in various disciplines as a 
possible solution to the challenges of a rapidly changing environment (Friedman and Miles, 
2006) and ‘stakeholderism’ has become an integral feature of modern management texts. At 
the date of writing this thesis (June 2011), a simple search of the word ‘stakeholder’ in 
Google Scholar returned more than 424,000 references. A number of issues of renowned 
academic journals have been devoted to elucidating the stakeholder concept, which has since 
become commonplace throughout many fields. Interestingly, the mass media use the term 
frequently. In the UK, it achieved widespread popularity when used in reference to the New 
Labour party of Tony Blair and its ‘big idea’ of the Third Way (Blair 1994; 1996), with 
consequent application to specific issues which occupy a central place in the public attention, 
such as ‘stakeholder pensions’. Since 2004, most US states have initiated and passed a series 
of laws carrying the term in their titles.  
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This widespread popularity has resulted in ambiguity and the concept has become subject to 
divergent interpretations. Stoney and Winstanley (2001) noted a decade ago that the word had 
become “content free” and was often used to refer to “anything the author desires”. This, they 
maintained, accounted for a certain ambiguity in debates concerning stakeholders. Since then, 
there have been many attempts to clarify the concept. Many definitions appear in the strategic 
literature. A commonly cited definition is that set forth by Freeman (1984), who integrated 
stakeholder theory into the current management literature, defining a stakeholder as “any 
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s 
objectives” (p. 31). This is very similar to the earliest definition offered by the Stanford 
Research Institute: “those groups without whose support the organization would cease to 
exist” (ibid: 46). Starik (1994: 90) summarizes the diverse range of definitions:  
...there may be numerous levels of specificity as to what the term ‘stakeholder’ 
means, depending on what the user is referring to. The range appears to be 
bounded in this case, on one end, by those entities which can and are making 
their actual stakes known (sometimes called ‘voice’), and, on the other end, by 
those which are or might be influenced by, or are or potentially are influencers 
of, some organization or another, whether or not this influence is perceived or 
known. 
Considering fifty-five definitions given in seventy-five texts, Friedman and Miles (2006: 10) 
set forth a model for defining the term, suggesting that any definition has two components: 
the first is “the connection between organizations and stakeholders”, expressed through verbs 
such as ‘impact’, ‘influence’ and ‘interact’; the second is an “adjective or other qualifier or 
aspect of either the organization or the stakeholder” which narrows them in two ways: 
strategic or normative (Figure 2.7). Within the strategic dimension, definitions can be 
arranged along a continuum, at one end of which there are definitions with a very high 
strategic implication, limiting stakeholders to those who are critical or affect the very survival 
or existence of the organization. At the other end there are those characterized by legal or 
institutional constraints that push organizations to engage stakeholders. As we move along 
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the continuum, we find definitions that define stakeholders in terms of their power, 
legitimacy or responsibility.  
 
 
Figure  2.7: Representation of strategic and normative dimensions to the narrowing of 
stakeholder definitions 
Source: Friedman and Miles (2006: 11) 
2-5-2 A brief review of stakeholder theories 
Since 1963, when the Stanford Research Institute put the stakeholder concept at the forefront 
of management studies, a growing number of authors have proposed theoretical foundations 
in an attempt to explain this new concept (Friedman and Miles, 2006; Freeman et al, 2010). 
There exist a wide range of theories concerning the stakeholder concept. A commonly cited 
typology of such theories is that proposed by Donaldson and Preston (1995), who distinguish 
three branches within stakeholder theory on the basis of its descriptive accuracy, instrumental 
power and normative validity, as follows.  
Stakeholder theory can first be regarded as descriptive, because it sets forth a model to 
describe what the corporation is, or how organisations cooperate with stakeholders. “It 
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describes the corporation as a constellation of a cooperative and competitive interests 
possessing intrinsic value. It explains past, present and future states of corporations and their 
stakeholders” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). In this sense, stakeholder theory is related to 
the ways that managers actually deal with stakeholders (Berman et al, 1999). This strand is 
also labelled ‘empirical’.  
Secondly, stakeholder theory can be considered instrumental when it “establishes a 
framework for examining the connections, if any, between the practice of stakeholder 
management and the achievement of various corporate performance goals” (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). This means, other things being equal, that corporations practising stakeholder 
management will be relatively more successful. As Jones (1995) elaborates, instrumental 
theory makes connections between certain practices and certain goal states. To put it another 
way, if a firm is pursuing certain results such as sustained profit, long-term growth and so on, 
then it should undertake certain practices, such as stakeholder management. As Berman and 
colleagues (1999) maintain, instrumental stakeholder theory has to do with what happens if 
managers treat stakeholders in a certain way. 
Finally, stakeholder theory can be regarded as normative when it acknowledges that 
“stakeholders are persons and/or groups with legitimate interests in a corporation” and that 
“the interests of stakeholders are of intrinsic value” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995: 71). That 
is, each stakeholder is of intrinsic value and merits consideration for its own sake and not 
merely because of its capacity to advance the interests of the other groups, such as the 
shareowners. Normative stakeholder theorists maintain that all stakeholders should be treated 
with proper respect and consideration for their own sake (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001). 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argue that the normative thesis is the strongest and the only 
one that can offer an epistemological explanation for stakeholder theory. This does not lead 
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to a rejection of instrumental and descriptive theories, but supports the idea that the three 
strands can be regarded as nested one within the other (Figure 2.8). The external shell is the 
descriptive feature, which presents and explains practice. Instrumental stakeholder theory 
shapes the next layer, supporting the descriptive thesis through predictive power. At the core 
is the normative thesis.  
 
 
D = descriptive  
I = instrumental  
N = normative  
 
Figure  2.8: Three branches within stakeholder theory 
Adapted from Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
Reed (2002) suggests the terms ‘positive’ and ‘strategic’ as alternatives to Donaldson and 
Preston’s ‘descriptive’ and ‘instrumental’. In a simpler taxonomy, Friedman and Miles 
(2006) use analytic stakeholder theory as a label to cover all stakeholder theory that is not 
strictly normative. This includes theories that Donaldson and Preston (1995) term descriptive 
and instrumental and which Reed (2002) calls positive and strategic. Following Friedman and 
Miles (2006), stakeholder theories are divided in this work into the analytic and normative 
categories; the following pages carry a discussion of how they can be used to set forth a 
theoretical foundation for the study.  
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2-5-3 The application of normative stakeholder theorizing to the study 
The discussion in this subsection indicates how the language and tools of normative 
stakeholder analysis can be useful for this study. There exists a variety of normative 
stakeholder theories drawing on different philosophical foundations. For the purpose of this 
research those normative stakeholder theories proposed by Bryson (2004) and Friedman and 
Mason (2005) will be considered.  
Bryson (2004) offers a comprehensive discussion of stakeholder theory and in particular, a 
detailed development of specific techniques of stakeholder analysis. He mentions the 
importance of the way in which we define stakeholders and who is counted as a stakeholder, 
specifically for normative reasons that come from his concern with democracy and social 
justice. He argues that stakeholder theory should not focus only on those with power or on 
easily identified stakeholders, but that it should “urge consideration of a broader array of 
people, groups or organizations as stakeholders, including the nominally powerless” (Bryson 
2004: 22). He then considers the importance of stakeholder analysis for creating and 
sustaining “winning coalitions” and fostering organizational success over time. Bryson 
claims that key stakeholders “must be satisfied” at least minimally and that organizations 
need to “attend to the information and concerns of stakeholders” (ibid: 23). Special attention 
is given to several factors that make stakeholder analysis important: the need to determine the 
feasibility of certain objectives and to take measures to make them more likely to occur; the 
importance of keeping stakeholders satisfied (based on their own ideas of this); and the need 
to ensure that managers have met the requirements of procedural justice, rationality and 
legitimacy. Based on these insights, Bryson proposes that the systematic use of stakeholder 
analyses would be associated with more successful outcomes.  
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Friedman and Mason (2005) discuss stakeholder analysis, stakeholder management and their 
usefulness as a lens for inspecting important public policy decisions, taking as an example the 
move of the Houston Oilers professional American football team to Nashville, Tennessee. In 
assessing the literature on stakeholder theory, the authors deduce from Freeman’s (1984) 
work that the use of stakeholder management principles will better satisfy constituent needs 
and claims, helping organizations over the long term to achieve their objectives. In thinking 
through the challenge of balancing the various needs and claims of stakeholders, Friedman 
and Mason (2005) maintain that Freeman’s work is not refined enough, so they draw on that 
of Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) to prioritize. They then follow the four-step process 
outlined in a previous paper (Friedman and Mason, 2004): first, a preliminary map is drawn 
of the core (thirteen) stakeholders; second, the map is adapted to fit Nashville’s unique 
context and the particularities of the stakeholders involved; third, they conduct an event 
analysis to follow how the focal stakeholder (Phil Bredesen, the mayor of Nashville) sought 
to gain support and diminish opposition; fourth, key events and stakeholders are reassessed 
over time to reflect changed circumstances (Friedman and Mason, 2005: 99). The authors 
then proceed to analyse the case via their four-step process and to fit various stakeholders 
into the Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) typology. Like Bryson (2004), they argue that their 
case study underscores the importance of a systematic use of stakeholder analysis for “more 
efficient and effective constituent management” (Friedman and Mason, 2005: 112).  
From the above discussion the important normative conclusion that can be drawn for the 
theoretical model of this study is that organizations should attempt to understand and balance 
different stakeholder interests. This responsibility is based on the argument that an 
organization cannot survive in the long run unless it treats its key stakeholders fairly. 
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2-5-4 The application of analytic stakeholder theorizing to the study 
In the previous section, based on normative stakeholder theory, it was indicated that the 
organization must meet the demands of stakeholders and balance their claims if it is to 
manage efficiently. Yet it should be noted that it is neither easy nor straightforward to 
achieve equilibrium in stakeholder management. This is in part because stakeholders vary in 
their salience to the organization (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al, 1997). In addition, it has 
been proven that stakeholders interact with one another differently; some have the potential 
to pose obstacles, while others have the potential to cooperate with the organization (Savage 
et al, 1991). Freeman (1984) suggests that to achieve equilibrium in stakeholder management 
one should first identify and assess the importance of each stakeholder, then analyse how 
they interact with one another. In the following pages the notion of stakeholders’ salience 
proposed by Freeman (1984) and Mitchell et al (1997) and the formulation by Savage et al 
(1991) of the way stakeholders interact with one another will be used as two building blocks 
of analytical stakeholder theory, explaining the management of stakeholders. 
2-5-4-1 Identification and salience of stakeholders 
There have been many attempts to shed light on the identification of stakeholders, alluded to 
in the discussion of definitions above. A very well known approach is to define them as any 
groups of people who have an apparent relationship with the agency in question. In his 
seminal work on stakeholder theory, Freeman (1984: vi) takes this approach by defining a 
stakeholder broadly as “any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the 
achievement of a corporation’s purpose”. Accordingly, he lists the most common groups of 
stakeholders as shareholders, customers, suppliers, distributors, employees and local 
communities. Based on such a wide definition, many types of individual and group are liable 
to be stakeholders, in addition to those listed above, including:  
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• Stakeholder representatives, including trade unions or trade associations of suppliers or 
distributors; 
• NGOs or activists;  
• Competitors; 
• Government(s), regulators and other policymakers; 
• Financiers other than stockholders (creditors, bondholders, debt providers); 
• The media; 
• The public in general; 
• Non-human aspects of the earth and the natural environment; 
• Business partners; 
• Academics; 
• Future generations; and 
• Past generations (in particular the memory of founders of organizations).  
While these categories are practically useful and help the manager to understand better the 
stakeholders’ characteristics, they fail to highlight the affiliation of stakeholders to multiple 
groups. Therefore, scholars have attempted to find more sensible criteria by which to classify 
stakeholders. A key criterion proposed by them is whether stakeholders are limited only to 
those that are essential for the accomplishment of the agency’s aims or whether mere contact 
with an agency is enough to be identified as a stakeholder. The latter entails a very broad 
identification of stakeholders. Freeman and Reed (1983) and Freeman (2004) distinguish 
these bases as ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’. Similarly, several authors classify stakeholders as 
primary or secondary. For instance, Clarkson (1998) regards primary ones as those who have 
a “formal, official or contractual” relationship with the organization. In particular, Clarkson 
(1998: 106-107) notes that a primary stakeholder “is one without whose continuing 
participation the corporation cannot survive as a going concern”, while secondary ones are 
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“those who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by, the corporation, but not 
engaged in transactions with the corporation and not essential for its survival”. 
Mitchell et al (1997) offer a novel insight by combining the concepts of power, urgency and 
legitimacy to create a typology to analyse stakeholder salience. They argue that scholars 
disagree on what Freeman (1994: 25) calls “the principle of who or what really counts”. 
Alternatively, they call for a theory of stakeholder identification to discover why and how 
managers recognize stakeholders, differentiate them from non-stakeholders and classify them 
in terms of their importance. They maintain that three characteristics of stakeholders make 
them salient to managers, namely their power to influence the firm, the legitimacy of their 
relationship with the firm and the urgency of their claim on the firm. These concepts of 
legitimacy, power and urgency are employed to create seven stakeholder categories and one 
non-stakeholder category. These attributes are paraphrased here as:  
•  Power: the extent to which an organization possesses or is able to invoke coercive, 
utilitarian, or normative apparatus to take the lead in the relationship with another 
organization. Coercive power is determined by the physical resources of force, violence, or 
command; utilitarian power includes material or financial resources; and the main 
components of normative power are symbolic resources.  
•  Legitimacy: a common awareness or assumption that makes the measures of an 
organization desirable, suitable or proper within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions.  
•  Urgency: the extent to which immediate stakeholder involvement is required because of 
time constraints and the sensitivity of the situation in question.  
Mitchell et al (1997) also maintain that it is the perceptions of managers that characterize 
each feature. Therefore, a stakeholder possessing these three features is given a higher 
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preference by managers for involvement in decision-making; when a stakeholder possesses 
two features, the preference is modest; and a stakeholder possessing only one has little if any 
importance in the decision-making process. Finally, any entity which does not possess any of 
these features cannot be considered a stakeholder at all.  
2-5-4-2 Strategies for managing stakeholders 
Once stakeholders have been identified and their salience determined, management may 
develop and utilize appropriate strategies to govern its interactions with them. Various 
authors have long advocated specific management strategies or responses to stakeholders, 
beginning with Carroll (1979), followed by Wartick and Cochran (1985) and Clarkson (1988, 
1991), who have identified a scale with reference to organizational reaction. This scale, 
“reactive, defensive, accommodative, or proactive”, explains the organization’s posture or 
strategy relating to stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995: 103).  
In a fashion analogous to SWOT analysis, which examines strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats, it is possible to analyse those stakeholders who support, oppose or 
are undecided about an organization’s given actions by considering a variant of relevant 
stakeholders’ potential for threat and cooperation (Freeman, 1984; Rowe et al, 1989). On this 
basis, Savage et al (1991) note that stakeholders’ potential to threaten or cooperate constitutes 
an important determinant of management’s strategic response to them. They outline four 
main managerial strategies taken by stakeholders towards one another (Figure 2.9). 
 
69 
 
Figure  2.9: Stakeholders’ management strategies 
Source: Savage et al (1991: 65) 
The first, termed ‘supportive’, is characterized by a low potential for threat and a high 
potential for cooperation. This strategy resembles Freeman’s notion of ‘offensive’ and the 
related strategy of exploitation, as both models put emphasis on involvement. The second 
strategy is termed ‘marginal’ and its main feature is the low potential for both threat and 
cooperation; thus it assumes a monitoring role for stakeholder interactions. The third strategy 
is called ‘non-supportive’ and is characterized by a high potential for threat and a low 
potential for cooperation. According to this strategy, stakeholders pose many dangers for 
corporations which take a defensive posture. The final strategy is called ‘mixed blessing’, 
with a high potential for both threat and cooperation, leading to collaborating strategies. In 
short, the models of Freeman and of Savage et al both strive to increase the potential for 
cooperation and reduce the potential for threat.  
Interestingly, the formulation of stakeholders’ salience proposed by Mitchell et al (1997) and 
the theory of Savage et al (1991) concerning the way stakeholders interact with one another 
have been applied to tourism and crisis management studies. In the following pages, these 
applications will be reviewed, along with commentary and explanation.   
2-5-5 The application of stakeholder theory to the tourism industry  
Stakeholder theory has been used as a planning and management tool in the tourism industry 
by Sautter and Leisen (1999), Yuksel et al (1999) and Getz and Jamal (1994). Robson and 
Robson (1996) have utilized the theory as an ethical business management vehicle, 
maintaining that stakeholders should take part in decision-making and that stakeholders’ 
concerns, goals and values should be included in the strategic framework of tourism 
businesses. Stakeholder identification and involvement have been recognised as key steps 
70 
 
towards achieving partnership and collaboration within tourism in the studies of both Jamal 
and Getz (2000) and Medeiros de Araujo and Bramwell (1999). Ioannides (2001) applied a 
stakeholder framework in conjunction with the destination lifecycle concept to analyse 
varying stakeholder attitudes toward tourism and sustainable development at different stages 
of destination development. Stakeholder theory has also been used as an ethical tool in 
sustainable tourism marketing by Walsh et al (2001). The application of stakeholder theory to 
tourism so far, however, has been mostly superficial, with the exception of Hardy and Beeton 
(2001), who applied it both to identify stakeholder groups and to understand their perceptions 
of sustainable tourism. The stakeholder concept has largely been defined in a management 
and organisational context, but the organisational setting of a firm and the concept of a 
‘destination’ that is managed are somewhat similar. In this context, Ryan (2002: 27) argues 
that “destinations are also bundles of resources, like companies” and that at the strategic level 
“destinations seek to configure their product, and to sustain it through adopting a mix of 
environmentally friendly and economically viable policies”.  
2-5-5-1 Tourism stakeholders 
People, groups, communities, organisations, firms and the natural environment are entities 
that are generally considered to qualify as genuine or potential stakeholders (Starik, 1995; 
Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997). The tourism literature has enumerated a number of 
stakeholder groups (Sautter and Leisen, 1999; Ryan, 2002; Timur and Getz, 2002). The 
tourism industry generates business opportunities, employment and investment by offering a 
wide range of tourism services. Prime examples of these services include transportation, 
lodging, food and drink, and travel. Some scholars have applied the concept of ‘mixed 
industry’ to tourism to stress the divergent sectors and stakeholders operating within it 
(Anderson and Getz, 2009). As clarified by Kapur and Weisbrod (2000), the concept of 
mixed industry is based upon the notion of a ‘mixed economy’, in which the public, private 
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and not-for-profit sectors are considered to co-exist in generating economic activity. Drawing 
on this notion, tourism stakeholders can be said to fall within the three broad categories of 
public, private and non-profit stakeholders. Although the boundaries of these sectors are 
blurred, even in countries at a high level of economic development, the notion of mixed 
industry is nonetheless helpful to identify and clarify the sectors and stakeholders of tourism. 
The main tourist attractions, such as historic sites, in common with cultural, sporting and 
recreation facilities, are usually owned and managed by governments. When it comes to the 
private sector, a variety of stakeholders can be identified including accommodation providers, 
transport firms and organisations in intermediary organisations such as travel agencies. Non-
profit organizations, which are formed to act in the interests of the tourism business in 
general, include chambers of tourism. They might also organize tourism events such cultural 
festivals and sporting events. Indeed, the most influential not-for-profit stakeholder in the 
tourism industry is the chamber of tourism organization. Some scholars (e.g. Swarbrooke, 
1999) consider the host community, including all those people who live within the tourist 
destination, to constitute another important tourism stakeholder. Within these categories, 
several different stakeholders can be identified. Since considering all of these is beyond the 
scope of this study, in what follows the most significant tourism stakeholders, DMOs, will be 
reviewed in detail. 
2-5-5-2 Destination management organizations 
While tourism is an industry sustained largely by private enterprise, governments have 
customarily played a crucial role in its development and in the advancement of their countries 
as tourism destinations. The state’s intervention in the tourism industry is clearly more crucial 
in developing countries or countries where tourism is in its initial stages (WTO, 1996; 2000; 
Edgell, 1999; Jeffries, 2001). There are a variety of reasons why governments involve 
themselves in the tourism industry: regulating the balance of payments, regional growth and 
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regeneration, broadening the national economy, harmonisation of a fragmented tourism 
industry, creating job opportunities and increasing revenue (Hall, 1994; Hall & Jenkins, 
1995). Bonham and Mak (1996) in particular argue that government interference in the form 
of public finance is necessary because promotion is essentially a public good whose benefits 
permeate to the whole community. This intervention is mainly exerted through the leading 
tourism organization, commonly known as a destination management organization. The 
empirical research of Sheehan and Ritchie (1997) found that DMOs received most of their 
funds from government and for this reason they are viewed as the organizations responsible 
for investment on behalf of the targeted community. DMOs are as diverse as the countries 
within which they operate. They include visitors’ bureaus, regional marketing organizations 
and state and local tourism offices (Pearce, 1992). In North America, the most typical form of 
DMO is the Convention and Visitors Bureau, but there exist several other forms of tourist 
offices. Gehrisch (2005: xxv) defines these as organizations “serving as a coordinating entity 
bringing together diverse community stakeholders to attract visitors to their area”. Pike 
(2004: 14-15) offers the following classification of DMOs: A destination marketing 
organization is any organization at different levels of government in charge of the marketing 
of a particular destination. This definition disregards government departments responsible for 
planning and policy. A national tourism office (NTO) is an organization with inclusive 
authority for marketing a country as a tourism destination. The China National Tourism 
Administration and the Mexico Government Tourism Office are prime examples of NTOs. A 
state tourism organization (STO) is an organization with inclusive authority for marketing a 
state, province, or territory as a tourism destination, in federal countries. Examples are the 
California Division of Tourism and the Hawaii Visitors and Convention Bureau. A regional 
tourism organization is an organization responsible for marketing a homogenous tourism area 
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as a tourism destination. Examples include the European Travel Commission and the South 
Pacific Tourism Organization.  
Apart from definitions, there remains some ambiguity about the abbreviation DMO, which 
used to stand for ‘destination marketing organization’, because these organizations initially 
concentrated largely on marketing. In recent years, however, DMOs have developed to take a 
significant role in tourism management more generally. Nevertheless, according to Harrill 
(2005), most veteran DMO directors have acknowledged that marketing is still at the heart of 
the tourism industry and that selling is a common activity of all DMOs. Pike (2004) states 
that the main aim of destination marketing organizations is to nurture sustained destination 
competitiveness. He then summarizes the main specific goals of DMOs as enhancing 
destination image, increasing industry profitability, reducing seasonality and ensuring long-
term funding. Ritchie and Crouch (2003) refer to other functions of DMOs including building 
brand awareness and destination image, research (e.g. into the profitability of tourism 
investments), employment and leadership. Destination image and brand awareness in 
particular are examined further by Blain et al (2005) and Pike (2004). Blain et al (2005) 
propose a more wide-ranging definition of the branding role of DMOs, including 
identification, differentiation, experience, expectations, image, consolidation, reinforcement, 
recognition, consistency, brand messages and emotional response.  
Another area of DMOs’ new responsibilities which goes beyond traditional marketing and 
promotional goals is in managing responses to external disasters or crises (Pike, 2004). They 
have undertaken a new role as crisis management coordinators in response to crises occurring 
in several destinations. Harrill (2009) identifies three key roles for DMOs in responding to 
crises: the dissemination of information about safety and security shortly after a crisis, 
monitoring and reporting regarding steps taken towards economic recovery and making 
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recommendations to local and central government about the requirements for rebuilding 
crisis-affected zones. 
Jamal and Jamrozy (2006) argue that there is a wide gap between destination marketing and 
planning that can lead to the unsustainable development of a destination. To remedy this 
shortcoming, they formulate a comprehensive model of destination sustainability, focusing on 
diversity and equity and on environmental and economic balance. They maintain that the 
model’s main objectives “are not to design a product, price, place and promotion of a tourism 
destination or attraction, but to ensure quality of life and environments through tourism 
development” (ibid: 168). They also formulate an integrated destination management 
framework drawing on three factors: a collaborative and systems-based approach, sustainable 
tourism and community-based principles, and the destination’s sense of place, along with its 
economic and cultural diversity. However, the application of this model, according to the 
authors, requires some fundamental changes in existing destination management practices. 
Among others, they emphasize governance structures and processes that ensure active 
participation in destination development from those who are assumed to be most affected by 
tourism, including residents and NGOs. This calls for collaborative practices among the 
DMOs and the multiple stakeholders and interests that they manage. This aspect of DMOs’ 
new role has been developed further by scholars who have utilized stakeholder theory in the 
analysis of DMOs; it is discussed in detail in the following pages.  
2-5-5-3 The salience of tourism stakeholders 
Stakeholder theory has been applied as a planning and management tool (Sautter and Leisen, 
1999; Yuksel et al, 1999; Getz and Jamal, 1994; Robson and Robson, 1996; Walsh et al, 
2001; Jamal and Getz, 2000; Medeiros de Araujo and Bramwell, 1999) and for stakeholder 
identification (Hardy and Beeton, 2001; Sheehan and Ritchie, 2005). Recently, Sheehan and 
Ritchie applied stakeholder theory to assess destination stakeholders from the perspective of 
75 
 
DMOs and concluded that if these agencies were to be re-conceptualized as destination 
management organizations it would require the DMO to effectively build and manage 
stakeholder relationships. They specifically called for a network approach “to create a picture 
of the connectedness of destination stakeholders” and to test the hypothesis that “the DMO is 
the most central and most connected actor in the network” (Sheehan and Ritchie, 2005: 731).  
In their discussion of community planning, Jamal and Getz (1995) argue that the 
effectiveness of tourism destination planning will depend on encompassing the following key 
stakeholder groups:  
• Local government and other public sector bodies with the authority to allocate resources;  
• Tourism industry associations and bodies such as chambers of commerce, visitor bureaus 
and regional tourist authorities;  
• Community groups;  
• Social agencies (e.g. school boards, hospitals) and 
• Relevant interest groups.  
Robson and Robson (1996) detail the stakeholder theories applied to the tourism industry and 
refer to the stakeholder groups for a tour operator and local government tourism marketer. 
Their work, however, is descriptive rather than analytical; nor does it present DMOs as the 
most important tourism stakeholders. Rather, it suggests the term ‘government tourism 
marketer’, which actually includes different DMOs (Figure 2.10).  
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Figure  2.10: Stakeholder groups for the local government tourism marketer 
Source: Robson and Robson (1996: 536) 
In a concise study, Wheeler (1993: 356) identifies local authorities, including local council 
headquarters, departments and councillors, along with their customers, as the primary 
stakeholders in UK tourism, while the central government, national tourist boards, local 
businesses and the environment hold secondary status. The classification of stakeholders as 
primary versus secondary is very helpful both in practice and theoretically, yet it fails to 
provide a series of standards by which one can distinguish one stakeholder from another.  
Sheehan and Ritchie (2005) start by offering a definition of the most important stakeholders, 
the DMOs, then proceed to list 32 tourism destination stakeholders identified in an empirical 
study. Their sample frame was members of the International Association of Convention and 
Visitor Bureaus (IACVB), which represents about 389 key DMOs in North America and 
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some other countries. The questionnaire distributed to them asked them to identify their 
stakeholders and evaluate their salience. The respondents were first asked to list some 10 key 
players in the tourism industry, then to identify the three most important of these. The results 
indicate that hotels were ranked first in terms of their importance, followed by city/local 
government, regional/county government, attractions/ attraction associations and state/ 
provincial tourism departments (Figure 2.11). This topic is referred to again in the discussion 
chapter (section 7-2) indicating some differences between the Egyptian context and other 
contexts, and between Eastern and Western studies. 
 
Figure  2.11: A stakeholder view of the DMO 
Source: Sheehan and Ritchie (2005: 728) 
2-5-5-4 The strategies of tourism stakeholders’ interactions  
Jamal and Getz (1995) are among the pioneers in applying stakeholder theories to tourism 
management. They point out the “...necessity of involving key stakeholders and refining 
processes for joint decision making on destination planning and management issues within a 
community-based domain” (p.192). They also identify five important points to enhance the 
collaboration of stakeholders in planning, including the perception of stakeholders of their 
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importance, interdependence and the benefit from collaboration and the decisions that should 
be implemented.  
Based on the typology of Savage et al (1991) for management’s strategic response to 
stakeholders, Sheehan and Ritchie (2005) examined stakeholders’ relationships with DMOs, 
basing two groups of questions on two theoretical pillars proposed by Savage et al. The first 
group asked whether each stakeholder had created problems, had the potential to threaten and 
had the potential to cooperate with the chief executive officers (CEOs) of DMOs. The second 
group asked the respondents about the extent to which CEOs would support different 
management strategies. Respondents were asked to choose the most suitable of four strategies 
for managing the relationship with each stakeholder:  
1) A collaborative strategy ranging from cooperation to joint ventures or mergers;  
2) An involvement strategy soliciting opinions/ input for planning and decision-making 
purposes;  
3) A defensive strategy, protecting CEOs from negative actions; and  
4) A monitoring strategy, assessing the stakeholder’s ability to threaten or cooperate 
with changes.  
Finally, the respondents were asked to match the stakeholders’ potential for threat and 
cooperation to their related management strategy in order to make comparisons with the 
classification of Savage et al. The study revealed that CEOs perceived hotel and city 
stakeholders to have a high potential to threaten and cooperate with the DMO. However, 
some CEOs preferred involvement rather than collaborative strategies as suggested by 
Savage et al (Sheehan and Ritchie, 2005: 727). Figure 2.12 shows the Sheehan and Richie 
framework. 
 Stakeholder’s Potential for Threat to Organization 
High Low 
  Mixed Blessing  Supportive  
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Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
Strategy: Collaborate 
Stakeholders: Hotels, 
City government,  
Regional government,  
State/provincial 
government,  
Board of directors, 
Convention centre, 
Residents 
Strategy: Involve 
Stakeholders: Attractions, 
Members, 
Restaurants, 
University/college,  
Chamber of commerce, 
Sponsors 
Low 
Nonsupportive Strategy: 
Defend 
Stakeholders: None 
Marginal  
Strategy: Monitor 
Stakeholders: None 
 
Figure  2.12: Management strategies as a result of cooperation with and threat to DMOs 
Source: Sheehan and Ritchie (2005: 727) 
Sheehan, Ritchie and Hudson (2007) later explored in detail the relationship between the 
DMO and two critical stakeholders: city government and local hotels. Their research was 
based on three case studies which compared the views of CEOs with those of another very 
important person in the DMO, as well as with representatives of the stakeholder groups 
themselves. The results, from the perspectives of both the DMO and its two key stakeholders 
(city government and local hotels) support the existence of a destination promotion ‘triad’ 
(Figure 2.13).  
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Figure  2.13: The tourism destination triad 
Source: Sheehan et al (2007: 72) 
The authors suggest that each member of the triad performs a unique role and that all are 
interdependent, in that each needs the resources of the others if destination promotion is to be 
effective. Their research is unique in that they consider the nature of specific stakeholder 
relationships in a qualitative manner. They argue that the role of the city (the public sector) is 
to provide the majority of financial resources, acting as financer to the triad. However, the 
city depends on the DMO to enhance its vision and in turn can help the DMO to achieve the 
tourism vision. Hotels enjoy the unique role of providing operational resources, acting as a 
partner to the triad. Hotels bring to the triad an ability to partner with the DMO by providing 
in-kind resources (complimentary or discounted rooms) to promote the destination to key 
travel influencers, information on room prices and availability to support DMO efforts to 
bring large meeting groups to the destination, and aligning plans including travel to promote 
the destination in key markets. Hotels should also communicate with the city regarding the 
operational performance of the DMO, since the city can only observe the macro-level results 
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of the DMO’s efforts. The most important role of the DMO is to act as a coordinator by 
offering organizational resources. More specifically, its role is to manage the critical interface 
between the destination and its internal and external environments, as well as promoting 
strategy development and implementation. DMOs, as noted, have critical financial and 
operational relationships with the other two stakeholders. 
The most successful DMOs excel in establishing partnerships and collaborative networks. 
Sheehan et al (2007), having explored the DMO-city-hotel triad, conclude that while such an 
arrangement can be productive and functional, it may also be problematic and highly 
political. They recommend four key strategies for DMO survival: collaborate with strategic 
stakeholders; institutionalize this collaboration by ensuring that they are represented on the 
board of directors; ensure regular, frequent and clear communication with triad members 
using personal relationships; and receive, interpret and disseminate market information to 
stakeholders.  
Wang and Fesenmaier’s (2007) study of collaborative destination marketing in Elkhart, 
Indiana, is also instructive. They found that collaboration destination marketing evolves 
through stages and results in three important types of outcome, oriented towards strategy, 
organizational learning and social capital. The authors found that collaboration and 
cooperation may improve a DMO’s marketing skills and operations, but may also result in 
particular learning problems, such as uncontrolled information disclosure. 
2-5-6 The application of stakeholder theory to crisis management  
The field of crisis management has also utilized stakeholder thinking in its analysis. Pauchant 
and Mitroff (1992) were the first to draw attention to the application of stakeholder theories 
to crisis management, arguing that organizations should be aware that a crisis may introduce 
new stakeholders which had not been anticipated. As a result, the criteria for determining 
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stakeholders after a crisis are likely to be noticeably different from those applying under 
normal conditions. Thus, the authors offer “emotional, ecological, social, ethical, medical, 
moral, spiritual, aesthetic, psychological, and existential” criteria as the basis for stakeholder 
identification in crisis situations (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992: 129). Their call for the 
application of stakeholder thinking in crisis management analysis prompted a number of 
studies. For the purpose of the present research, two key aspects of these studies are now 
reviewed: the identification and salience of stakeholders, and strategies for managing them.  
2-5-6-1 Identification and salience of stakeholders and crisis management 
Ulmer and Sellnow (2000) make a distinction between external and internal stakeholders but 
argue that such a dichotomy often results in overemphasis on internal stakeholders at the 
expense of external ones in crisis situations; organizations should work to balance the needs 
of both groups. Smith and Elliot (2006: 102) argue that giving more attention to stakeholder 
saliency would represent a significant opportunity for research into crises, stating that “it is 
evident that any crisis response must also take into consideration the diversity of stakeholder 
involvement and need if management efforts are to be effective”. They go on to cite the 
framework of Mitchell et al (1997) for determining stakeholder saliency using a ‘metric’ of 
power, urgency and legitimacy. The application of such a framework to a crisis scenario 
represents a significant opportunity for research. Alpaslan et al (2009) address this demand 
and apply this framework to investigate the extent to which crises might change the interests 
and salience of different stakeholders (Figure 2.14).  
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Figure  2.14: The salience of stakeholders before and after a crisis 
Source: Alpaslan et al (2009: 42) 
They contend that crises or the element of urgency, combined with the elements of power 
and/or legitimacy, have the potential to increase the salience of a given stakeholder. Based on 
the terms used by Mitchell et al (1997), they identify three different forms of change in 
importance when stakeholders are influenced by a crisis. First, they argue that dormant 
stakeholders, or those whose main attribute is the possession of power but not the elements of 
legitimacy and urgency, may increase their salience when affected by a crisis and in some 
instances become ‘dangerous’. Discretionary stakeholders, who are characterized by the 
element of legitimacy but not the attributes of power and urgency, are also susceptible to 
increase their salience and become ‘dependent’ when they are hit by a crisis. Finally, 
dominant stakeholders possess the characteristics of legitimacy and power, but not the 
element of urgency; they may increase their salience and become ‘definitive’ when the firm is 
affected by a crisis. The most significant conclusion that can be drawn from their analysis is 
that the salience of stakeholders does not remain stable during different stages of a crisis.  
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2-5-6-2 Strategies for managing stakeholders and crisis management 
Although the debate on the strategies for managing stakeholders seems intuitively to offer 
much to the understanding of the crisis management field, it has not been widely taken into 
consideration in the current literature. Acquier et al (2008: 104) argue that “the managerial 
value of stakeholders’ frameworks for crisis situations has been systematically discussed so 
far neither by the stakeholder management literature, nor by the crisis management 
literature.” Similarly, Ritchie (2004: 670) calls for close attention to be paid to stakeholder 
theories in tourism crisis management, stating that “understanding and working with key 
internal and external stakeholders are required to plan and manage crises and disasters in the 
tourism industry”. He highlights the role of stakeholders in the strategic implementation 
phase by focusing on the need to understand and collaborate with them during any crisis:  
In the case of crisis and disaster planning and management, understanding the 
impact of a crisis or disaster on internal (business units, staff, managers, 
shareholders) and external (other agencies and organizations, general public, 
media, tourists) stakeholders and the relationship between these stakeholders is 
critical (Ritchie, 2004: 670). 
The work of Savage et al (2004) is a notable exception. They examine how two health 
centres, one small and newly established, namely the West Alabama Health Service 
(WAHS), and the other large and well established, namely the Capstone Rural Health Centre 
(CRHC), responded to a crisis by using the Savage et al (1991) framework to discover how 
the main relationships with stakeholders were altered by the crisis. They argue that the 
collapse of WAHS changed the urgency of the stakes for many stakeholders whose 
relationships before the WAHS crisis were neither threatening nor cooperative. These 
marginal stakeholders, however, promptly awakened from their latent states and their 
relationships became either non-supportive or, at best, mixed blessings for WAHS. The 
change in stakeholder relationships occurred abruptly and accelerated as the authority of the 
leadership and the authenticity of its actions came under question. Savage et al (2004) argue 
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that the pattern of change in stakeholder relationships was a self-reinforcing negative spiral. 
The importance of dormant, marginal stakeholder relationships was also evident as both the 
CRHC and WAHS responded to the crisis brought about by WAHS’s failure. However, for 
both bodies, these marginal stakeholder relationships were transformed into either supportive 
or mixed-blessing relationships. At the same time, they were able to transform many mixed-
blessing relationships into supportive ones. In both instances, these transformations were 
achieved through intensive negotiations to establish partnerships and by expanding board 
memberships. Table 2.4 shows the changing strategies of WAHS internal stakeholders . 
Table  2.4: Strategies for managing stakeholders before and after crises 
 Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Supportive 
Relationships 
Bureau of Primary Health Care Clients 
County Commissioners 
Capstone Rural Health Centre 
Greene County Hospital 
Citizens Federal Savings Bank 
RWJ Foundation 
WARS Attorneys/ Board/ Employees 
Clients 
WAHS employer 
 
 
 
Mixed blessing 
relationships 
Alabama Medicaid 
Capstone Family Clinic 
Media 
Other Regional/County Hospitals 
Whatley Health Services 
 
Alabama Circuit Court 
Alabama Medicaid 
Capstone Family Clinic 
Capstone Rural Health Center Media 
Other regional/county hospitals 
WAILS attorneys 
WAITS Board 
WAILS Compliance Officer/ Whatley Health Services 
Non-supportive 
relationships 
Some Rural Private Physicians 
 
Alabama Attorney General 
Bureau of Primary Health Care/ FBI 
Office of the Inspector General 
Citizens Federal Savings Bank 
Some clients 
Some County Commissioners 
Greene County Hospital 
RWJ Foundation 
Some Rural Private Physicians 
 
Marginal 
Relationships 
Alabama Attorney General 
Alabama Circuit Court / FBI 
Office of the Inspector General 
WAITS Compliance Officer 
 
 
Source: Savage et al (2004: 68) 
The most important findings of the Savage et al (2004) study is that the way stakeholders 
interact with one another differs considerably before and after a crisis. In light of this 
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contrast, changes in stakeholders’ strategic management across different stages of crisis can 
be identified and analysed. In fact, Savage et al (2004) incorporate the stakeholder strategies 
within the notion of staged crisis management, which has significant implications for the 
present study, including the theoretical framework discussed in section 2-7. This discussion 
of the theoretical framework also serves to summarise the present section on stakeholder 
theory and the next, which examines the final major element of that framework: culture. 
2-6 The impact of culture  
Up to this point, this chapter has discussed the procedural factors influencing the 
management of stakeholders in tourism crises, be they normative or analytical, such as how 
to balance their interests or the way they interact. The focus of this section is on a conceptual 
issue that plays a crucial role in this regard: the impact of culture. Culture has become a main 
theme of discussion in recent years for most management periodicals, largely because 
organizations consider it a crucial element of failure or success. One example is that of 
Japanese firms, whose economic performance far exceeded that of their Western 
counterparts. Many researchers attribute the ‘Japanese miracle’ to the collective and group 
work characterizing the Japanese culture and consequently influencing its organizations in 
terms of staff behaviour and relationships (Ahmed, 1995).  
In line with this trend, cultural issues have been discussed in the literature on tourism and 
crisis management (Campiranon and Scott, 2007; Schmidt and Berrell, 2007). Indeed, there 
are many cultural differences between individual countries which influence the ways that 
they view crises (Bland, 1998). Johnson and Peppas (2003) point out that crisis intensity 
varies from country to country and culture to culture, which means that it is very important 
that crisis response plans are developed for a specific location and involve input from both 
local managers and public officials. Crisis management, in the sense of prevention and 
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damage control, is an essential responsibility in national culture. The crisis management 
process begins before a crisis occurs, with the stakeholders’ perception of risk and a 
conscious decision to seek ways to prevent or reduce it (Smits and Ezzat, 2003). In times of 
crisis, stakeholders must demonstrate strong interpersonal skills (King, 2002; Ucelli, 2002) 
by implementing the most effective plan of action, adhering to it and continually monitoring 
the organization’s performance (Brenneman, 2000).  
In some developing countries, the national culture is often unsympathetic to the active 
management of crises (Elsubbaugh et al, 2004). Normally, stakeholders will use locally 
available ideas and practices to guide their interactions, to coordinate their responses and 
ultimately to live in culture-specific ways (Prentice and Miller, 1999). As a result, 
stakeholders tend to manage crises differently among diverse national cultures. This crisis 
response issue has been acknowledged by several authors (e.g. Elsubbaugh et al, 2004; 
Chandler, 2007). For instance, senior managers in some countries perceive the need to 
eradicate the individualistic culture, mostly found in developing countries, and to encourage a 
cooperative culture in times of crisis, both horizontally among managers and vertically 
between them and the workers (Elsubbaugh et al, 2004).  
Thus, national culture has an undeniable influence on both crisis planning and crisis response. 
Campiranon and Scott (2007) argue that the different contexts necessitate modification of the 
crisis management models and in turn they extend those models by taking account of cultural 
influences. Their model draws on the findings of earlier studies (e.g. Hofstede, 2001; Liu and 
Mackinnon, 2002; Schneider and Littrell, 2003) to the effect that people from different 
cultural backgrounds appear to have different styles of management. They conclude that it is 
vital for governments and organizations to acknowledge the impact of national culture on 
crisis management. 
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In light of these discussions, this section first seeks to clarify the concept of culture by 
offering a definition and then elucidates the cultural elements which shape the stakeholder 
relations in managing a tourism crisis.  
2-6-1 Culture: definition and classification 
The definition of culture varies among scholars. The classical definition proposed by Kroeber 
and Kluckholhn (1952: 181) states that:  
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired 
and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human 
groups, including their embodiment in artefacts; the essential core of culture 
consists of traditional ideas and especially their attached values.  
These authors suggest that a large culture exists in a society and it may comprise other 
smaller sub-cultures. For them, culture is a set of shared distinctive values of a human group, 
usually expressed in their behaviour and artefacts. A more recent definition of culture is 
offered by Spencer-Oatey (2000: 18):  
Culture is a fuzzy set of attitudes, beliefs, behavioural norms, and basic 
assumptions and values that are shared by a group of people, and that influence 
each member’s behaviour and his/her interpretations of the ‘meaning’ of other 
people’s behaviour. 
She likens culture to an ‘onion’ composed of several layers and suggests that basic 
assumptions and values form its inner core, surrounded by a layer of beliefs, attitudes and 
conventions. The third layer consists of systems and institutions, followed by an outer layer 
of culture. This cultural model has made two significant contributions: first, it highlights the 
functions of culture in addition to the values and behavioural outcomes. Second, it suggests 
the existence of two core levels of culture with a fuzzy boundary; the new core component 
contains attitudes, beliefs and behavioural conventions (Dahl, 2004). 
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Several classifications have been offered to clarify the concept of culture. Schein (1992) 
contends there are different types of culture. At the broadest level are civilizations (Western 
and Eastern cultures); at the country level, there are national or country cultures (e.g. 
American Culture and Mexican culture) and at a group level, there are ethnic cultures (e.g. 
Caucasian / American and Asian / American cultures) and occupational cultures (e.g. white 
and blue collar cultures). Hofstede (1991) also recognises the presence of different levels of 
culture, albeit within a slightly different typology:  
1. National level, according to one’s country 
2. Regional, ethnic, religious, and linguistic affiliation level 
3. Gender level 
4. Generation level, which separates grandparents from parents from children 
5. Social class level, associated with educational opportunities and a person’s occupation or 
profession 
6. Organizational or corporate level. 
Most authors on management, while seeking to determine the impact of culture on 
organizational success, have differentiated between two types of culture: national and 
organizational. Van Oudenhoven (2001) maintains that national culture distinguishes 
members of a nation from others, while organizational culture distinguishes the employees of 
one organization from another. Moreover, he assumes that national culture refers to values 
and profound beliefs along with the practices shared by the vast majority of people belonging 
to a certain nation, reflected in the way people behave or act in their day to day life. They are 
reinforced through national laws, governmental policies, the education system, family life, 
and business. Organizational culture, on the other hand, refers to values, beliefs and practices 
shared by most members of a corporate body and which may be applicable outside the 
organization. 
90 
 
The nature of an organizational culture as a social system differs in many respects from a 
national culture. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005: 3) define organizational culture as the “The 
collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one organization from 
another”, adding that it is constructed of “perceived common practices: symbols, heroes, and 
rituals”. This means that organizational cultures can be meaningfully delineated by a number 
of practical dimensions referring to practices which depend on organizational characteristics 
such as structures and systems. Organizational cultures are mainly expressed not in members’ 
values but in more superficial manifestations such as common symbols, heroes and rituals. 
This has two important consequences: first, organizational practices can be easily influenced 
by changing these organizational characteristics, compared to people’s collective values, 
which are extremely difficult to change. Second, there is no one cultural model for all 
organizations, because different organizations may have different organizational practices 
and characteristics. 
Another difference between national and organizational cultures seems to be based on their 
different mix of values and practices. Hofstede and others conducted research between 1985 
and 1987, under the auspices of the Institute for Research on Intercultural Cooperation, on 
several companies in Denmark and Netherlands. They found the roles of values versus 
practices at the organizational level to be exactly the opposite of their roles at the national 
level. There were considerable differences in practices but much smaller differences in values 
between similar people in different organizations (Figure 2.15). Hofstede and Hofstede 
(2005) suggest that societies, organizations and individuals represent the gardens, bouquets 
and flowers of social science. They conclude that the three are related and part of the same 
social reality. All three levels should be taken into account to better understand our social 
environment. They add that national cultures are part of the mental software we acquire 
during the first ten years of our lives and that they contain most of our basic values, while 
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organizational cultures, which are acquired when we enter an organization with our values in 
place, consist mainly of the organization’s superficial practices. Apart from this clear 
distinction, the concept of culture has often been used interchangeably to describe the 
national or organizational level. To avoid confusion, this research makes a distinction 
between these two concepts.  
Gender/National Values  Family 
Social Class    
Occupational   School 
Industry    
Organizational/Corporate         Practices Work 
 
Figure  2.15: The balance of values and practices for various levels of culture 
Source: Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
2-6-2 Dimensions of national cultural differences 
In light of the above discussions, it can be suggested that national cultural values may have 
some impact on the behaviour of all stakeholders. This raises the important question of how 
national cultural differences affect the behaviour of managers, the corporate culture in which 
they work and thus the behaviour of firms in general. Several scholars have tried to 
categorize the aspects of culture into taxonomies, applying different criteria and bases for 
their classifications. The work of Hofstede (1979; 1980; 1983; 1984; 2001) and more recently 
of Hofstede & Hofstede (2005) offers the best-known framework in this regard. Hofstede 
(2001) suggests that five different elements can be identified to describe variations in national 
culture: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism, 
masculinity versus femininity and long-term versus short-term orientation. While a number of 
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authors have called Hofstede’s theory into question (e.g. Fang, 2003; Litvin et al, 2004; 
Venezia, 2005), it is still the most popular, because of its persistent reliability and validity. A 
similar and often-cited framework is that offered by Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 
(2000), who identify six dimensions as pairs of opposing values which can be a source of 
value creation: (1) universalism-particularism, (2) individualism-communitarianism, (3) 
specificity-diffusion, (4) achieved status-ascribed status, (5) inner direction-outer direction 
and (6) sequential time-synchronous time. The present research takes as its main framework 
the conceptualization and classification of cultural dimensions offered by Hofstede (1979; 
1980; 1983; 1984; 2001) and by Hofstede & Hofstede (2005), while insights from Hampden-
Turner and Trompenaars (2000) and other relevant discussions provide complementary 
explanations. The following four subsections examine in turn those of Hofstede’s dimensions 
which have been found appropriate for this study. 
2-6-2-1 Power distance  
Power distance is described as “the extent to which the less powerful members of 
organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally” 
(Hofstede, 2001: 28). Examples suggest that flat organizational structures are more often seen 
in low power distance cultures, whilst tall organizational structures are more common in high 
power distance ones (ibid). In societies with high power distance, “superiors are expected to 
act autocratically without consulting subordinates. This would tend to indicate that a greater 
importance is given to both the cues of superiors and more formal norms in countries with a 
large power distance” (Vitell et al, 1993). In such conditions, it can be argued that it is less 
probable that stakeholders in societies marked as high power distance will act as individuals 
(Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Equally, in countries with low power distance, it may be that 
the opinions of peers matter more than those of superiors (Zey-Ferrell et al, 1979; Zey-Ferrell 
93 
 
& Ferrell, 1982). As a result, we would expect stakeholders as individuals to be more likely 
to take the initiative in a crisis situation, rather than communicating with one another. 
2-6-2-2 Uncertainty avoidance  
Uncertainty avoidance is the degree to which the members of a culture feel threatened by 
vague or unknown circumstances. This contributes to unwillingness to take risks and a 
greater degree of planning to diminish uncertainty. For instance, senior managers in a low 
uncertainty avoidance culture are more willing to become involved at a strategy level, while 
their counterparts in a high uncertainty avoidance culture tend to be engaged at the 
operational level, according to Hofstede (2001: 28). Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 
(1997; 2001) have reached very similar findings using their individualism-collectivism or 
individualism-communitarianism continuum.  
Using Hofstede’s conceptualisation of uncertainty avoidance would lead to the belief that 
stakeholders in societies with high uncertainty avoidance are likely to show a high degree of 
internal consistency in their behaviour, leading to trust, as a result of the variety of bonds that 
connect people closely, whether through guanxi mechanisms, as with the Chinese, or through 
kankei in the case of the Japanese (Pye, 2000). In low uncertainty avoidance cultures, a low 
level of trust is likely to prevail, arising from high levels of ambiguity (Ferrell & Skinner 
1988). As a result, the key stakeholders cannot be assumed to have in mind the best interests 
of all involved stakeholders, unlike in Japan (Ouchi, 1981). Within the context of crisis 
management, this dimension may help to explain or enhance models based on the integration 
of participation by the community and less important stakeholders in crisis management. 
2-6-2-3 Individualism vs collectivism  
According to Hofstede (2001), individualism is the characteristic of a society where the links 
between individuals are loose; thus individuals tend to look after themselves and their 
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immediate families. In contrast, collectivism is the feature of a society where people are 
predominantly integrated into strong, unified in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime 
continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. In management decision-
making, a collective decision is preferable in a collectivist culture, whilst an individual 
decision is more likely to be seen in an individualist one. 
The Hofstede conceptualisation suggests that managers and stakeholders from countries that 
are low on individualism are more likely to be susceptible to group pressure than those from 
countries that are high on individuality. Caution is needed in coming to this conclusion, 
however, when we remember that America ranks high on individualism but at the same time 
has always been an ardent exponent of voluntary associations, noted as long ago as 1835 by 
De Tocqueville in Democracy in America, and this will weaken the tendency for 
individualists to be solely concerned with their own self-interest. Nevertheless, Hampden-
Turner & Trompenaars (1997) support the contention that the focus will be different, because 
in countries with an individualistic culture people will tend to put shareholders ahead of other 
stakeholders and may be more likely to believe in the virtues of all-out competition and task-
orientation. On the other hand, in communitarian cultures, it is more likely that the interests 
of all stakeholders will be taken care of and rather than looking to voluntary associations 
people will look to family for help, which may be particularly true of Chinese 
communitarians, though not so true of the Japanese (Fukuyama, 1995). 
More important still is the contention that in individualistic cultures, people are inner-
directed, believing in self-reliance and seeking to satisfy self-interest, whereas in 
communitarian cultures, people are outer-directed and so more concerned with what society 
or their in-group has to say about their actions. Perhaps the most important distinction is that 
in individualistic cultures the underlying assumption is that the individual is self-made, 
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whereas in communitarian cultures the belief is that the social system creates personal 
success (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 2000). 
2-6-2-4 Long-term orientation  
A long-term orientation stands for the fostering of values oriented towards future rewards, 
perseverance and thrift. Conversely, a short-term orientation stands for the fostering of values 
related to the past and present, based on respect for tradition, preservation of ‘face’ and 
fulfilling social obligations. In the business environment, a short-term orientation culture 
tends to look for short-term results, ending with the strength of the bottom line, whereas a 
long-term orientation culture builds a strong relationship and market position (Hofstede, 
2001). In the context of crisis it can be expected that such a society will act more proactively 
and be well prepared from the beginning. Such societies may also be marked by patience and 
tolerance of problems in the short term, because their emphasis will be placed rather on the 
future consequences of their current actions. It may be thought that confronting problems 
immediately may solve them more quickly, but may lead to recriminations or bad feeling, 
which will affect future relationships adversely.  
In contrast, societies with low long-term orientation tend not to reinforce long-term 
commitments and traditional values, but focus much more on short-term relationships with 
more immediate outcomes. This leads to a greater emphasis on the quality and use value of 
time and the understanding of time as a scarce resource that has to be allocated efficiently. 
This has a direct impact on crisis management, in which the pre-crisis phases including 
preparation is always taken for granted, because there is likely to be less patience and 
tolerance of problems in the short run and a greater tendency to confront problems more 
immediately. As a result, action will be taken more rapidly in these societies, because the 
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focus is on the best use of time and the return on time invested in projects, rather than on 
long-term commitments and traditions. 
To summarise, it can be argued that the management of stakeholders during a crisis does not 
take place in a vacuum, nor is it something that can be applied in exactly the same way in all 
places, cultures and societies. To be effective, the managing of stakeholders in crisis 
management must be open to adaptation to the specific consideration of each context. To 
understand how culture matters, many scholars have sought to conceptualize cultural values 
in terms of pairs of opposing dimensions, which can be a source of value creation.  
2-7 Theoretical framework of the study  
This chapter concludes with a short discussion serving to summarise those aspects of the 
sections most directly relevant to the conduct of the original research reported in this thesis, 
with the aim of proposing an overall theoretical foundation for the study. The chapter has 
outlined recent advances in crisis management and their implications for the management of 
tourism crises. It was indicated that despite these advances, serious shortcomings apply to 
studies in this field. In particular, these studies fail to offer a comprehensive theoretical 
framework capable of meeting the requirements of different contexts and to a large extent fall 
short of addressing adequately the peculiarities of terrorism crises. There is therefore a clear 
need to formulate a rigorous conceptual framework for the development of crisis 
management models to enable them to meet the idiosyncratic characteristics of different 
contexts. This represents a major gap in the current literature. It was shown in section 2-5 that 
stakeholder theories have mainly been utilized in the private sector and in the context of 
commercial firms, so the application of stakeholder theories to the tourism industry, which is 
a broader context involving mainly public sector actors, is not free from difficulty. To remedy 
this problem, it is argued that as far as stakeholder management is concerned, there is 
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significant similarity between the organisational setting of a firm and that of a tourism 
destination (Ryan, 2002). The most evident difference is that a tourism destination is more 
complex than a single organisation (Pavlovich, 2003).  
Having acknowledged the possibility of the application of stakeholder theory to the context 
of tourism destinations, the next step was to set forth a theoretical foundation drawing on the 
most relevant stakeholder theories. Both normative and analytic strands of stakeholder theory 
contribute to the theoretical foundation of this study. Drawing on the former, it is argued that 
the organization must meet the demands of stakeholders and balance their claims if it is to 
manage efficiently and to survive in the long run (Bryson, 2004; Friedman and Mason, 2005). 
It is, however, problematic to achieve such equilibrium, in part because stakeholders vary in 
their salience to the organization and in part because they do not appear always to be 
prepared to cooperate fully with it. To address this problem, the following analytical 
stakeholder theories will be applied. Firstly, based upon the model of Mitchell et al (1997), 
the significance of each stakeholder will be determined in terms of two criteria: power and 
legitimacy. Alpaslan et al (2009) apply this framework to investigate the extent to which 
crises might change considerably the interests and salience of different stakeholders. They 
contend that crises or the elements of urgency, combined with the elements of power and/or 
legitimacy, have the potential to increase the salience of a given stakeholder. The questions 
related to this argument are: 
Q1: What are the key stakeholders in managing terrorism crises in tourism? Which are 
more powerful or legitimate? How does their importance change after a crisis?  
Secondly, the model proposed by Savage et al (1991) will be used to distinguish those 
stakeholders having the potential to pose obstacles from those with the potential to cooperate 
with the organization. Savage et al (1991) note that stakeholders’ potential to threaten or 
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cooperate constitutes an important determinant of management’s strategic response to them. 
They outline four main managerial strategies taken by stakeholders towards one another. 
Based on the typology of Savage et al (1991) for management’s strategic response to 
stakeholders, Sheehan and Ritchie (2005) examined stakeholders’ relationships with DMOs 
in the tourism industry. Savage et al (2004) used the Savage et al (1991) framework to 
discover how the main relationships with stakeholders were altered by the crisis. Drawing on 
this discussion, the next research question is as follows:  
Q2: What is the nature of the relationships among stakeholders before and after a 
crisis? Which stakeholders tend to cooperate or pose threats in normal situations and after a 
crisis? 
To be effective, the managing of stakeholders in crisis management must be open to 
adaptation to the specific consideration of each context. To understand how culture matters, 
many scholars have sought to conceptualize cultural values in terms of pairs of opposing 
dimensions, which can be a source of value creation. Section 2-6 discussed the concept of 
cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede (1979; 1980; 1983; 1984; 2001) and by Hofstede 
and Hofstede (2005), the relevant dimensions in the present context being power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism and long-term versus short-term 
orientation. These dimensions will be utilized to examine the influence of culture on the ways 
in which the stakeholders manage a tourism crisis, while the work of Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars (2000) and others will be evoked as appropriate to complement the analysis. 
Based on this literature, the next question can be formulated as follows: 
Q3: What is the influence of national culture on the management of stakeholders in the 
crisis management efforts? 
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The abovementioned elements ultimately shape and condition the specific strategies and 
methods that have been used to combat security crises in the tourism industry. It was found 
that early tactical explanations of staged crisis management models and the strategic 
approach which views CM as a cyclical process made a great contribution to the development 
of the CM field. It was also argued that the development of literature on CM in tourism 
studies has kept pace with the equivalent development in broader CM studies (Faulkner, 
2001; Ritchie, 2004). In line with their proposals for a more proactive and strategic approach 
to crisis management in the tourism industry, scholars began paying further attention to the 
specific requirements of security crises in tourism. It was also noted that there are many 
commonalities among the strategies adopted to manage terrorism crises and other sorts of 
security incidents. Among others Pizam (1999), Mansfield and Pizam (2006) and Fuchs and 
Pizam (2011) identify several strategies specific to tourism security incidents at different 
stages of crisis management, which can be divided into two categories in line with crisis 
stages: prevention and recovery strategies. The prevention strategies can in turn be 
categorised under five broad headings: (i) strategies specific to government; (ii) strategies 
specific to security sectors; (iii) strategies specific to private sectors; (iv) strategies specific to 
tourists; and (v) strategies specific to local citizens. Four categories are also identifiable 
regarding recovery strategies: information dissemination, reassurance campaigns, marketing 
schemes and financial assistance programmes. In section 2-4-2, it was also concluded that a 
variety of methods and strategies are at the disposal of governments to combat terrorism. 
These range from protection by focusing on security measures and instruments, via 
preventive general policies such as reducing poverty, to responding by taking emergency 
action in the midst of chaos and to the pursuit, arrest and prosecution of terrorists. Although 
these strategies overlap in many ways with those proposed by CM scholars, there are some 
significant differences between these two types. The most obvious differences are identifiable 
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in prevention and pursuit policies. Two underlying issues in these strategies are the degree to 
which these strategies are active or reactive and how these strategies involve the participation 
of a wide range of stakeholders. In the light of these studies, the following questions can be 
formulated: 
Q4:  What strategies do stakeholders employ in managing a terrorism crisis? In 
particular:  
 To what extent are these strategies active or reactive? 
 Do these strategies involve the participation of a wide range of stakeholders? 
 
Finally, it was noted in section 2-2 that terrorism has often imposed significant costs on the 
tourism industry in certain countries, yet the emphasis of most of the literature has been on 
the macroeconomic effect of these incidents on the host countries. Although Fuchs and Pizam 
(2011) have recently underscored the importance of this issue, they do not go further, to 
clarify and expand it adequately. The Egyptian tourism industry has witnessed a growing 
number of terrorist attacks which have caused damage to the tourism industry and hence 
attracted much scholarly attention regarding their economic impact (Richter and Waugh, 
1986; Aziz, 1995; Abdulwahed, 1998). Nevertheless, knowledge of the social impact of 
terrorism crises on the Egyptian tourism industry is rudimentary. Based on this observed gap, 
the final question of the study can be proposed as:  
Q5: What has been the overall impact of terrorism crises on the tourism industry in Egypt? 
Thus, the main purpose of this study is to generate a systematic understanding of the crisis 
management environment by application of stakeholder theories to the crisis management 
field, which will help stakeholders in the tourism industry to create an effective and more 
flexible crisis management programme to avoid having crises or minimise them when they 
occur.  
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The theoretical framework of this study presented in this concluding section is illustrated in 
Figure 2.16, which shows it as consisting of three main building blocks. The first of these is 
the national cultural dimension. As noted earlier in this section, national cultural determinants 
that affect other elements of the framework are cultural values in terms of pairs of opposing 
dimensions developed by Hofstede (1979; 1980; 1983; 1984; 2001) and by Hofstede and 
Hofstede (2005), which for present purposes are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism versus collectivism and long-term versus short-term orientation.  
The second building block of the framework is the stakeholder dimension, which 
encompasses important factors discussed above, such as the salience of stakeholders and their 
strategic management. Following the model of Mitchell et al (1997), the significance of each 
stakeholder will be determined in terms of two criteria: power and legitimacy. The element of 
urgency also recognized by Mitchell et al (1997) is excluded from our theoretical foundation, 
largely because in a crisis situation the term has a different meaning (Alpaslan et al, 2009). 
The notion of stakeholders’ strategic management draws on the model proposed by Savage et 
al (1991), which distinguishes those stakeholders having the potential to pose obstacles from 
those with the potential to cooperate with the organization.  
The final dimension of the framework is crisis management, which draws largely on the 
strategic models (Fink, 1986; Mitroff, 1994), making distinctions among pre-crisis, crisis and 
post-crisis stages of crisis management and their application to tourism (Faulkner, 2001; 
Ritchie, 2004). More precisely, models proposed for the management of security and 
terrorism crises will be utilized in this study (Mansfield and Pizam, 2006). A diverse range of 
strategies is undertaken by stakeholders in managing security crises. Following Mansfield 
and Pizam (2006), these strategies and methods are divided into two categories: prevention 
and recovery methods, each with subsections.  
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Figure 2.16: Conceptual framework 
Source: Author 
 
This chapter has examined the relevant literature and outlined the theoretical framework of 
the study. The next examines in detail its context: tourism and terrorism in Egypt. 
  
National cultural dimensions 
 Power distance  
 Uncertainty avoidance  
 Individualism versus collectivism  
 Long-term versus short-term orientation 
 
Recovery strategies 
 Information dissemination 
 Reassurance campaigns 
 Marketing schemes 
 Financial assistance 
programmes 
Preventive strategies 
Strategies specific to: 
 Government  
 Security sector   
 Private sector 
 Tourists 
 Local citizens 
Underpinning elements of stakeholder theory  
 The salience of stakeholders  
 The extent to which stakeholders 
cooperate or otherwise pose obstacles 
Strategies specific to managing terrorism crises in the tourism industry 
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Chapter 3 Tourism and Terrorism in Egypt 
 
3-1 Introduction 
An abundance of major historical sites and a rich cultural heritage have made Egypt a unique 
tourism destination. The prominence of the tourism industry has had such an impact on the 
overall national economy that it has been regarded by many observers as the economic 
lifeblood of the country. The crucial significance of the tourism industry has not been 
overlooked by Egyptian political dissenters. Although hitherto unsuccessful, they have at 
times attempted to further their political ends by carrying out terrorist attacks on this 
vulnerable industry.  
This chapter attempts to offer some general insights into the dimensions of Egyptian national 
culture, the tourism industry in present-day Egypt and the effects on it of terrorist incidents. It 
begins with a brief overview of the geographical, economic and political context, proceeding 
with a review of Egyptian national culture as perceived by Hofstede (1980; 1983; 1984) and 
others, as set out in Chapter 2 (section 2-6). It then discusses the changing fortunes of the 
tourism industry in the past three decades. The analysis is largely based upon official data 
provided by Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) and 
the annual analysis of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). On occasions, complementary 
aggregated data have been adapted from other sources, such as the Business Source Premier 
and Regional Surveys of the World, the Middle East and North Africa (2008). The analysis is 
split into three periods, comparing international tourist arrivals and receipts. These results are 
then represented in a graph tracing the trends over the past three decades. The next section 
deals with the main tourism stakeholders in Egypt and the final section discusses the 
emergence, evolution and challenges of terrorist groups in Egypt and their attacks on tourism 
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destinations. It then reviews counterterrorism strategies, which have oscillated between 
‘carrot’ and ‘stick’, assessing the degree to which each has been successful.  
3-2 Egypt  
The Arab Republic of Egypt is located in the north-east of the African continent and on the 
Sinai Peninsula. It has land borders with Sudan in the south, with Libya in the west and with 
Israel and Palestine in the east. Its shorelines extend along the Mediterranean Sea to the north 
and the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba to the east. Since most of the country is desert, the 
population is distributed very unevenly, being concentrated in Cairo and Alexandria and 
around the River Nile and the Suez Canal. These areas are among the world’s most densely 
populated regions (Ellicott, 2008). Egypt’s geographical situation, the distribution of its 
population and especially the total reliance on the Nile for irrigation have resulted in a 
strongly centralised administration and allowed the government to extend its authority to the 
peripheries (Goldschmidt, 1988).  
In 2008, the total population of Egypt was 81,713,520, making it one of the most populous 
countries in the region. A large proportion of the population is young: half of Egyptians are 
under twenty years of age and two-thirds are under thirty, a demographic imbalance that 
severely strains the economy (CAPMAS, 2008). Egypt’s government is hardly able to meet 
the demands for food, shelter, education and jobs. Around three million Egyptians have 
migrated to other Arab countries, particularly the oil-rich states, in search of work. Their 
remittances to their families constitute a major source of national income (Conrad, 2005).  
Much like elsewhere in the world, the economy has come to play a crucial role in Egyptians’ 
lives. The long history of colonial exploitation and the enduring legacy of authoritarian rulers 
forestalled the industrial development of Egypt in the nineteenth century. At the turn of the 
twentieth century, industrialization began to take root, with rapid growth in the textile 
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industry, which was comparatively satisfactory before the socialist government of Abdel 
Nasser (1956-1970) took power (Al-Awa, 2006). Nasser’s sixteen-year rule was 
characterized by the militarization of politics and the concentration of power through the 
supremacy of the executive branch. Under Nasser, the state took control of the economy to 
ensure equitable development, a policy known later as Arab Socialism. Nasser was a 
charismatic leader and earned a reputation as a champion of Arab interests, but his economic 
policies brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy (Fahmy, 2002a). His death in 1970 
was followed by profound political and economic changes in Egypt. By initiating the 
economic policy of enfetah (openness) or liberalization of the economy, his successor, Anwar 
El Sadat, began a series of fundamental reforms of the economy. In addition, Sadat’s regional 
foreign policy, including a peace initiative and rapprochement with Israel, enhanced the 
international image of Egypt (Al-Awa, 2006). From 1981 to 2011, under President Hosni 
Mubarak, Egypt followed the same route and strove for the same goals; however, Ellicott 
(2008) argued towards the end of this period that there was a long way to go, as the country 
was still grappling with chronic problems emanating from within and from abroad. 
3-3 Egyptian national culture 
In Egypt, loyalty to one’s group takes precedence over the individual’s interpretation of the 
requirements of his or her job. Among Arabs, a friend is someone whose company is enjoyed. 
However, equally important to the relationship is the duty of a friend to give help and 
perform favours to the best of his or her ability (Nydell, 1987). The position of friendship as a 
cornerstone of Egyptian culture has a major effect on selection and promotion practices. Not 
surprisingly, nepotism is common in many Egyptian organisations and saving face is of 
utmost importance in the national culture. Egyptians hate to say no, a phenomenon which 
may appear to westerners as dishonest and lacking in integrity, but is instead the result of a 
strong desire to preserve harmony. It is no surprise that Hofstede (1980; 1983; 1984) 
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classifies Arab societies such as Egypt as collectivist in nature, noting that workers from 
collectivist cultures tend to be more involved and identified with their workplaces. In contrast 
to individualism, collectivism requires the members of a group to work together for survival. 
As an Arab nation, Egypt has a culture characterized by high power distance (Hofstede, 
1984), as explained in Chapter 2 (section 2-6-2-1), one characterised by the acceptance of a 
superior’s opinion simply because it emanates from one’s superior. In a high power distance 
culture, superior and subordinate consider each other as unequal: indigenous organisations 
centralise power more and subordinates are expected to be told what to do (Hofstede, 1984). 
Order—a phenomenon critical to Egyptian organisational practice—is preserved more by 
autocratic decision making than by establishing and following rules and regulations. In high 
power index countries like Egypt, employees are frequently afraid to disagree with superiors, 
who are often seen as autocratic or paternalistic. 
The Arab cultural cluster also scores highly on Hofstede’s (1984) uncertainty avoidance 
index (section 2-6-2-2). One of the factors that might have lowered the Arab region’s 
collective score is its affiliation with the fatalistic tendencies inherent in the form of Islam 
prevalent in Egypt. Muslims generally do not question events and are more likely to accept 
the uncertainties of life. Nonetheless, the relative immobility of the Egyptian people because 
of their dependence on the Nile may have reduced their tolerance for uncertainty and change 
as compared to many other Arab countries where nature is harsher. Such is likely to be the 
case in the Gulf region, where physical movement in search of work and food has historically 
been a more critical issue.  
It should be noted that when Hofstede conducted his original cultural research, Egypt was 
combined with other nations (Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya and the United 
Arab Emirates) in a category which he called “Arab speaking countries”. While there may be 
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some similarities among these countries, these are not sufficiently strong or comprehensive to 
justify combining them uncritically in this way, give the loss of information that this entail 
regarding the differences in culture between them. To elucidate some of the unique cultural 
characteristics of Egypt, Hatem and Hearn (2003), in a comparative study of American and 
Egyptian culture, identify as many as sixteen cultural dimensions which can be used to 
explain the national culture of Egypt, including three of those proposed by Hofstede. The full 
list of sixteen is: individualism, communication and language, dress and appearance, food 
and feeding habits, time and time consciousness, work habits and practices, relationships, 
values and norms, environment, beliefs and attitudes, action, power distance, 
competitiveness, structure, thinking, religion and humour. The use of these dimension places 
Egypt within a national cultural taxonomy in an almost opposite position to that of the 
countries chosen for Hofstede’s original study in three of the four cultural dimensions of the 
Hofstede framework (power distance, individualism and uncertainty avoidance). This means 
that any effect of the national culture of Egypt should be examined closely in its own right, 
because of the major differences in cultural dimension scores of these countries compared to 
Egypt. 
3-4 The recent development of tourism in Egypt 
Between 1982 and 1990, the number of international tourist arrivals in Egypt rose from 
1,423,251 to 2,600,117, an increase of 182 percent. Given that international tourists are the 
most significant source of tourism revenue in Egypt, the revenue from international tourism 
had reached about 2.5 billion US dollars by 1990, making it one of the most lucrative sectors 
of the Egyptian economy (Table 3.1) (SIS, 2009). Such great progress was in part because of 
the Egyptian government’s economic initiatives of liberalization, as indicated in section 3-2 
(Al-Awa, 2006; Wahab, 1996, in Pizam and Mansfeld, 1996: 175-186). However, the tourism 
industry proved to be one of those most susceptible to instability in the region. The triggering 
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of terrorist activity in the Middle East after the mid-1980s and the growth of anti-American 
sentiment in the region, intensified by the US air strikes on targets in Libya in 1986, resulted 
in a reduction in the number of tourists, particularly US citizens, travelling to these areas. For 
instance, by the end of 1986, American visitors recorded a 50% decline in bookings to 
Mediterranean countries and a 65% reduction to Egypt (Sonmez 1998: 427).  
Table  3.1: International tourism arrivals and receipts in Egypt, 1982 to 1990 
 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
International Arrivals  1,423,251 1,497,932 1,560,932 1,518,426 1,311,250 1,794,953 1,969,493 2,503,980 2,600,117 
Receipts (x 1000 US dollars) 304,100 288,840 409,600 315,300 379,600 885,900 900,600 1,071,800 2,502,200 
Source: CAPMAS 
The 1990s began with a dramatic sequence of events: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990, followed by the dispatching of international troops to the region. Not surprisingly, the 
tourism industry in Egypt was affected considerably by the consequences of this event 
(Conrad, 2005). In February 1991, international tourist arrivals in Egypt fell to 57,000, 
compared with 208,000 in February 1990. Following the end of the Gulf conflict, however, 
tourist numbers recovered quickly, reaching 2,214,277 on average (Table 3.2). Interestingly, 
in 1991, despite considerable falls in international tourist numbers, the corresponding revenue 
did not fall but actually increased slightly, largely because of the unprecedented growth of 
luxury hotels in Egypt as a result of the opening of the sector to private investment, after 
decades of tight public control. As Vignal (2010) reports, since the 1990s the number of 4 
and 5-star hotels as a proportion of the total number of hotels has risen significantly, from 
11% and 15% respectively to 16% and 21% in 2008. She argues that the effects of investing 
in the hotel industry became evident in the early 1990s, more particularly in 1992, when the 
Egyptian tourism industry witnessed a record figure of more than 3 million arrivals.  
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However this flourishing of the tourism industry was short-lived, as it crashed again when 
tourism destinations were targeted by Islamist terrorists (Al-Awa, 2006). The number of 
international tourists visiting Egypt fell by about 22% in 1993, while revenue fell by 38% 
(Table 3.2). Having failed to eradicate the problem of terrorism through its campaign against 
militant Islamists, the government allocated 25 million US dollars to a venture to promote 
tourism in 1994, with the aim of restoring revenue from this sector to its 1992 level (Wahab, 
1996 in Pizam and Mansfeld, 1996: 175-186). Notwithstanding this initiative, the number of 
international visitors in the first three months of 1994 was 15% lower than the 1993 level. In 
January 1993, the World Bank had approved a loan of 130 million US dollars for the 
development of new tourism infrastructure, within the framework of a programme valued at 
some 805 billion US dollars (EIU, 2004). Recognizing tourism as one of the cornerstones of 
the national economy, a comprehensive plan was prepared for the fiscal year 1994/1995 to 
enhance the efforts in three main aspects of tourism: development, promotion and public 
awareness (El Beltagui, 1995). The Ministry of Tourism was among the pioneers of a policy 
of privatization. In addition, an overall national tourism development strategy drawing on 
marketing techniques was adopted. This strategy laid out the priority zones and determined 
the detailed rules for investors while taking into account a sustainable development strategy 
by protecting the natural and cultural resources (SIS, 2009).  
The Ministry of Tourism also undertook practical measures in the promotion of the tourist 
industry through an ambitious plan, one important element of which was to strengthen 
Egypt’s international image as a conventional tourist destination. Furthermore, it attempted to 
raise public awareness of the significance of tourism through the mass media. Ten public 
information films were produced in 1993-1994 and repeatedly shown on the main Egyptian 
TV channels. An agreement was also made between the Ministry of Tourism and the 
Ministry of Education to incorporate tourism issues in the curricula of primary and secondary 
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schools (El Beltagui, 1995). By mid-1995 several developmental plans with the aim of 
enhancing tourism infrastructure had been implemented in Abu Soma and the Red Sea coast 
at Sahl Hashish. According to a Tourism Development Authority report, during these years 
some 27 new projects were also undertaken on the south Sinai coast (EIU, 1998). The 
consequences of such measures were obvious: in 1995, international tourist arrivals increased 
by 25% over the previous year, reaching 3.13 million, a pattern repeated in the following 
year, with some 3.9 million tourist arrivals and an estimated revenue of 3.7 billion US dollars 
(Table 3.2). 
Table  3.2: International tourism arrivals and receipts in Egypt, 1990 – 1997 
Source: CAPMAS 
The strong recovery of the tourism industry was halted by yet another dramatic setback in 
late 1997. Constant fears for the safety and security of travellers followed a terrorist attack on 
a German tour bus in Cairo in September of that year, in which nine German tourists and one 
Egyptian lost their lives. These fears were aggravated the following month by the massacre of 
58 tourists and 12 Egyptians in Luxor (Essner, 2003: 9; Wheatley and McCauley, 2008). 
Many tourist agencies cancelled trips and many potential tourists from across the world 
withdrew their plans to travel to these destinations. For its part, the government took 
immediate and extensive measures, including attempts to compensate for the loss of external 
tourism by boosting internal tourism in the region (SIS, 2009; Conrad, 2005). Egypt Air, 
which had lost many foreign tourists, offered half-price tickets for domestic tourists. Key 
among the recovery measures taken in these years were numerous discounts on a range of 
goods and services to encourage potential travellers to return to the region. The official 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
International arrivals  2,600,117 2,214,277 3,206,940 250,776,2 2,581,988 3,133,461 3,895,942 3,900,000 
Receipts (x 1000 US dollars) 2,502,000 2,529,000 2,375,000 1,779,300 2,298,900 3,009,100 3,700,000 3,700,000 
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statistics estimate that a cost of 1.2 billion US dollars resulted from the decrease of tourist 
numbers from 3.9 to 3.7 million and from other expenses (CAPMAS, 2008).  
In 1999, the tourism industry underwent a significant recovery and the former construction 
plans for the industry were accelerated. The statistics for that year confirm that around 4.8 
million tourists visited Egypt and brought in revenue of about 3.9 billion US dollars 
(CAPMAS, 2008). Investment in the industry in the following years was unprecedented. For 
instance, the value of a single contract for development of luxury accommodation in Port 
Ghaleb on the Red Sea was around two billion US dollars. Such investments proved to be 
effective, as tourist arrivals increased to 5.5 million in 2000,  bringing in an income of almost 
four and a half billion US dollars (EIU, 2000).  
No sooner had this recovery begun, however, than the sector was plunged once again into 
decline by regional and international crises, namely the renewed conflict between 
Palestinians and Israelis marked by the second intifada of September 2000 and the attacks on 
the USA in September 2001. A number of projects were put on hold and many travellers 
cancelled their flights as a result. By November 2001, international tourist numbers had fallen 
by 54.5% compared with the same month the previous year. Thereafter, international tourist 
arrivals began to rise steadily again, so that by August 2002 arrivals were a remarkable 15% 
up on the previous year. However, revenues were taking longer to return to pre-September 
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 levels, as a result of increased discounting (Table 3.3). Once again, the government took 
recovery measures in 2002 to make up for the heavy losses of international tourist revenues. 
Due to the global value of the Egyptian heritage, prestigious international organizations 
showed a willingness to invest in the tourism industry in Egypt. A prime example is 
UNESCO, which supported a 350 million dollar project to reconstruct the Great Egyptian 
Museum near the Pyramids at Giza. The second Gulf War in 2003 affected the tourism 
industry in Egypt to some extent. In the same year, Egypt was host to an international 
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conference on the promotion of sustainable tourism, which contributed immensely by 
offering a positive image of the Egyptian tourism industry (SIS, 2009). In 2004, tourist 
income reached 6.1 billion US dollars, which was the most important current-account credit 
in the economic history of the country. International tourist arrivals increased by 35% in 2004 
to 8.1 billion, a second successive record (EIU, 2004).  
The Egyptian government has since maintained support for the industry by targeting the 
markets in European and Arab countries and removing the existing barriers to foreign 
investment (Al-Ahram, 2007). Two successful measures taken by the government were to 
sponsor the travel of tourism journalists and to allow German and Italian visitors to use 
identity cards rather than passports. Among the most important government measures have 
been its investments in human resources, such as the signing of a contract with Cornell 
University to offer training courses for Egyptians in the hospitality and tourism industry. 
Similar educational contracts have also been signed with countries having long experience in 
the tourism industry, such as Greece and France. In addition, a five-year campaign with the 
aim of raising the awareness of the public was undertaken in April 2006. Within these 
programmes, Egyptians are given training in the significance of the tourism industry in the 
national life and how to communicate in a hospitable manner. Such training has been 
incorporated into the primary school curriculum. The campaign also makes full use of 
televised and printed media (Conrad, 2005). Another campaign has been undertaken to 
enhance tourism at international level, with the hiring of the UK-based DDB International. 
Marwa Fayed, senior account manager, notes, “The campaign borrows some of the same 
concepts used by Malaysia and India ... We are trying to make Egypt into a brand” (cited by 
Meed, 2007). 
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Finally, according to recent statistics, in 2006 tourism revenue reached 7.6 billion dollars, 
Egypt’s largest source of export earnings. International tourist arrivals rose by 5 percent to 
9.1 million, a third successive record (EIU, 2008).  
Table  3.3: International tourism arrivals and receipts in Egypt, 1998 – 2006 
Source: CAPMAS 
Figure 3.1 shows graphically the data presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, indicating the way 
in which steady overall growth in international tourist arrivals and revenues has been 
punctuated temporarily. Yet, as the overall trend shows, terrorism attacks in Egypt have not 
halted the long-term growth of tourism in the country. The destinations targeted by terrorist 
attacks have largely regained the lost tourist arrivals within a few months or years, because of 
the successful recovery strategies undertaken by Egyptian tourism stakeholders, helping 
potential visitors to forget such incidents; thus, international demand has returned to normal 
relatively soon after the occurrence of such shocking attacks. The next section examines the 
various stakeholders in the Egyptian tourist industry. 
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Figure  3.1: International tourism arrivals and national revenue from tourism (US $) in 
Egypt, 1982 – 2006 
Source: CAPMAS 
3-5 Tourism stakeholders in Egypt 
3-5-1 Central and local government 
Due to the centralized system of governance, the appointed authorities in Egypt at local and 
central levels have always played major roles in the tourism industry. In particular, in recent 
years, they have drawn considerable attention to the industry. Egypt is organized into 27 
governorates, each headed by an appointed governor. The Local Government System Act of 
1960 stipulates diverse responsibilities for governorates, ranging from social, health, welfare 
and educational services to the social and economic development of the regions. Governors 
monitor the activities and plans of the city and village councils. The real authority, however, 
rests with top officials in Cairo in a highly centralized manner, through a rigidly hierarchical 
bureaucracy. The village mayors, who were at one time the only elected local officials, are 
now appointed by the Ministry of the Interior (Fahmy, 2002a).  
3-5-2 Ministry of Tourism 
The Egyptian Ministry of Tourism has come to play the role of a destination management 
organization in Egypt, albeit with more limited power than its Western counterparts. It is the 
national body authorized to make tourism policy (Figure 3.2). It is in charge of maintaining a 
comprehensive legal and regulatory framework in the context of a sustainable tourism 
development strategy. The role of the Ministry is seen as that of a regulator and a facilitator 
of tourism activities, as well as a promoter of good governance, particularly in publicly-
owned tourism establishments. Like most other ministries, however, it suffers from 
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overstaffing and inadequate technical capability. In recent years, it has taken many proactive 
steps to support and monitor the activities of the private tourism sector. The initial step was 
the establishment of the Tourism Development Authority (TDA) in 1991, with the aim of 
enhancing the relationship of the private sector with the Ministry and the role of the latter in 
guiding and promoting touristic investments (Wahab, 1996, in Pizam and Mansfeld, 1996: 
175-186). The TDA works primarily on setting and implementing regulations for tourism 
projects and investments (OECD, 2010) The Ministry also supervises a number of public 
sector organizations: both the Egyptian Tourism Authority (ETA) and the General Authority 
for Tourism Development (GATD) fall under its jurisdiction. The Ministry is supported by 
five directorates working with the abovementioned authorities. Of particular relevance to the 
present study, a crisis management unit has been established within the Ministry of Tourism 
to coordinate the activities of stakeholders during and after any crisis (SIS, 2009). 
Key to the recent changes in the Ministry is the new position of the public sector Tourism 
Authority, as an umbrella body consisting of five associated companies: the Egyptian General 
Organization for Tourism and Hotels, the Misr Travel Company, the Egyptian Hotels 
Company, Misr Hotels and Grand Hotels of Egypt (Wahab, 1996, in Pizam and Mansfeld, 
1996: 175-186). Appointments made in 2004 to the top managerial body of the Ministry of 
Tourism also represent fundamental positive changes for the tourism sector in Egypt 
(American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2008). 
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Figure  3.2: Organizational structure of the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism 
Source: OECD, 2010 
3-5-3 Interior Ministry and Police 
There are two major branches of the police force in Egypt: the State Security Investigations 
Sector, which investigates crime, and the Central Security Force, which deals with internal 
security issues like policing public protests and countering opposition. As a whole, the force 
maintains law and order, detects and prevents crime, collects evidence, processes passports, 
controls traffic and screens immigrants. In each governorate, a director of police oversees law 
enforcement in the district. The director reports to the governor and both are overseen by the 
Ministry of the Interior. Police ranks reflect the gradations within the army, with the highest 
ranking police officers having the ranks of major general down to first lieutenant. Below this 
are lieutenant-chief warrant officers. Enlisted officers hold the ranks of master sergeant, 
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sergeant, corporal and private. There is a special tourist police, whose members wear an 
armband with an insignia in Arabic and English and are able to speak English. The tourist 
police, which forms part of and is affiliated to the Central Security Force, was established in 
1997 after the massacre of 58 tourists at the Hatshepsut temple in Luxor (Essner, 2003: 9; 
Wheatley and McCauley, 2008). The Tourist Police have offices in every main tourist 
location throughout Egypt. They are authorized to deal with a variety of security problems 
that tourists may face, ranging from being cheated or overcharged to being victims of 
criminal acts or terrorism. They have the power to investigate immediately and to obtain 
refunds of overcharges where warranted. According to one report, a large body of tourist 
police has been deployed to guard tourist sites (Fielding and Shortland, 2005).  
3-5-4 Egyptian Tourism Federation  
Private sector tourism operators in Egypt are represented by the Egyptian Federation of 
Tourist Chambers, which was established in 1968, when the first tourism law was enacted. 
With new demands for enhancement of the tourism industry, its official title was changed to 
the Egyptian Tourism Federation (ETF) in 2002. The ETF’s main task, stipulated in its 
constitution, is to ensure “the common interests of the tourism industry by developing 
strategic cooperation and joint planning between the five Affiliate Associations”. This is 
accomplished through close relationships with the five affiliate business associations:  
- Egyptian Hotels Association  
- Egyptian Travel Agents Association  
- Egyptian Chamber of Tourist Establishments 
- Egyptian Chamber of Tourist Commodities 
- Egyptian Chamber of Diving and Water Sports. 
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The ETF also works in association with travel and tourism enterprises, with the Ministry of 
Tourism and public authorities in general and with the supply structure of the tourism 
industry. According to its official website, an important function of the ETF is to enhance and 
support the following:  
 Development of resources  
 Transportation  
 Infrastructure and superstructure of tourism destinations  
 Human resources development  
 International and regional organizations concerned with tourism development. 
3-5-5 Egypt Air 
Egypt Air is a major state-owned airline established in 1932 and headquartered in Cairo. 
Beginning in 1980, Egypt Air embarked on a modernization and marketing strategy. 
Accordingly, it planned its network to maximize its traffic and scope, serving major cities in 
all five continents. To carry out its marketing plan, Egypt Air purchased several new aircraft 
and then developed an autonomous infrastructure to support and serve its fleet in order to 
operate in a safe and efficient manner (SIS, 2009). As a result of its market research, Egypt 
Air was restructured as a stepped pyramid whose base was its most profitable markets. This 
was a significant step toward establishing the airline’s financial credibility, which can be very 
challenging for an airline from an underdeveloped region of the world such as North Africa. 
Egypt Air owns shares in many tourism companies and hotel chains, such as Cairo Airport 
Mövenpick, Tut Amon, Nefertari in Aswan and Abu Simbel, and Taba Hilton resorts in Sinai. 
It also owns shares in many charter companies, such as Shorouk Air and Air Cairo. Such 
investments have increased Egypt Air’s assets tenfold since the implementation of its 
modernization and expansion plan in 1980 (Groenewege, 2003). 
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3-6 Terrorism in Egypt 
There is little doubt that the main challenge to the tourism industry comes from a major anti-
government extremist movement, the Islamic Group (IG, known in Arabic as Al-Gamaat-
Islamiya). IG emerged in the late 1970s with the principal objective of removing the current 
Egyptian government from power and replacing it with an Islamic regime. Affiliated to al-
Qaida, it is also strongly anti-American. Between 1992 and 1999, IG militants carried out 
several attacks against tourist destinations in Egypt, most notably in November 1997 at 
Luxor, when 58 foreign visitors were killed. Overall, 95% of violence in Egypt in the 1980s 
and 1990s has been blamed on IG (Essner, 2003: 9). 
In 1992, the Egyptian police and security forces embarked on a major offensive against 
Islamist groups. Coupled with these counterterrorism measures, the Egyptian parliament 
passed a new anti-terrorism law stipulating the death penalty for some crimes and 
subsequently the Egyptian martial judiciary sentenced a number of terrorists to death on 
charges of trying to overthrow the regime. The Islamist groups fought back through terrorist 
attacks, mainly on tourism destinations. Such attacks continued throughout 1993 and proved 
to be a suitable vehicle for terrorists to pursue their goals, while the tourism industry suffered 
considerably from these attacks, leaving a strongly negative image of Egypt as a tourist 
choice and resulting in the withdrawal of many international tourism operators from Egypt 
(Al-Awa, 2006). This time, the government accelerated its counterterrorism measures, 
undertaking a very large deployment of security forces. Those found guilty of terrorist acts 
received very severe punishments from the military courts, which in 1993 sentenced to death 
an unprecedented number Islamists: 38, of whom 29 were executed (Al-Awa, 2006: 141; Tal, 
2005). Not surprisingly, these measures were seen to conflict with the principles of human 
rights and triggered extensive international criticism. Such opposition caused the government 
to ease somewhat its aggressive countermeasures. It also adopted a policy of replacing the 
120 
 
stick with the carrot, allowing the political opposition to occupy some minor public posts 
(Kepel, 2005).  
The tug-of-war between the government and Islamist dissenters continued until 1997, when 
in a mass trial 98 opposition members were convicted on charges of subversion, four being 
sentenced to death and eight to imprisonment for life. This triggered a new wave of terrorism, 
including an attack on a tourist bus in Cairo which killed nine German tourists and injured 11 
others (Al-Awa, 2006: 143). The responsibility for this attack remains unclear, as the 
government claims the terrorists had no link with IG, but there is evidence to support a strong 
connection of IG members with the event, following which two suspected perpetrators were 
executed. This severe reaction led in turn to the tragedy of Luxor, in which 70 people, 
including 58 foreign tourists, were massacred by members of IG (Essner, 2003: 9; Wheatley 
and McCauley, 2008).  
This overreaction taught the government to place more emphasis on policies of reconciliation 
rather than repression. It therefore opened a dialogue with moderate opposition activists as 
part of a programme of national reform (Al-Awa, 2006; Kassem, 2004). As a result, the 
Muslim Brotherhood condemned the Luxor attack. Another political measure taken to combat 
terrorism was a secret agreement between Egypt and the West to facilitate the identification 
and extradition of IG leaders in exile. Since public opinion no longer supported the 
aggressive actions of terrorists, IG showed signs of seeking a ceasefire in 1999. In 2000, Al-
Jihad took the same route and declared a halt to terrorist attacks. The ceasefire was short-
lived, however: in October 2004, 34 people were killed in bomb attacks at Taba. These were 
followed by terrorist attacks in Sharm El Sheikh in 2005, in which 64 people died, and a 
series of bombings in Dahab in April 2006, which killed 20 people. The government has 
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linked these attacks to ‘terror cells’ of local Bedouin from North Sinai, which have 
connections to al-Qaida (Al-Awa, 2006; Wheatley and McCauley, 2008). 
Figure 3.3 is a graph of the numbers of terrorist incidents in Egypt between 1992 and 2006, 
showing clearly the episodic nature of the problem.   
  
 
Figure  3.3: Numbers of terrorist incidents in Egypt, 1992 – 2006  
Source: MIPT Terrorist Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org  
 
3-7 Conclusion 
Progress in the tourism industry in Egypt was extremely slow under Nasser; however, in the 
aftermath of his death, the country drew attention back to tourism and since then, as the 
official statistics indicate, it has thrived and developed dramatically. The industry has, 
however, proved to be very vulnerable to security incidents. In response, the Egyptian 
government has employed a number of counterterrorism techniques. The results over the last 
two decades demonstrate the country’s capacity for rebounding strongly from such incidents, 
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but indicate that a sustained campaign to ensure long-term stability and security would be far 
more difficult. The first three chapters of this thesis have placed in context the problem 
addressed by the present study and examined in some detail its theoretical and historical 
background. The next turns to the selection of an appropriate research methodology. 
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Chapter 4 Research methodology 
4-1 Introduction 
From an examination of the literature on (social) research methods, it is evident that different 
scholars used different terminology for the same concepts in the field. For instance, Bryman 
(2004) uses the term ‘research strategy’ to cover quantitative and qualitative research types, 
while Saunders et al (2009) consider grounded theory, case studies and surveys as research 
strategies. Confusion reaches its peak when scholars seek to construct epistemological and 
ontological typologies and definitions. Easterby-Smith et al (2002), for instance, refer to 
‘positivism’ and ‘relativism’ as the ‘epistemology of science’ and to ‘realism’ and 
‘relativism’ as the ‘ontology of science’. Conversely, Bryman (2004) uses ‘interpretivism’ 
and ‘positivism’ as ‘epistemological’ terms, while ‘objectivism’ and ‘constructionism’ are 
labelled ‘ontological’. Such examples are abundant in the field. Thus, it is probably wise to 
rely on one typology or a few similar ones, without ignoring the merits of the others.  
The typologies and definitions of the overall methodology process offered by Saunders et al 
(2009) are often cited in the business and management literature. They use the metaphor of an 
onion to describe the formulation of research methodology in this field (Figure 4.1), 
suggesting that, as with an onion, one has to peel away the outer layers to reach the core; so 
one has to understand the research philosophy and the various approaches to research before 
dealing with the research strategies and the selection of appropriate data collection methods. 
Their work provides the foundation of terminology and definitions required to give an 
account of the methodology of the present research, which nonetheless sometimes makes 
reference to other authors. This chapter takes a brief look at the outer layers of the onion, 
termed the research philosophy, approaches and strategies, before offering a more detailed 
discussion of the data collection methods. 
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Figure  4.1: The research process ‘onion’ 
Source: Saunders et al (2000: 85) 
 
4-2 Research philosophy 
A research philosophy captures the way researchers think about the genesis and evolution of 
knowledge and is often described by the term ‘paradigm’, which in turn “refers to the 
progress of scientific practice based on people’s philosophies and assumptions about the 
world and the nature of knowledge; in this context, about how research should be conducted” 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997: 47). In business and management, three dominant paradigms are 
usually identified: positivism, phenomenology (or interpretivism) and pragmatism.  
Social science methodologists explain the positivistic and phenomenological paradigms 
through different assumptions as to ontology and epistemology. Ontological assumptions 
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seek to address the substantial question of the nature of reality. The positivistic paradigm 
views the social world as having an external existence, objective and singular, apart from 
the researcher, while the phenomenological paradigm sees reality as subjective and multiple, 
depending on the ways humans perceive and experience the world. Epistemological 
assumptions deal with the nature of knowledge: what can be known, how knowledge can be 
obtained, and the relationship between the researcher and the researched. Positivism views 
the researcher as independent from what is being researched, whilst the phenomenological/ 
interpretivist paradigm assumes a kind of interaction between researcher and researched 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003). These fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality and 
knowledge have implications for the way research is conducted. Positivist researchers focus 
on facts and seek cause-effect relationships and basic patterns that can be tested. In contrast, 
phenomenological/interpretivist researchers seek to develop a holistic understanding of the 
meanings people attach to their experiences of the world, sometimes immersing themselves 
in the research context and collecting data by a variety of means. Table 4.1 outlines the main 
elements of these two paradigms and the role of the researcher in relation to them.  
Table  4.1: Key Features of Positivist and Phenomenological Paradigms 
Aspects Positivist Paradigm Phenomenological Paradigm 
Basic belief The world is external and objective. 
Observer is independent. 
Science is value-free. 
The world is socially constructed and subjective. 
Observer is part of what is observed. 
Science is driven by human interest. 
Researchers 
should 
Focus on facts. 
Look for causality and fundamental laws. 
Reduce phenomena to simplest elements. 
Formulate hypotheses and then test them. 
Focus on meanings. 
Try to understand what is happening. 
Look at the totality of each situation. 
Develop ideas through induction from data. 
Preferred 
methods 
include 
Operationalizing concepts so that they can 
be measured. 
Taking large samples. 
Using multiple methods to establish different 
views of phenomena. 
Small samples investigated in-depth or over 
time. 
    Source:  Easterby-Smith et al (1991: 27)   
In the world of social research, these different paradigms are often aligned with two distinct 
traditions of research, namely, quantitative and qualitative. Denzin and Lincoln (2000) note 
that measurement and analysis in quantitative studies are based on large amounts of data 
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which relate to causal relationships between variables rather than processes. Therefore, 
quantitative research consists of mathematical models, graphs and statistical tables. 
Qualitative studies, on the other hand, investigate things in their natural settings and try to 
make sense of phenomena using a variety of empirical materials such as case studies, 
observations or interviews, to name the most common ones. Quantitative research is usually 
associated with positivism and qualitative research with phenomenology, although Hussey 
and Hussey (1997: 55) indicate that “it is possible for a positivistic paradigm to produce 
qualitative data and vice versa.” Creswell (1994) appears to use the terms quantitative and 
qualitative synonymously with positivist and interpretive. He moves beyond the ontological 
and epistemological assumptions to clarify three other assumptions that distinguish the two 
paradigms (Table 4.2). 
Table  4.2: Distinctions between quantitative and qualitative paradigms 
Assumption Question Quantitative Qualitative 
Ontological What is the nature of 
reality? 
Reality is objective and singular, 
apart from the researcher. 
Reality is subjective and 
multiple as seen by 
participant in a study. 
Epistemological What is the relationship 
of the researcher to that 
researched? 
Researcher is independent from that 
being researched. 
Researcher interacts with 
that being researched. 
Axiological What is the role of 
value? 
Value-free and unbiased. Value-laden and biased. 
Rhetorical What is the language of 
the research? 
Formal. Based on set definitions. 
Use of accepted quantitative words. 
Informal. Evolving 
decisions. Use accepts 
qualitative words. 
Methodological What is the process of 
research? 
Deductive process. Causal 
relationship. Static design categories 
isolated before study. Context-free. 
Generalizations leading to 
prediction. Accurate and reliable 
through validity and reliability. 
Inductive process. Context-
bound. Emerging design 
categories identified during 
research process. Accurate 
and reliable through 
verification. 
Source:  Creswell (1994) 
The paradigmatic debate eventually diminished considerably in the mid-1990s and early 21
st
 
century (Patton, 2002), mainly because “most researchers had become bored with 
philosophical discussions and were more interested in getting on with the task of doing their 
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research” (Smith, 1996: 162-163). The pragmatist paradigm was a natural response to this 
frustration. Pragmatism as a research philosophy concerns what works well as a solution to 
problems (Patton, 1990). Pragmatists recommend that instead of focusing on parsimonious 
methodological distinctions, researchers should draw attention on the research problem and 
use all approaches at their disposal to understand it as much as possible. As Saunders et al 
(2009:109) note, “pragmatists argue that the most important determinant of the epistemology, 
ontology and axiology you adopt is the research question—one may be more appropriate than 
the other for answering particular questions”. That is said, this approach is typically associated 
with mixed-methods research in that the quantitative and qualitative methods to research are 
not dichotomous and disconnected. Instead, every element or aspect of a study is on a 
continuum between the quantitative and qualitative (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2009). Figure 
4.2 presents this continuum.  
 
Figure  4.2: The pragmatic approach as a continuum of quantitative and qualitative 
integration 
Source: Tashakkori (2006:21) 
In light of the above discussion, it can be argued that the present research lies somewhere 
between positivism and phenomenology and thus it adopts a pragmatist philosophy. Most of 
the studies reported in the literature which have applied the stakeholder concept to crisis 
management (e.g. Ulmer and Sellnow, 2000; Smith and Elliot, 2006; Alpaslan et al, 2009) and 
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to the tourism industry (e.g. Sheehan and Ritchie, 2005; Sheehan et al, 2007) have followed 
positivist principles. This research cannot be purely positivistic, however, because it also 
concerns national culture as a factor significantly influencing the way crisis management 
takes place in the context of the study. Since national culture has to do with human 
beliefs, attitudes and behaviour, it tends, as does any other research engaging these 
determinants (in contrast to physical laws or mathematical equations), to be largely 
phenomenological (Quinton and Smallbone, 2006). In addition, the ambiguity of the 
concept of terrorism means that the perceptions of its researchers will inevitably influence 
the subject of research. As suggested in Chapter 2, section 2-4-1, the extant literature on 
terrorism has proved to be biased and value-laden, reflecting as it does both ruling 
groups’ and authors’ assumptions and priorities.   
4-3 Research approach 
Research approaches also fall into two broad categories, inductive and deductive. Positivistic 
research follows a deductive logic, whereby the starting point is theory and the generation of 
hypotheses. Data collection is then carried out to test the hypotheses (Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
In phenomenological/interpretivist research, the research logic operates in the opposite 
direction, beginning with the collection of data and proceeding towards the development of 
theory (Bryman and Bell, 2003).   
 It can be argued that a mixed approach of induction and deduction is utilized in this thesis. A 
review of the extant literature made it evident that several scholars had already researched 
tourism crisis management in other contexts. As such, a deductive approach can be adopted, 
building the study on existing frameworks and verifying them by empirical research. An 
inductive approach is also applicable to the research, because there is very little literature in 
Egyptian context. The inductive approach helps to offer a general picture of the terrorism crisis 
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management situation in the tourism industry in Egypt and contributes to the development of 
hypotheses appropriate to this specific context.   
4-4 Research strategy 
Having decided on the adoption of the research philosophy and approach, the next step is to 
design the process of research or translate the research question into a research project 
(Robson, 2002). Saunders et al (2009) differentiate between two main tasks in research 
design: strategy and tactics. The strategy deals with the overall approach that the researcher 
adopts, whilst the tactics concern the finer detail of data collection and analysis. A wide range 
of possible research strategies are suggested by methodology scholars, including experiments, 
ethnography, action research, case studies and survey (Saunders et al, 2009). In the following 
a number of research strategies will be reviewed briefly and most of them rejected as 
inappropriate to this research, while the survey strategy, identified as the most suitable, is 
discussed at some length.  
Experiment is the conventional form of research customarily linked to natural science, 
although some social sciences such as psychology use it extensively. Experiments are 
conducted in a systematic way, either in a natural setting or in a laboratory, and are therefore 
associated closely with the positivist paradigm and the deductive approach (Bryman, 2004). 
Ethnography and participant observation (the most popular ethnographic research method) 
are used in some business studies within an inductive approach; although ethnography is not 
dominant in business research, it is the classic example of fieldwork research. Action 
research is a strategy which assumes that the social world is constantly changing and that the 
research and the researcher are part of this change. Consequently, the purpose of action 
research, which is used in applied sciences, is to find an effective way of bringing about a 
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conscious change in a partly controlled environment (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). Thus it is 
attached to a phenomenological philosophy.  
Case study can be defined as “the detailed examination of a single example of a class of 
phenomena” (Abercrombie et al, 2000: 41). Yin (2003) makes a distinction between holistic 
and embedded case study design. The holistic case study includes only one unit of analysis, 
while embedded case study consist of one or a number of sub-units. Dul and Hak (2008) 
provide a structured and broader view of the use of case study research in management and 
business studies. They make clear the differences between the varying uses of case studies, 
including the difference between practice-oriented and theory-oriented research. In particular, 
in addition to theory-building, they pay attention to two areas: theory-testing and replication, 
with its consequent impact on generalizability. Yet, the main focus of case study research in 
business remains theory building through qualitative research such as interviewing (Tharenou 
et al, 2007). Morris and Wood (1991) argue that a case study is most appropriate when one 
wishes to advance a rich understanding of the context of the research and the processes being 
followed.  
Survey is a very common strategy in business management research, owing to the advantage 
of collecting a large volume of data from a sizable population in a highly economical way 
and the ability to have control over the research process. Questionnaires, structured 
observations and structured interviews are the most popular data collection devices which 
belong to the survey category. Social research makes a distinction between descriptive and 
analytical surveys: the former deals with identifying and counting the frequency of a specific 
population, while the latter is concerned with determining whether there is any relationship 
between different variables. Surveys are largely linked to a positivistic paradigm and a 
deductive approach.  
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The most appropriate strategy is the one which is most likely to generate satisfying answers 
to the research questions. Therefore, experiments, ethnography and action research were not 
considered for use in the present study, while others, such as participant observation, were 
considered but then rejected. Initially, it was intended to adopt the case study strategy by 
focusing on one case (tourism destinations in Sharm El Sheikh) and employ semi-structured 
interviews to collect the data, largely because there is a dearth of literature on tourism crisis 
management in Egypt, so a case study would offer a better understanding of the nature and 
complexity of the research phenomena. However, when work on the first stage of study 
began in the field, it became apparent that this method failed to yield plausible and 
trustworthy results, mainly because contextual constraints and the sensitivity of the topic 
prevented informants from offering satisfactory responses. In addition, one of the objectives 
of this research is to give an overall picture of the management of terrorism crises in the 
Egyptian tourism industry, but the investigation of the single Sharm El Sheikh case would 
provide only a particular view, rather than an overview. Consequently, a questionnaire was 
also designed to collect complementary data from a wide range of respondents from Sharm El 
Sheikh and two other terrorism-affected destinations, namely Taba and Dahab, as well as a 
number of tourism stakeholders in Cairo, to provide a thorough picture regarding terrorism 
crisis management in Egypt. These amendments led to a number of changes in the research 
strategy. Therefore, it seemed most appropriate to combine the elements of a survey and a 
case study. 
4-5 Data collection methods 
Within the pragmatic research paradigm, the present study adopted a combination of 
methods intended to gather both qualitative and quantitative data (Bryman and Bell, 2007; 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). There are many designs for mixed methods (Creswell and 
Plano Clark, 2007), but the most basic families of design have been described as parallel, 
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sequential and conversion. A fourth family (fully integrated) includes combinations of these 
three basic types (Tashakkori et al, 2009). In parallel designs, two sets of data (one 
qualitative and one quantitative) are collected and analysed independently at the same time or 
with an interval, in order to answer a mixed research question. In sequential designs, the 
second round of data collection and analysis is rooted in (initiated from, made possible by, or 
modified according to) the results of the first set. In conversion mixed designs, the qualitative 
data are transformed (quantized) into numerical indicators that may be analysed separately 
using statistical techniques. Alternatively, in these studies, quantitative indicators (e.g. test 
results) might be transformed (qualitized) into qualitative data (e.g. profiles) that are analysed 
separately as they originated from a separate sample (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). In 
practice, many mixed-methods studies use a combination of these three families in an 
iterative and dynamic manner. These studies have been labelled fully integrated mixed 
studies, using an iterative mixed-methods design (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). 
This research design lies somewhere between sequential and parallel, with a tendency 
towards parallel design. This design allows the researcher to use both qualitative and 
quantitative methods dynamically, taking insights from one type of data to modify or 
enhance the other across stages of the study. As noted in the previous subsection, the main 
data collection process which began the field research included a number of exploratory 
conversations with tourism stakeholders in Sharm el Sheikh. Although these conversations 
were not conducted in a systematic way, the preliminary findings proved very helpful in 
making sense of the field reality and prompted the researcher to modify and enhance the 
theoretical basis of the study. Once the conceptual framework of the study had been 
determined, by drawing on the literature review and these exploratory conversations, it was 
possible to begin the main data collection process, comprising a structured questionnaire 
survey in parallel with semi-structured, face-to-face, in-depth interviews. Although these 
133 
 
steps seem to be in a logical sequence, at times the phases overlapped or even ran in 
parallel. This design allowed both quantitative and qualitative data to be gathered and thus 
for corroborated conclusions to be drawn (Creswell, 1999).  
Depending on the nature of the research questions and the sensitivity of exploring specific 
issues, further emphasis was placed on specific data collection methods which were more 
appropriate to addressing these questions. For instance, to explain the role of contextual 
factors (national culture) in the effectiveness of strategies, qualitative data proved to be more 
helpful than quantitative ones. Because of their qualitative nature, the interactions of the 
stakeholders were best analysed though qualitative methods. To address the overall impact 
of terrorism on the tourism industry, the data regarding the perception of stakeholders 
collected through interviews were compared and contrasted with the facts and figures based 
on official statistics (Table 4.3).  
Table  4.3: Links between research goals and methods of analysis 
 
Figure 4.3 presents a schematic view of the research process. The first stage comprised the 
literature review and the exploratory conversations in Sharm el Sheikh, which helped to 
Main goals of research Methods of analysis 
To identify and describe key stakeholders in the 
tourism industry and management of crises in 
tourism destinations  
Qualitative analysis, 
interview 
 
Quantitative analysis, 
questionnaire 
To describe and analyse the nature of the 
interaction among key stakeholders in normal 
situations and after crises 
Quantitative analysis, 
questionnaire 
 
Quantitative analysis, 
questionnaire 
To explain the role of culture in the interaction 
of stakeholders in crisis management in tourism 
Qualitative analysis, interview 
 
To promote deeper understanding of the crisis 
management techniques that stakeholders 
employ in the tourism industry to combat 
terrorism 
Qualitative 
analysis, 
interview 
Quantitative 
analysis, 
questionnaire 
Secondary data 
obtained from 
statistics 
To make sense of the overall impact of terrorism 
on the tourism industry in Egypt 
Secondary data obtained 
from statistics 
 
Qualitative analysis, interview 
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modify the theoretical basis, to provide a better understanding of stakeholder thinking and 
crisis management methods and to furnish the study with an initial framework. As discussed 
earlier in this section, the adoption of mixed methods required qualitative and quantitative 
data to be collected in a combined process. Quantitative data were collected through a 
structured questionnaire survey of 130 respondents in Cairo, 52 in Taba, 97 in Sharm el 
Sheikh and 49 in Dahab, while qualitative data were collected in 36 semi-structured, face-to-
face, in-depth interviews conducted in Cairo and Sharm al Sheikh. 
The remainder of this section gives details of the various stages of the data gathering process, 
both quantitative (4-5-1) and qualitative (4-5-2), beginning with the in-depth interviews. 
4-5-1 Qualitative interviews 
Designing and conducting the semi-structured interviews for this study was fairly difficult 
and involved the use of a number of procedures, including sampling, designing the interview 
protocol, running a pilot study and conducting the interviews, after which the data so 
collected was subject to analysis. Although these steps seem to be in a logical sequence, at 
times the phases overlapped or even ran in parallel. For example, when the first batch of 
interviews had already been carried out and partly transcribed, other interviews were just in 
preparation. The following subsections describe the various phases in greater detail. 
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Figure  4.3: Schematic view of the research process 
Source: author 
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4-5-1-1 Sampling 
The first step in any interviewing endeavour is to identify those people whose ideas are 
important for the research, or in technical terms, to produce a sample. The most common 
sampling method used for qualitative interviews is purposive sampling (Denscombe, 2010). 
This is a type of non-probability (or non-random) sampling in which researchers choose to 
select samples based on their subjective judgement rather than statistically at random 
(Babbie, 2010). Purposive sampling in particular allows the researcher to make choices 
among particular cases, because it will best enable the researcher to answer the research 
question and to meet the research objectives. It was also relevant to choose the sample so as 
to “... identify particular types of cases for in-depth investigation... the purpose is to gain a 
deeper understanding of types” (Neuman 2006: 222). In snowball sampling, the initial 
participants introduce further potential participants themselves. This kind of sampling is used 
“... to select members of a difficult-to-reach, specialised population” (ibid). These two 
sampling techniques were deemed most appropriate to this research.  
The main plan was to conduct several interviews with tourism stakeholders as well as 
security officials involved in counter-terrorism in Egypt, in order to elicit a range of opinions 
and ideas. Because of the sensitivity of the terrorism issue, the security officials who were 
approached refrained from participating in the research. As mentioned in the literature review 
(section 2-5-5-1), the most common classification of tourism stakeholders is that which 
makes distinctions between private, public and non-profit sector stakeholders. A clear 
distinction was also identified in the pilot study between local and central stakeholders, in 
Sharm El Sheikh and Cairo respectively, so a matrix was constructed which combined these 
two dimensions to produce six categories of stakeholder (Table 4.4).  With regard to time and 
financial resources, a sample size up to a maximum of thirty-six interviews had been set, 
ideally to be shared equally among the six categories. The initial choice of respondents was 
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based on the Egyptian Tourism Information Guide (Dalil Maloomat al-Siahiah Mesriah), a 
booklet released by the Ministry of Tourism identifying key tourism stakeholders, such as 
public authorities and others involved in tourism. In addition, during the interview process, 
the snowball technique was employed so that respondents could introduce others whom they 
assumed to have the relevant characteristics and valuable information as to the purposes of 
the study (Saunders et al, 2009). The final sample of respondents thus included not only key 
stakeholders but also their referrals, representing divergent stakeholders from government 
agencies and private sector organizations. Of the total of 36 interviews, 17 were conducted in 
Cairo and 19 in Sharm El Sheikh; more specifically, there were 15 interviewees from public 
bodies (eight in Cairo and seven in Sharm El Sheikh), 16 from private sector organisations 
(eight each in Cairo and Sharm El Sheikh) and five from the non-profit sector (one in Cairo 
and four in Sharm El Sheikh) (see Appendix Five).  
Table  4.4: Interview sample 
 Public Private Not-for-Profit 
Cairo 8 8 1 
Sharm el Sheikh 7 8 4 
 
4-5-1-2 Designing interview questions  
This section discusses the technical issues involved in designing the interview questions, 
whereas specific details relating to the content of questions according to the research 
objectives and main themes will be discussed in Chapter 5. The task of designing started with 
a determination of the interview objectives. These objectives, which were derived directly 
from the study purpose, were translated into open-ended questions, based on the literature 
review. In other words, the objectives were represented in conversational form in order to 
collect deep information related to the study themes. In addition, using open-ended questions 
allowed the researcher to involve respondents fully and naturally in the interviews (Daymon 
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and Holloway, 2002). The structure recommended by the various resources has more or less 
the same structure, including the following elements.  
1)  Introduction: information regarding the researcher and the main goals of research, use of 
findings, confidentiality and permission to record. 
2)  Questions: open questions, starting with general background information regarding the 
respondent’s role, then turning to more specific questions. Finally, a question regarding 
whether the respondent would like to ask anything or add to the list of questions. 
3)  Presentation of interim findings and discussion, time permitting and off the record. 
Overall, the interview questions were carefully written and formatted to cover the research 
themes while taking into consideration several important factors, including flexibility, the 
duration of each interview, the opportunity to cross-check the validity of the responses and 
the clarity of the questions. For example, interviewees were asked to identify the other 
stakeholders involved in the tourism industry in Egypt and not included in the list of 
stakeholders provided, then to assess which of these were most influential in the industry in 
general and in tourism crisis management in particular.  
Based on the main themes of the research, interview questions were designed to cover these 
main themes: the identification and importance of stakeholders, the differing impact of 
terrorism crises, crisis management and the role of national and organizational culture. To 
ensure the flexibility of questions, each theme was represented by a number of more specific 
questions according to the respondents’ categories. Thus, although the main themes were the 
same, three different series of specific questions were designed within each theme, 
appropriate to peculiarities of private, public and non-profit stakeholders. For instance, for 
private stakeholders the focus of specific questions was on how they were able to cover 
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financial losses, while public stakeholders were asked if and how they allotted financial help 
to the private sector. A copy of the interview questions is given in Appendix Three. 
4-5-1-3 Pilot study of semi-structured interviews 
The pilot study is an important stage in any research. As noted in the introduction to section 
4-5, the results of this pilot study were used to shed light on both the main qualitative 
interviews and the quantitative survey. Given that in this research, qualitative and quantitative 
analysis were conducted in parallel, the pilot study provided a good opportunity to make 
sense of various aspects of the field research. It consisted of a series of exploratory 
conversations with key stakeholders in Egypt and was carried out with the cooperation of the 
Director of the Tourism Department in the Ministry of Tourism in Cairo, managers of the 
Sharm El Sheikh Marriott Hotel, one tour operator and a manager of Egypt Air. These 
selected people were all involved in managing the terrorism crisis that affected tourism in 
2005; therefore, they were knowledgeable about the research topic.  
The information gained from a pilot study can be divided into two broader categories:  
logistical topics (e.g. learning about the field time needed to cover certain procedures and 
how to get access to respondents) and more substantive ones (e.g. refining a study’s research 
questions) (Yin, 2003). The logistical issues will be discussed in greater detail in section 4.6 
on the sensitivity of the research, while the present subsection seeks to review the numerous 
lessons learned and challenges identified regarding the study aims and research questions. 
Perhaps the most important issue to be clarified was that of the importance of stakeholders. A 
number of stakeholders were identified and an important distinction was perceived between 
those on one hand who sit at the centre and are involved mostly in decision-making and those 
on the other hand who work in the locally affected terrorism destinations and are tasked 
largely with the implementation of crisis management policies.  
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As a result of these pilot interviews, the structure of the main interviews was amended. In 
particular, the issue of the impact of inadequate financial help and the negative effect of 
terrorism crises on the quality of life of the entire country were included in the questions. In 
addition, the respondents were found to be unfamiliar with the terminology of cultural 
dimensions, such as ‘power distance’. The researcher therefore decided to use words which 
were familiar to the local tourism industry, as part of the language used in the everyday 
conversations of Egyptian tourism stakeholders.  
In summary, the findings of the exploratory qualitative study provided insights which 
allowed the researcher to more fully understand the concepts and helped him to identify 
issues affecting the management of terrorism crises in Egypt as perceived by various tourism 
stakeholder groups. These results assisted in preparing both the interview and survey 
instruments so as to address the research questions appropriately. 
4-5-1-4 Conducting the interview 
Once the sampling frame had been determined, the next design choice was to gain access to 
the respondents. Easterby-Smith et al (2002: 90) note that “an important factor underlying the 
effectiveness of social interaction within qualitative interviewing is trust” and that “the first 
point is to ensure that one is well clued up” about the interviewee. Due to the sensitivity of 
the terrorism issue there were a number of barriers to establishing a rapport with participants. 
A number of measures were therefore undertaken to manage the sensitivity of the topic. Key 
to the concerns of Egyptian participants was the need for official proof that the researcher 
was authorized to conduct the research. This required the researcher to show a letter from the 
relevant authorities in Egypt confirming his position. Obtaining such a letter required a 
lengthy procedure. He first had to ask his employer, the Saudi Ministry of the Interior, to 
draft a letter to the Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau in London, because the research was due 
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to be conducted outside Saudi territory. In turn, the Bureau had to inform the Saudi Embassy 
in Cairo, which contacted the local authorities, requesting them to issue the necessary letter 
(see Appendix Six). This procedure was carried out in due course; however, no reply was 
forthcoming from the Egyptian authorities, so the researcher had no choice but to travel to 
Egypt to pursue the matter in person. After three months of direct contact and requests, the 
researcher finally obtained approval from the Egyptian authorities, but this was only verbal.  
All in all, the cooperation of the Egyptian authorities was very poor and unsatisfactory. The 
only helpful support the researcher received was from the Ministry of Tourism, after he 
managed to visit the Minister with a recommendation from the Saudi Embassy in Egypt (see 
Appendix Six). The Minister made it possible to arrange a number of interviews with people 
in his department, such as the Director of the Hotel Sector and Tourism Villages, a 
spokesperson at the Ministry of Tourism and the Director of the Crisis Management Unit in 
the Ministry. However, many stakeholders engaged in the crisis management of tourism did 
not operate under the auspices of the Tourism Ministry. Nevertheless, informing the rest of 
participants that a number of tourism authorities had participated in this project reassured 
them and make them feel that their own participation was possible, especially when the 
researcher provided them with some names of senior managers at the Ministry of Tourism 
who had agreed for their participation to be recorded and declared, such as those mentioned 
above.  
In the main study, a total of thirty-six interviews were conducted in Cairo and Sharm El 
Sheikh in September, October and November 2007, each lasting two to three hours. One 
significant factor that influences the quality of the qualitative analysis is “subjectivity or 
qualitative researcher’s internal understanding of the phenomena” (Hays and Singh, 2011: 
145). Some authors argue that to minimise subjectivity, researchers are well advised to base 
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their analysis only on data from the audio-recorded and transcribed text of interviews 
(Drapeau, 2002). In the present research, however, only 11 interviews were recorded, six in 
Cairo and five in Sharm El Sheikh, because it was felt that in consideration of the sensitivity 
of the topic, interviewees who had agreed to their responses being audio-recorded were more 
careful and restrained in their answers than those whose words were not recorded. For this 
reason, the researcher stopped seeking permission to record interviews; instead, during each 
interview he took notes and tried to make these as complete as possible. His fast typing skill 
was very helpful, allowing him to capture and record many details. As with transcribed data, 
the data produced in this way reflected accurately the responses of the participants and thus 
the subjectivity of the researcher was minimized. 
The prepared list of questions proved to be a good guide through the interview. However, 
some questions were sometimes dropped during the interview in favour of more important 
questions which arose during the course of it, and sometimes the sequence of questions was 
changed spontaneously. By November 2007 the phase of collecting primary data through 
qualitative interviews had been completed. 
4-5-1-5 Analysing the qualitative data 
The final stage of research design is the analysis and interpretation of data, because once 
researchers have collected their data, they need to analyse them to answer their research 
questions or test their hypotheses. This stage is essential to make sense of the research. As 
mentioned in section 4-2, a qualitative interview is associated with the phenomenological 
paradigm in which an in-depth understanding is pursued instead of explanation via causal 
relationships and findings that may be generalisable to similar settings and contexts.  
The first choice to make in analysis of qualitative data is whether software such as NVivo 
shall be used. A discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of computer-assisted data 
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analysis is an integral element of many studies of qualitative data analysis. The pertinent 
question is whether computers can take over the analytical process and how they can improve 
the validity of qualitative analysis, if at all. Computer-assisted data analysis can offer many 
advantages to the researcher in the storage, coding and systematic retrieval of qualitative 
data, especially when the researcher deals with an extensive amount of textual data. However, 
it is subject to some criticisms, including (1) the sacrificing of depth for breadth of analysis 
and the application of quantitative principles such as frequency, (2) the favouring of distance 
rather than personal engagement with data and (3) overemphasizing data analysis with 
grounded theory rather than a wide range of theories (Bazeley, 2007). Some scholars have 
attempted to address these criticisms largely by focusing on developments in software. 
However, the most significant concerns are that computer-assisted analysis cannot substitute 
for the analytic mind, nor can it provide a shortcut to data coding.  
Apart from the potential shortcomings indicated above, each of which can serve as a barrier 
to using computer-assisted data analysis in research such as this, the decision to use it in a 
particular project is influenced by a number of factors, such as the nature of the data and the 
researcher’s preferred approach to data analysis, which will have at its basis certain 
epistemological and ontological assumptions (Morison and Moir, 1998: 106). The present 
research relied on relatively short data extracts and focused on individualized understanding 
such as can be gained from interpretive, constructive, or negotiated processes, rather than on 
the thematic content of qualitative data. Having said that, computer-assisted data analysis 
would arguably be less beneficial to this study. A further practical reason for rejecting the 
application of analytical software is the fact that many of the functions of such software, for 
example searching for a series of interrelated texts, can be found in simple word-processing 
packages such as Microsoft Word, making it unnecessary and inefficient to invest the time 
needed to become familiar with intricate software packages. 
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Analysis of data is time consuming and researchers have to think about it in advance (Walsh, 
2001) and should organize such qualitative data into manageable formats. Perhaps there are 
long written answers or a great deal of tape to be listened to. This is what is called preparing 
data for analysis and in this case the act of data analysis is very likely to occur at the same 
time as the researcher gathers these data, as well as afterwards. It is widely believed that there 
are neither easy nor straightforward procedures in qualitative analysis. Yin (2003) refers to 
quantitative researchers as having access to several tried and tested statistical methods whilst 
qualitative and case study researchers have a number of language-based analytical techniques 
at their disposal. In contrast to statistical analyses, there are few certain formulas or pre-
determined structures at the forefront of qualitative analysts. However, many researchers 
suggest that the process of analysis involves certain distinct stages.  
For instance, Miles and Huberman (1994: 10) propose an interactive data analysis model 
consisting of the following three elements: data reduction, which “refers to the  process of 
selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written-
up notes or transcription”; data display, which “is designed to assemble organised 
information into an immediately accessible, compact form so that the analyst can see what is 
happening and either draw justified conclusions or move on to the next step of analysis the 
display suggests may be helpful”; and conclusion drawing/verifying, using various patterns, 
such as clustering, making metaphors, making contrasts/comparisons, finding intervening 
variables and noting relations between variables, building a logical chain of evidence, or 
making conceptual/theoretical coherence. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) point out that data reduction and data display are not separate 
from analysis but are part of it. The three streams of qualitative data analysis together with 
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the process of data collection can be represented either in parallel form or in a cyclical 
interactive model, as indicated in Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure  4.4: Interactive Data Analysis Model 
Source: Miles and Huberman (1994) 
Jennings (2005) proposes a modified qualitative analysis of interviews to suit tourism 
research. He divides the process into various stages which include all of Miles and 
Huberman’s (1994) tasks of analysis. He particularly identifies these stages: transcription, 
identification of general themes, specific findings relating to research objectives, comparing 
and contrasting specific findings, developing interpretations and verification, presentation 
and writing. Miles and Huberman (1994) and Jennings (2005) both seem to provide useful 
techniques in order to analyse the collected data. For the purpose of this research, the two 
concepts have been combined in a five-step-analysis-process. 
Step 1: Transcription 
After the interviews had been carried out, the tapes were transcribed. Linguistic 
characteristics such as dialect or fillers were cleared up as far as they had no relevance to the 
content. Although the literature suggests that interviews can be transcribed by other people 
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than the researcher, all the interviews were transcribed by the author himself in order to get a 
feeling for the data. 
Step 2: Creation of subject areas 
The transcribed interviews were read through several times in order to get a feeling for the 
data and the content. During this stage, some comments were made on each individual 
interview. These comments then led to the creation of relevant subject areas in combination 
with the already existing research subjects/questions mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
Step 3: Selection of statements and allocation to specific subject areas  
After the subject areas had been created, the transcriptions were read through again in order 
to select relevant statements, which were then allocated to the specific subject areas. 
Step 4: Comparison of statements within specific subject areas  
The individual statements within specific subject areas were then compared with each other 
in order to filter differences and/or similarities. Of special interest was the question as to 
whether there were any contrasts between public and private or local and central statements. 
Step 5: Conclusions 
From the data generated in the previous stages, conclusions were then drawn and were used 
to build principal research propositions and hypotheses, as described in greater detail in 
Chapter 7. 
4-5-2 Quantitative survey 
As noted in section 4-5-1, the qualitative and quantitative research phases were conducted in 
parallel. The quantitative phase, which took several months, comprised a number of stages. 
First, a the population frame had to be created and samples defined, then the questionnaire 
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had to be designed and pilot tested before it was distributed and collected. The last stage was 
to prepare and analyse the data. These stages are described in the following subsections. 
4-5-2-1 Creating the sample 
In order to conduct a survey, the first step is to make sense of its target population, which is 
“the entire set of individuals to which findings of the survey are to be extrapolated” (Levy 
and Lemeshow, 1999: 13). This target population is considered to be the ideal population to 
be studied, but this ideal is hardly ever achieved in practice. Instead, researchers choose to 
study a desired number of units, which is technically termed a sample of the population. To 
execute a real-life survey, researchers also need a sampling population or ‘sampling frame’, 
which is a comprehensive or quasi-comprehensive list of all units (e.g. people, employers, 
organisations) in the target population (Groves et al, 2004). The greatest challenge regarding 
sampling frames is that in some instances they do not represent the target population 
adequately, because they miss some parts of it or include item which lie outside it. The 
congruence or disparity between target populations and sampling frames has always been a 
matter of concern. Another problem is that a sampling frame is not always available to 
researchers, who therefore have to compile one that suits the research aims best by collecting 
the information from printed sources or digital databases.  
For this research, an accurate and up-to-date database (i.e. a suitable sampling frame) of 
tourism stakeholders involved in crisis management in Egypt was not available. Therefore, 
the first task of the researcher in creating a sample was to construct the such a sampling 
frame, so he conducted an archival search of the relevant sources. It became clear that there 
were a number of databases holding details of tourism stakeholders in Egypt, but they 
suffered from two main limitations. First, they were limited to private sector bodies, having 
been produced for commercial tourism purposes. Second, in several instances, detailed lists 
of names and addresses were incorrect or outdated. A very helpful source of information 
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proved to be the Egyptian Tourism Information Guide (Dalil Maloomat al-Siahiah Mesriah), 
which provides some useful key contact details for Egyptian tourism stakeholders. This 
provided a very valuable basis for identifying the target population, but in order to produce a 
more comprehensive list of the tourism stakeholders involved in crisis management and to 
collect accurate details of potential respondents for the purpose of the questionnaire survey, it 
was necessary for the researcher to consult lists compiled by the Egyptian Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation and by the Central Agency for Mobilization and 
Statistics, which provided useful data on both public and private sector stakeholders, with 
detailed lists of names and addresses. With respect to stakeholders in the non-profit and 
community sectors, a booklet published by the Ministry of Awqaf (Endowment) was used to 
compile a list of some imams, while the databases of the Egyptian Social Fund for 
Development offered useful information regarding other NGOs active in the tourism industry 
in Egypt. Overall, it was not difficult to create a list of public-sector tourism stakeholders, 
given the limited number of government agencies involved in the industry, but there was a 
potentially limitless number of organizations and representatives within the private sector 
involved in one way or another in Egyptian tourism. In the case of non-profit organizations, 
the task was even more challenging, as there was a clear lack of useful and publicly available 
data concerning these entities and their involvement in the tourism industry. 
Once the target population had been broadly defined, within the limitations noted above, the 
next step was to carry out the sampling. Probability sampling was not possible, because the 
population size was ambiguous. As discussed in section 4-5-1-1, non-probability sampling 
takes various forms. For this quantitative phase, quota techniques were deemed more 
appropriate than the purposive and snowball techniques used in the qualitative phase, largely 
because the relevant quota variables were available and the intention was to create a sample 
as representative of the population as possible (Babbie, 2010). Quota sampling, frequently 
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used in business and marketing, involves selecting a sample based on specific criteria, such as 
age, gender or social class, in proportions equal to those represented in the population. 
However, interviewers select individual respondents, rather than having a pre-defined list as 
with probability sampling (Fowler and Mangione, 1990). The non-probability nature of quota 
sampling means that it is not possible to estimate sampling error; however, its strength lies in 
the speed with which data can be collected and its usefulness in situations where no finite 
sampling frame exists (Moser and Kalton, 1971).  
The process of sampling begins with defining a matrix, describing the quotas in terms of 
strata of the target population. The first stratum represented the categories of stakeholders. 
The main categories of tourism stakeholders in Egypt had already been identified in the pilot 
study of the qualitative phase. They were divided into 10 categories: central/ local 
government; Ministry of Tourism; Ministry of the Interior (Tourism Police); General 
Authority for Promoting Tourism; hotels/ Hotel Association/ resorts; tourism companies/ 
travel agencies; Chambers of Tourism; airlines and cruise lines; religious scholars (imams); 
national media, international media (Al Jazeera TV’s representative in Cairo) and 
international tourism organizations (WTO representatives in Cairo and Sharm El Sheikh). 
The Tourism Police was later excluded as it refrained from participating in the research. 
Another distinctive feature was the central or local geographical location of stakeholders, a 
distinction being made between those stakeholders based in Cairo and those based locally in 
the terrorism-affected cities.  
Once these quotas were set and the matrix was created, the researcher proceeded with 
sampling by filling each cell of the matrix with respondents having all the characteristics of a 
given quota. An important consideration in this process was that all respondents in each cell 
should be given a weight appropriate to their proportion of the total population, so that the 
matrix would ultimately present a picture of respondents reflective of the whole target 
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population. This is illustrated in Table 4.5 in that the number of units allocated for sampling 
in each cell represents around 70 percent of the overall population. For instance, 24 
respondents in the sample had the characteristics of the first cell of the matrix (local/ 
governmental stakeholders in Cairo), making approximately 70% of the whole population of 
43. The respective numbers for Sharm El Sheikh, Taba and Dahab were 16 out of 29, 12 out 
of 19 and 14 out of 17.  
Table  4.5: Questionnaire matrix 
Location Cairo Sharm el Sheikh Taba Dahab 
Stakeholders 
categories  
Distribution of units 
in population and 
samples 
Distribution of units 
in population and 
samples 
Distribution of units 
in population and 
samples 
Distribution of units 
in population and 
samples 
Sample 
size 
Population 
size   
Sample 
size 
Population 
size   
Sample 
size 
Population 
size   
Sample 
size 
Population 
size   
Central/ local 
government 
24 43 16 29 12 19 14 17 
Ministry of 
Tourism 
58 89 37 48 18 31 17 26 
Ministry of 
the Interior 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tourism 
bodies and 
chambers 
40 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tourism 
companies/ 
travel 
agencies 
30 58 27 58 17 22 23 32 
Hotels/ 
restaurants/ 
associations 
21 41 22 41 18 37 25 31 
Airlines and 
cruise lines 
22 30 15 28 15 26 16 21 
National 
media 
20 24 19 23 8 9 0 0 
International 
Media 
3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Imams 8 19 13 23 12 17 5 9 
International 
Tourism 
Organization 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Total Number 228 372 150 250 100 161 100 136 
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This method of sampling has a number of inherent weaknesses. First, the samples might not 
be representative of their populations (although in this case the total populations—of private 
stakeholders in particular—were limited). The question is therefore how well these samples 
represent the populations as a whole. In this study, the populations under scrutiny were 
largely public, private and non-profit tourism stakeholders in Egypt. In the case of private 
tourism stakeholders, the sampling frame represents the population only partially, because it 
can be assumed that the available databases and booklets did not list all private sector 
stakeholders. One might conclude that the research does not represent accurately the crisis 
management situation in the Egyptian tourism industry. However, in the case of public 
stakeholders, the sample was drawn from an approximately complete list. In addition, the 
proportion of public stakeholders responding supports the conclusion that the sample was 
representative.  
Another limitation of quota sampling relates to the data analysis, in view of the fact that the 
selection of sample elements within a given cell may be biased, even though its proportion of 
the population is accurately estimated. In relation to this problem, it can be argued that the 
underlying assumption was that top stakeholders had unique characteristics giving them a 
greater influence on the overall management of security crises than that exercised by minor or 
peripheral stakeholders. For example, a large and prestigious hotel can be more effectively 
involved in crisis management than a small inn. However, it was assumed that local 
stakeholders would be of particular importance to the extent that they were involved directly 
in crisis management efforts, so the main sampling quota was allocated to them.  
Despite these justifications, these limitations of quota sampling have to be taken into 
consideration when dealing with samples. One option would have been not to include a 
quantitative stage at all, in light of the sampling problem. However, it was felt that a number 
of the factors emerging from the qualitative stage merited measurement. Therefore, other 
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strategies had to be found to overcome the above problems. The most popular strategy to 
address such limitations is the use of a multi-method approach, combining qualitative 
research with quantitative measures of population, as proposed by Silverman (2000). As 
noted in section 4-3 and 4-4, the methodology adopted for this study is based on a parallel 
mixed-methods approach involving qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey. 
Denscombe (2003: 133) explains the value of mixed methods as follows: 
Seeing things from a different perspective and the opportunity to corroborate 
findings can enhance the validity of the data. They do not prove that the 
researcher has ‘got it right’, but they do give some confidence that the meaning 
of the data has some consistency across methods and the findings are not too 
closely tied up with a particular method used to collect the data. Effectively, 
they lend support to the analysis. 
In summary, the problems of quota sampling were taken into consideration, limitations 
relating to this study were recognized and strategies were followed in order to overcome 
these limitations. 
4-5-2-2 Designing the questionnaire 
This section deals with the formal issues of questionnaire design (i.e. layout considerations, 
length of questionnaire, covering letter, pilot testing), while specific details relating to the 
actual content of the questionnaire (i.e. the initial questions according to the research areas 
and actual scales used in the questionnaire) will be dealt with in Chapter 6. 
Saunders et al (2009) suggest that the design of the questionnaire will affect not only the 
response rate, but also the validity and reliability of the data. They emphasise that a careful 
design of individual questions, a clear layout of the questionnaire form, a lucid explanation of 
the purpose of the questionnaire, pilot testing and carefully planned and executed 
administration of the questionnaire are crucial points in achieving a good response rate and 
ensuring reliability and validity. Hague (1992) identifies poor layout/sequence, inappropriate 
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length of questionnaire, inconsiderate questions and items which miss the mark as the major 
pitfalls of questionnaire design. 
Concerning an appropriate length for a questionnaire, Saunders et al (2009) recommend 6-8 
A4 pages. This is confirmed by Sharp, Peters and Howard (2002: 156), who explain that “it 
would usually be considered unwise to have a questionnaire requiring more than about 
twenty minutes to fill in or covering more than, say, six A4 pages.” The length of the 
questionnaire has always been considered an important issue in this study, assuming that it 
has an impact on the response rate. The aim of the research was therefore to restrict the 
questionnaire to eight A4 pages in order to produce a user-friendly booklet (four A4 pages on 
each of two A3 sheets, double-sided and folded). Length is also related to layout issues. In 
order to be manageable for the respondents, the questionnaire should be orderly and the 
instructions should be clear, according to Hague (1992), who continues that the convenience 
of respondents is a major issue in self-completion questionnaires and determines the response 
rate. Therefore, everything was done to make it easy for the respondent to fill in the 
questionnaire and reply to it, even if that meant additional work on the part of the researcher. 
Edwards et al (2002) note that questionnaires originating from universities are more likely to 
be returned than questionnaires from other sources (such as commercial organisations), so the 
University of Hull logo was reproduced on the cover of the questionnaire.  
May (2001: 100) emphasises that “the most important part of the actual design of questions is 
to construct them unambiguously and to be clear in your own mind what the question is for, 
who it is to be answered by and how you intend them to interpret it”. This advice was 
carefully followed in designing the questions. The actual process of question wording was 
based on recommendations made by May (2001), who rates the following points as 
important: ensuring that questions are not too general, using the simplest language possible to 
convey the meaning of the question, avoiding using prejudicial language and ambiguity, 
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eliminating vague words in order to avoid vague answers, avoiding leading and hypothetical 
questions, and ensuring that the respondents have the necessary knowledge to answer the 
questions. 
Questionnaires can be pre-coded to allow the classification of responses into meaningful 
categories and therefore to make the questionnaire easier to analyse (May, 2001). Pre-coding 
was considered but then abandoned, in the belief that respondents might be confused by 
additional numbers. Here again, the convenience of the participants was more important than 
that of the researcher. 
The cover letter is as important as the questionnaire itself, according to Czaja and Blair 
(1996: 82), who explain that it ought to help obtain cooperation. Therefore, it “must be eye-
catching (yet professional), clear (but brief), and compelling (but neutral). The letter must 
stand out from the welter of junk mail most people receive and must speak for the researcher 
to the respondent, addressing the key obstacles to cooperation.” A polite and clearly 
formulated cover letter was designed following the recommendations of Dillman (1978), 
Hague (1992) and Czaja and Blair (1996), including a personal salutation (whenever the 
name of the contact was known), a brief description of the research project, a rationale for 
selecting the stakeholders in question, clear instructions, a reassurance of confidentiality and 
anonymity, and finally contact details of the research team. The statement of confidentiality 
was made explicit, as this not only protects respondents’ identity, but also increases their 
willingness to take part in surveys (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Saunders et al, 2009). It was 
especially important in the Egyptian context at the time of conducting the fieldwork. Each 
letter was then signed by the researcher using blue ink.  
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4-5-2-3 Pilot testing 
Pilot testing is a crucial aspect of every questionnaire survey, as it enables one to “refine the 
questionnaire so that respondents will have no problems in answering the questions and there 
will be no problems in recording the data” (Saunders et al, 2009: 308). Oppenheim (1992: 64) 
adds that “studies which have been inadequately piloted, or not piloted at all, will find that a 
great deal of effort has been wasted on unintelligible questions producing unquantifiable 
responses and uninterpretable results.” The pilot test consisted of two stages.  
First, a draft of the instrument was shown to a group comprising 20 fellow postgraduate 
students of the Business School from Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries (Libya, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran), as well as some people working in the tourism industry 
across Egypt, including a manager of the tourism company Kimidar Tours and the Director of 
the Public Relations Office of the Tourism Development Authority in Sharm El Sheikh. 
Experts in questionnaire design within and outside the Business School were also consulted. 
They reviewed the questionnaire for clarity, wording and layout, then suggested changes to 
the first draft of the survey instrument. All pilot testers were contacted beforehand and asked 
whether they were willing to test the questionnaire. They then received a copy of the covering 
letter and the questionnaire. Following the recommendation of Bell (1999), they were also 
given a list of factors to consider, such as the length of the questionnaire, its layout and 
manageability as well as its content. Most of the pilot testers were quite happy with the length 
of the questionnaire, although three suggested a shorter version. The clarity of instructions 
was not a problem, according to the respondents. However, some suggested rethinking a 
number of the questions. For example, a question dividing strategies into ‘supportive’, 
‘marginal’, ‘non-supportive’ and ‘mixed blessing’ was deleted because of the ambiguity in 
the understanding of the concepts and difficulty in operationalization. The use of term 
‘terrorism’ was also reduced throughout the questionnaire, as many respondents considered 
156 
 
this a highly sensitive issue which made them reluctant to take part in the survey. Following 
pilot testers’ recommendations, the section about specific measures and strategies was 
reconsidered and modified, as the initial questionnaire offered a single list, whereas 
respondents felt that the list should be broken into three parts. The sections dealing with the 
powers of stakeholders and their interactions were also modified. In the initial questionnaire, 
two separate tables had been used for each stage of crises, while the pilot testers felt that it 
was better to merge all stages into one table. Thus, all tables these sections were reduced and 
some of them modified as suggested by some respondents.  
Based on this feedback, the researcher developed a second draft, which was subsequently 
delivered to seven stakeholders (three from the tourism industry and four from government 
bodies) in Sharm El Sheikh, who were asked to complete it and provide additional feedback 
on matters relating to content, wording, comprehension and the appropriateness of questions. 
At this stage, the Arabic wording of the questionnaire was improved according to pilot 
testers’ recommendations. Based on the recommendations of the respondents in the pre-test, 
the researcher then produced the final version of the questionnaire. The purposes of the pre-
test were to ensure that the instrument measured what was intended and to improve the 
quality of the questionnaire before finalizing the survey.  
All in all, pilot testing proved to be useful, as modifications in response to recommendations 
made by the pilot testers improved the quality of the final questionnaire. 
4-5-2-4 Distribution and collection of the questionnaire 
After the process of questionnaire design had been completed, the final instrument was 
distributed. The timing of questionnaire distribution was an important consideration, as it 
might well have an impact on the response rate. Gillham (2000: 46) suggests avoiding 
“holiday periods or when organisations are likely to be closed, or exceptionally busy”. In this 
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respect, the summer months seemed to be problematic, because all private stakeholders were 
likely to be very busy. The period shortly before or after summer holidays might also cause 
problems, as most private sector stakeholders would be preparing or reviewing their peak-
time activities. In the case of public stakeholders, however, the timing seemed less 
problematic. In view of these observations and considering the timeframe of the study, it was 
decided to approach private and public stakeholders at the beginning of September 2007, thus 
avoiding both the summer months and Christmas time, which is another busy season for 
tourism stakeholders. Given that the overall process of data collection took 3 months, it was 
over before the Christmas peak.  
Another decision which had to be made concerned the method of distribution of the 
questionnaire, in person or by post. The primary method was the latter: respondents received 
a mailed package including a covering letter, a questionnaire and a postage-paid return 
envelope, making it easy for them to reply and therefore contributing to the convenience 
factor mentioned by Hague (1992). In Cairo, the mailing package also included an 
endorsement letter from the Graduate School of Hull University. Unfortunately, no support 
was received from the Egyptian authorities to issue an endorsement letter which could also be 
attached. Instead, the researcher stated in the cover letter that verbal permission for the 
research to be conducted in the Egyptian tourism sector had been given by Egyptian Minister 
of Tourism. He also mentioned that some high level managers at the Ministry of Tourism  
had already participated in the project. These procedures helped to reassure respondents and 
to increase the level of participation.  Public stakeholders were pre-notified by telephone, as 
suggested by Jobber and O’Reilly (1996) and Edwards et al (2002), as their number was 
manageable.  
The distribution process was carried out in two stages: the physical preparation and actual 
sending out of the postal questionnaires. Lists were made of the addresses and names 
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provided in the population frame, then questionnaires, covering letters, requests forms and 
return envelopes were printed three weeks before distribution. A total of 578 letters were sent 
out to tourism stakeholders across Egypt on Monday, 08 September 2007. This caused no 
problems thanks to strict and solid planning. In the first instance, 201 completed 
questionnaires were returned, which was considered an unsatisfactory response rate. The 
importance of follow-up letters in reaching a high overall response rate is mentioned by 
various authors (Hague, 1992; Saunders et al, 2003; Gillham, 2000; Bryman and Bell, 2003) 
and supported by some studies (e.g. Edwards et al, 2002). Following recommendations made 
by Hague (1992), a special covering letter was created for the second mailing, emphasising 
the importance of contribution and reiterating the objectives of the study. The covering letter 
also included an apology in case the reminder had crossed with a response to the first 
mailing. It was decided to distribute the follow-up letters purely by post. This second mailing 
carried out at the end of October 2007, but the result was unsatisfactory. Therefore, to 
increase the response rate, the researcher hired a number of local assistants to issue frequent 
reminders to the respondents. However, these efforts failed to overcome serious difficulties 
faced during data collection, especially in Dahab and Taba. Therefore, to maximize the 
response rate, the local assistants contacted targeted stakeholders and in many instances 
visited them in person, leaving the entire package once again with those who agreed to fill in 
the questionnaires. They also telephoned all stakeholders on the list and requested their 
participation in the study. Those who agreed to participate were provided with the entire 
package either by fax or by arranging a hand delivery via a third party living in the town 
concerned. These attempts resulted in the return of 195 additional questionnaires. All in all, 
396 questionnaires were returned. The response rate is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.  
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4-5-2-5 Analysing the quantitative data 
After the quantitative data collection process had been completed, data analysis began. 
Chapter 6 explains the various stages of this process in greater detail, whereas this section 
provides a brief overview of the process and techniques used. The decision of which data 
analysis technique to use was based on a number of factors, including the techniques used in 
previous similar studies. Another decision criterion is stated by Bryman and Bell (2003), who 
note that the techniques used are limited by the type of variables and the nature and size of 
the sample. In the first version of this thesis, the researcher decided to use only simple 
descriptions, that is, simple summaries of the characteristics of variables. However, on the 
recommendation of the examiner, this version has been analysed in a more sophisticated way, 
employing sound multivariate statistical methods. 
Most statistical resources differentiate between two types of statistical analysis: comparing 
the groups and exploring the relationships. The former is called causal-comparative research 
and concerns differences between groups, aiming to compare the values of certain continuous 
variables for different groups and occasions, while the latter is termed correlational research 
an focuses on the strength of the relationships between variables (e.g. Charles, 1998; Gay & 
Airasian, 2000; Martella et al, 1999).  
According to Johnson and Christensen (2000: 3), a main distinction between these two 
methods is that “causal-comparative includes a categorical independent and/or dependent 
variable (thus the word comparative implying a group comparison) and correlational only 
includes quantitative variables”. The causal-comparative approach starts with the selection of 
two or more groups with existing differences, which are then compared on an outcome 
(dependent) variable. Some causal-comparative designs involve only two independent groups 
to be compared on a particular continuous dependent variable, for example, studying the 
differences between male and female students on exam scores. In such causal-comparative 
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studies, the most common technique is the t-test, for testing the research hypothesis that there 
are differences between the two independent sample means. Some other causal-comparative 
research designs involve more than two groups, for example, studying differences between 
white, black and Hispanic students on exam scores. In such work, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) will be used to analyze the data. Other causal-comparative designs involve 
studying differences between (among) two or more independent groups on two or more 
related dependent variables. In this case, multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) is the 
correct statistical procedure to determine whether two or more independent groups differ on 
more than a single dependent variable. It is important to note that the t-test, ANOVA and 
MANOVA are parametric statistical procedures that require interval- or ratio-level data, a 
large sample size and the satisfying of statistical assumptions such as normality and 
independence of observations.  
The present research has adopted a causal-comparative approach to analysis as more 
appropriate because it includes two different categories of stakeholders (local vs. central) and 
different stages of crises (pre- and post-crisis). In addition, the research produced an 
extensive set of variables by using a five-point Likert scale. Likert items can be analysed in 
different ways. It is common to treat them as interval- or ratio-level data, and if relevant 
assumptions are met, parametric statistical tests, which usually use casual-comparative 
research, can be applied. However, before proceeding to this technique, the quantitative 
analysis chapter first seeks to offer a descriptive general view by organizing and summarizing 
the Likert scales in terms of means and standard deviation scores in a tabular format. To do 
so, each table lists in descending order all means from the highest to the lowest. The mean is 
selected because it is the most commonly used measure of a central tendency and is what is 
commonly referred to as the average of the data values. In addition, this research uses cross-
tabulations methods to present descriptive statistical findings by using quadrant analysis, in 
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which responses to two rating scale questions are plotted in four quadrants of a two-
dimensional table (Zikmund and Babin, 2006:508). The research used the IBM SPSS 19 and 
Minitab 16 software as analytical tools to analyze and compare the basic information.  
4-5-2-6 Reliability and validity of the questionnaire 
According to Neuman (2006), although perfect reliability and validity are virtually 
impossible to achieve, there are principles that researchers can apply to improve both. 
Reliability deals with an indicator’s dependability, which means that the information it 
provides does not vary as a result of the characteristics of the indicator, instrument, or 
measurement device itself (Neuman, 2006). Reliability is concerned with the accuracy and 
precision of a measurement procedure. In other words, a measure is reliable to the degree 
that it supplies consistent results (Cooper and Schindler, 2003).  
To improve reliability, this study not only replicated some measures that other researchers 
had used but also used a pre-test approach, as noted in section 4-5. The purposes of the 
pre-test were to ensure that the instrument measured what was intended and to improve 
the quality of the questionnaire before finalizing the survey. As noted in section 4-5-1-1, 
there was a problem regarding the quota sampling that may have influenced reliability. As 
the samples were not random and the population of tourism stakeholders was potentially 
limitless, it would have been impossible to achieve perfect reliability. The results were 
potentially biased by the fact of who responded. However, this was unavoidable and does not 
negate the findings. 
Validity is the degree of fit between a construct and its indicators (Neuman, 1994). It 
refers to how well the conceptual and operational definitions mesh with each other or the 
extent to which a test measures what the researcher wishes to measure (Neuman, 1994; Cooper 
and Schindler, 2003). Two types of measurement validity, face and content validity, were 
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checked in this study. Face validity is a judgment by the scientific community that the 
indicator really measures the construct (Neuman, 1994). It was established in this case by 
asking experts in crisis management, tourism and terrorism studies whether or not the 
definitions and methods of measurement fitted. More specifically, the academic experts in 
crisis management were asked to determine how well the beliefs and perceptions of tourism 
stakeholders concerning crisis management were defined and measured in the study; they 
were also asked how well the stakeholder theories were defined in the study and whether 
the operationalization of stakeholder analyses measured what the study aimed to assess. 
The content validity of a measuring instrument addresses the question of whether the full 
content of a definition is represented in a measure. In other words, it is the extent to 
which the measuring instrument provides adequate coverage of the topic under study 
(Cooper and Schindler, 2003). To achieve content validity, thorough research was used to 
define concepts clearly and to select the scales used in the study, then an international scholar 
who was an expert in crisis management in the context of tourism was asked to judge how 
well the instrument covered the relevant dimensions of the topic under study. His expertise 
was used to determine whether the instrument was able to analyse the structure of existing 
relations among destination stakeholders and to verify the appropriate sample for the study. 
He suggested minor changes, which were made to the second draft of the instrument. 
4-6 Sensitivity of the Research  
It is no exaggeration to say that terrorism is and has been among the most sensitive issues in 
Egypt. Few researchers are willing to approach topics associated with terrorism, particularly 
when the link between terrorism and an economically significant activity such as tourism is in 
question. Apart from the lack of literature, the primary resources on the topic are very rare 
and inaccessible. As with other closed societies, there is a prevailing tendency in Egypt to 
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classify documents as secret for no legitimate reason (Hatem, 1994). The only available 
information is that which the authorities allow to circulate; it is mainly in the form of self-
presentation, speeches and published interviews in the public press, which are unreliable in 
many ways. For one thing, there is an incentive amongst Egyptians to misrepresent 
themselves and to confuse hopes with realities (ibid). 
What made the situation particularly complicated in respect of the present study was the risk 
and potential harm that respondents thought they would face if they contributed to the 
research. One participant stated, “I have every intention of making a contribution to the 
project, but please do not blame me, as the release of information you requested would put 
me behind bars”. Another challenge was the widespread suspicion of conspiracy among 
citizens at large, due to Egypt’s long colonial history. This negative perception made 
respondents very reluctant to offer full and correct answers to the questions (Hatem, 1994). 
They often saw the research as a plot hatched by rivals from abroad as a means to collect 
sensitive information and ultimately use it to damage the tourism industry in Egypt. 
A number of measures were undertaken to manage the sensitivity of the topic. The researcher 
routinely explained to interviewees the value of the study and assured them that he had in 
mind their interests as well as the search for knowledge. However, these measures proved to 
be inadequate in the Egyptian context to build trust with participants. Therefore, alternative 
methods were used to demonstrate the independence of the researcher. Key to the concerns of 
Egyptian participants was the need for official proof that the researcher was authorized to 
conduct the research. This required the researcher to show a letter from the relevant 
authorities in Egypt confirming his position. Obtaining such a letter required a lengthy 
procedure. He first had to ask his employer, the Saudi Ministry of the Interior, to draft a letter 
to the Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau in London, because the research was due to be 
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conducted outside Saudi territory. In turn, the Bureau had to inform the Saudi Embassy in 
Cairo, which contacted the local authorities, requesting them to issue the necessary letter 
(Appendix six). This procedure was carried out in due course; however, no reply was 
forthcoming from the Egyptian authorities, so the researcher had no choice but to travel to 
Egypt to pursue the matter in person. After three months of direct contact and requests, the 
researcher finally obtained approval from the Egyptian authorities, but this was only verbal.  
All in all, the cooperation of the Egyptian authorities was very poor and unsatisfactory. The 
only helpful support the researcher received was from the Ministry of Tourism, after he 
managed to visit the Minister with a recommendation from the Saudi Embassy in Egypt 
(Appendix six). The Minister made it possible to arrange a number of interviews with people 
in his department, such as the Director of the Hotel Sector and Tourism Village, a 
spokesperson at the Ministry of Tourism and the Director of the Crisis Management Unit in 
the Ministry. However, many stakeholders engaged in the crisis management of tourism were 
not under the auspices of the Tourism Ministry. Nevertheless, informing the rest of 
participants that a number of tourism authorities had participated in this project reassured 
them and make them feel that their own participation was possible, especially when the 
researcher provided them with some names of senior managers at the Ministry of Tourism 
who had agreed for their participation to be recorded and declared, such as those mentioned 
above.  
Another measure that helped to increase quality and validity, while minimizing harm, was to 
give participants assurances of confidentiality (Palys and Lowman, 2006). To this end, 
interviewees were promised that information given to the researcher would not be disclosed 
in such a way that the participants could be publicly identified. However, many were still 
reluctant to participate fully and to share information, because the anonymity of participants 
165 
 
is partial in face-to-face interviews (Marx, 1999). To ensure full confidentiality, so that 
nobody could know the identity of participants in any way, a questionnaire with no identifiers 
was designed and local assistants were asked to distribute it under conditions of complete 
anonymity. In this case, since the researcher himself did not know the names of respondents, 
other interested parties were unlikely to attempt to access confidential research files. Such 
anonymity, however, raises validity concerns, because it was also impossible to know 
whether the survey was completed by the desired respondents; yet it was the only possible 
way to collect data while ensuring thorough confidentiality. The abovementioned measures 
all helped to increase the likelihood that participants would provide truthful information. 
However, because of the high sensitivity of the topic, it was very difficult to carry out the 
research in such a context.  
4-7 Summary 
This chapter has examined the methodological considerations applicable to a study of this 
kind and described in detail the choices made and procedures followed at each stage of the 
research design and implementation. It began by stating the purpose, the objectives and the 
research questions, then discussed the central conceptual issues, taking research philosophy 
as comprising five concentric dimensions: research paradigm, research approach, research 
strategy, data collection methods and time horizon. The choices made at each level were set 
out and explained. There was then a description of the qualitative and quantitative data 
collection methods used, including the selection of a research sample for the fieldwork and 
the administrative procedures followed. After a description and justification of the data 
analysis procedures which were adopted, the chapter ended with a consideration of the 
sensitivity of the research topic. The results of the data analysis are set out in detail in the two 
chapters which follow, beginning with the qualitative data gathered in face-to-face interviews 
with tourism stakeholders in Egypt. 
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Chapter 5 Qualitative Data Analysis 
5-1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present an analysis of the qualitative data gathered during the 
study. Drawing on the research objectives set out in Chapter One, the interview responses are 
grouped into five subject areas, each covering a major theme in the Egyptian context. The 
first research objective was to examine the salience of stakeholders in tourism crisis 
management and the ways in which this changes at different stages of a crisis. Thus, section 
5-2 examines data on the identification and salience of tourism stakeholders before and after 
crises. The second objective was to describe and analyse the nature of the interactions among 
key stakeholders in tourism when managing a crisis, both in a normal situation and after the 
crisis. This theme is explored in section 5-3, while section 5-4 addresses the fourth objective, 
to promote a deeper understanding of the crisis management techniques employed in 
managing the different stages of terrorism crises, by analysing responses concerning the 
methods adopted by stakeholders, categorized as preventive and recovery strategies. The 
third research objective was to explain the role of organizational and national culture and 
their impact on the stakeholders’ involvement in crisis management in the tourism industry; 
section 5-5 is devoted to addressing this crucial question. The final research objective, which 
was to examine the economic and social impacts of terrorism on the tourism industry in 
Egypt, is dealt with in section 5-6 and the chapter ends with a summary of the findings. 
Within each of the sections, responses to interview questions are analysed, compared and 
contrasted, then where appropriate, the findings are visualised by means of diagrams.   
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5-2 Identification and salience of stakeholders in tourism   
The main purpose of the questions in the first section of the interview was to elicit data which 
would provide information on the identification and importance of tourism and crisis 
management stakeholders in Egypt. To this end, respondents were first asked to identify the 
main stakeholders in the tourism industry as a whole and those involved in crisis management 
in particular, then to prioritize them in terms of their key roles in managing terrorism crises.  
The majority of respondents reported an impression of ambiguity concerning the 
classification of stakeholders as belonging to the private and public sectors; they also 
appeared uncertain about the existence of an independent non-profit sector in the Egyptian 
tourism industry. On the other hand, most referred to an obvious distinction between 
stakeholders based in Cairo and those operating locally in tourism destinations, the former 
being responsible for making major decisions and the latter for implementing those decisions, 
reporting to the central authorities and providing consultation services to them. Due to the 
politically and administratively centralised nature of public decision-making in Egypt, the 
key decisions on crisis management issues were made at a very high level of government in 
the capital, according to four public-sector interviewees who involved in making key 
decisions in Cairo (CPP1, CPP3, CPP6, CPP9). This was said to be especially the case when 
decisions had to do with tourism crisis management. A respondent in Sharm El Sheikh said:  
“All we do is to report to the Minister of Tourism in Cairo, who can make decisions 
about crises in the light of these reports” (SPP10).  
This was supported by other respondents, one of whom said: 
“We register hotel occupancy rates through our internal offices and report them to the 
Minister of Tourism in Cairo. He reports to the Prime Minister and President of the 
Republic, who in turn make decisions....” (SPP9). 
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Another clarified this: 
“In case of a massive crisis such as Sharm El Sheikh in 2005, decisions are taken at 
the highest level, such as the Prime Minister and the Tourism Minister....  I do not 
know how, but it seems to be through taking into account the related authorities’ 
reports” (SPP10).  
When asked to identify the crisis management stakeholders in Egypt, including in tourism, 
respondents referred to two important bodies: the National Crisis Management Committee 
(NCMC) and the Crisis Management Unit (CMU) at the Ministry of Tourism. The NCMC 
was said to be responsible for making decisions on all potential crises facing the country, its 
members being the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Tourism, the Minister of the 
Interior and the Chairman of Egypt Air. The committee was chaired and coordinated by the 
Prime Minister and decisions were based on reports and comments received from responsible 
ministers (CPP1, CPP5, SPP11).  
The CMU was said to be largely responsible for the management of tourism crises, as its title 
implies. The director of the Unit explained that its original brief was simply to publish 
positive news about tourism destinations to improve their image in the target markets, but 
that the role of the CMU within the ministry had changed, so that it now acted as mediator 
and coordinator between the Ministry of Tourism and other relevant stakeholders in the 
public and private sectors (CPP1).  
Respondents were asked to list as many stakeholders as possible that they perceived to be 
important in the Egyptian tourism industry. On occasions, a list based on that of key tourism 
stakeholders proposed by Sheehan and Ritchie (2004) and other major tourism textbooks was 
provided, to help respondents to remember the key stakeholders in their own particular 
context. The suggested list comprised central/ local government, the Ministry of Tourism, the 
Ministry of the Interior (Tourism Police), tourism chambers, tourism companies/ travel 
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agencies, hotels/hotel associations/ restaurants/restaurant associations, airlines and cruise 
lines, imams, state media, international media, governments of generating markets and 
international tourism organizations.  
Once an initial list of key stakeholders in Egypt had been made, the researcher asked 
respondents to classify them as private, public and non-profit organizations, but many found 
it difficult to distinguish clearly between the public and private sectors. Indeed, Egypt stands 
in contrast to many Western countries in that it is difficult to draw a clear boundary between 
public and private sector organizations within tourism, as government has penetrated all 
aspects of the industry. Some large tourism organizations like Egypt Air, a national airline 
company, are largely government owned, while the ownership and operation of others, such 
as Misr Travel, a leading Egyptian travel agency, are under public control. This matter was 
mentioned implicitly or explicitly by the majority of interviewees, one of whom noted:  
“We are hardly able to differentiate among hotels, tourism companies and airlines from 
the private sector and the Ministry of Tourism with all its departments from the public 
sector, representing the main stakeholders in tourism in Egypt... They are so interwoven 
that even members of staff have no clear idea of their career identity”  (CPP7).   
However, there was a working solution to this problem, as one of the respondents (CPP1) 
declared that the most important criterion distinguishing the public from the private sector in 
Egypt was that the revenue of public sector organizations would appear as components of the 
national budget. 
It is also notable that non-profit and community organizations appeared not to have 
consolidated a significant role in the Egyptian tourism industry. The prime example of these 
organizations is the Egyptian Tourism Federation, which several respondents described as not 
entirely independent of the public sector (CPP1, CPP10, SPP11). Another group of 
stakeholders of this kind is religious establishments and imams.  Indeed, one of the most 
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controversial aspects of stakeholder identification in the Egyptian tourism industry is whether 
to consider religious scholars or imams as independent stakeholders. Another ambiguity 
regarding these stakeholders is their potential role in tourism in general. Some of the 
participants indicated that imams played no significant role in tourism (SPP7, CPP5, SPP1). 
However, one of the participants emphasized the importance of the role that they could play 
in persuading people of the importance of tourism to the community:  
“There is little doubt that imams play an important role in the tourism industry, as most 
Egyptians are religious and respect them. Thus, they have power to persuade people 
through their sermons, enhancing the hospitality culture and raising public awareness of 
the importance of tourism” (SPP9).  
With the reservations noted above regarding ambiguity and uncertainty, the responses of 
interviewees can be interpreted as amounting to the classification of stakeholders set out in 
Figure 5.1.  
Finally, respondents were asked to put these stakeholders in order of their importance in 
managing terrorism crises. In general, they rated the public stakeholders as more important 
than the private ones. In addition, many emphasized that the importance of the stakeholders 
differed considerably once a crisis occurred. As one respondent said:  
“In normal times the all tourism stakeholders have a balanced weight, but during 
a crisis, the situation is totally different. There is chaos and the police role is 
dominant and the Crisis Management Unit of the Ministry of Tourism has a 
marginal role” (SPP12).  
Shortly after the resolution of terrorist attacks or during the recovery stage, however, the most 
important stakeholder appeared to be the General Authority for Tourism Development 
(GATD) within the Ministry of Tourism. The GATD was said to be responsible for 
marketing campaigns throughout the world, through its internal and external offices (SPP7). 
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It also had close relationships with private sector organizations (CPP5) and Egyptian 
embassies abroad (SPP7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  5.1: Tourism stakeholders classified as public, private and non-profit  
Overall, the responses of interviewees provide the basis of a better understanding of the 
various stakeholders in the Egyptian tourism industry and their affiliations within the classic 
sectorial divisions of public, private and non-profit sectors. A rough idea also was gained as 
to their importance in normal times and times of crisis. The most crucial finding of this 
section was that in the Egyptian context a functional distinction can be drawn between local 
and central stakeholders. Broadly speaking, the public and central stakeholders were found to 
play more important roles than their local and private counterparts. It was also shown that 
Stakeholders 
Public 
Tourism chambers 
Hotels and restaurants 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 
Non-profit 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 
Private 
Airlines and cruise lines 
Ministry of Tourism 
Central/ local government 
State media 
International media 
International tourism organizations 
Imams 
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during a crisis the security sector would play a dominant role, to be replaced at the recovery 
stage by the GATD.  
5-3 Stakeholder interaction and stages of crisis management   
Having identified and classified the stakeholders and assessed their relative importance 
before, during and after crises, the next step was to discover the nature of their interactions in 
normal times and during crises. According to the theoretical underpinnings spelled out in the 
previous chapters (particularly sections 2-5, 2-5-5-4 and 2-5-6), the extent to which 
stakeholders tend to cooperate or pose obstacles will determine the nature of their 
interactions, as will how and how often they interact with one another. As with the changes in 
the importance of stakeholders which follow the occurrence of a crisis, it was argued that the 
ways in which stakeholders interact differ considerably before and after crises. Drawing on 
these theoretical debates, several questions were formulated to address whether and how the 
stakeholders interacted to manage a crisis.  
Interviewees were first asked about their perceptions of the importance of stakeholder 
cooperation before and after crises in the tourism industry. Interestingly, there was 
widespread agreement among respondents that the cooperation of stakeholders was of great 
importance. The expressions they used to stress the importance of this engagement included 
‘essential and very important’, ‘integral part of any crisis management’, ‘the essence of the 
proper solution to the crisis’ and ‘a basic part of any successful action’. Two respondents 
argued that the cooperation of stakeholders in crisis management had made the well-
organized engagement of stakeholders more or less inevitable. One explained: 
“There are hotel managers, customs officers, Ministry of Health to follow up the 
wounded, Ministry of Foreign affairs etc. … During a crisis, some countries send planes 
to repatriate all their nationals... All these must have a high level of cooperation” 
(SPP14). 
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Similarly, another respondent said: 
“There is no doubt that cooperation is very important in the tourism sector due to the 
wide range of stakeholders often involved, including hotels, airlines, tourism companies, 
shops, other public services, government security … effective communication and 
cooperation between stakeholder and among their subsidiaries and internal departments 
is vital” (SPP11). 
Although there was consensus on the importance of cooperation, most interviewees declared 
that actual cooperation among tourist stakeholders in Egypt was poor. One clearly spelled this 
out:  
“There is cooperation, but unfortunately less than we would expect. All stakeholders are 
more or less reluctant to cooperate (CRP23). 
Interviewees identified several major barriers to efficient cooperation. Some attributed the 
difficulty of cooperation to the massive size of the tourism industry and the involvement of a 
wide range of stakeholders from different sectors. One said: 
“The tourism sector needs an advanced communication network which brings together 
different parties such as the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Interior from the 
public sector with hotels, tourist companies and airlines from the private sector. Although 
they have little in common, they are working in one field. Considering such a wide range 
of stakeholders it is very difficult to reach compromises among them” (CPP8).  
In the same vein was the following contribution:  
“The nature of the tourism sector implies the involvement of different parties from 
different areas...  Yes, all of them are active in the field of tourism and in the service of 
tourists, but there are fundamental differences: hotels differ from the Ministry of 
Tourism; similarly, airline services differ from tourism companies” (SRP17). 
This problem was noted by other respondents in different terms; for example:  
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“There exists cooperation among most of the relevant ministries. However, in some cases 
the nature of the work simply does not allow good cooperation with others, as each party 
has its functions which are distinct from others. ... Cooperation gets underway in the 
tourism industry when a crisis happens, but perhaps the size of the industry and its 
inclusion of both public and private sectors makes cooperation between them very 
difficult” (CPP13).  
Some respondents associated the problem of the size and diversity of stakeholders with 
another problem, which they called the sector-oriented behaviour of different organizations. 
Interviewees referred to this as a major obstacle to satisfactory cooperation. One said: 
 “Sector-oriented thinking means each party works alone and pursues only its own 
interests. Therefore, cooperation between stakeholders is not what we would hope” 
(SPP12).  
An important factor that was said to adversely affect cooperation among stakeholders was the 
occurrence of crises. Several respondents stated that during crises, cooperation among 
stakeholders would fall to its lowest level. One spelled this out:   
“It’s true that all stakeholders show a willingness to cooperate, but during a crisis, 
everything is entirely different. As chaos prevails, everyone works individually; everyone 
wants to do his work regardless of the others’ work. Everyone feels that his work is more 
important than the others. In fact, according to what I’ve heard from my colleagues, 
what’s needed is a neutral position to carry out coordination among all stakeholders” 
(SRP26). 
In this context, security agencies were identified as the most difficult stakeholders with which 
to cooperate. As one respondent complained: 
“The most difficult people to cooperate with are those in the Ministry of the Interior, 
which represents tourist security. They are very reluctant to engage in this 
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communication. This unfortunately causes a big gap... I do not know the reasons behind 
their behaviour; they may have their reasons, but ultimately this leads to failure to 
interact satisfactorily with us” (SPP13).  
Another interviewee described how in the case of the Sharm El Sheikh attacks, the police 
acted by taking the lead and ignoring others: 
 “... there was real chaos... there was no prior coordination between the police and the 
hotel... Police prevented any person or vehicle from entering, even those whose services 
were urgently needed. It took several hours to get permission to enter; only ambulances 
were allowed to enter” (SRP26).  
The uncooperative behaviour of the security sector was itself a consequence of a 
phenomenon which respondents called the securitization of crises. This was confirmed by 
other respondents, one of whom said:  
“Presumably, the police should not be the only responsible actors and ignore the decisive 
roles of stakeholders… but the police always use the security excuse to justify all actions 
and take the lead… Perhaps the most important reason for the domination of the police is 
the securitization of crises in Egypt” (SRP26).  
As a result, some respondents called for an effective central body to coordinate these diverse 
parties and put aside their differences. The CMU was set up within the Ministry of Tourism 
to play just such a role, according to a senior manager of the Unit: 
“Our main task is to bridge between the public and private sectors before, during and 
after a crisis. [...] There is permanent cooperation between the public sector, represented 
by the Ministry of Tourism, and the Egyptian Federation of Tourism Chambers, which 
represents important private sector bodies. The Federation has a governing council 
which can meet in cases of crisis. The heads of the individual chambers gather with the 
head of the Federation and the Commissioner of the Crisis Management Unit. It is 
chaired by the Minister of Tourism…” (CPP1).  
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However, almost all other respondents declared that the coordinating role of the Ministry of 
Tourism was unsatisfactory and that the security sector had gained the upper hand.  
Notwithstanding this criticism, there was agreement that once an immediate crisis had passed 
and recovery strategies were being followed, the coordinator organizations played a more 
important part. As will be discussed in greater detail in section 5-4, the GATD was found to 
play a crucial role in coordinating these recovery strategies. The Egyptian Federation of 
Chambers of Tourism had traditionally acted as a coordinator between public and private 
sector organizations. Many participants confirmed that they had communicated with the 
public sector through the Federation and directly. One said:  
“There is cooperation, of course, depending on the nature of the work and common 
interests. We also cooperate with government departments such as the Ministry of 
Tourism through the chambers” (CRP16).  
The findings regarding the factors affecting cooperation among stakeholders at the various 
stages of crises are outlined graphically in Figure 5-2, where a positive effect is indicated by 
(+) and a negative one by (-).  As Figure 5.2 illustrates, a number of interrelated factors were 
seen as preventing stakeholders from cooperating with one another efficiently in normal 
times. These included inherent characteristics of the tourism industry such as its extremely 
large size and its dispersal across the diverse sectors of the economy. The interview data 
indicate that these two factors in turn gave rise to sector-oriented behaviour, in that each 
organization tended to work alone and to pursue only its own interests. This lack of 
cooperation was seen to worsen whenever a crisis arose: the security sector would take the 
upper hand during crises and have the last word, while the Ministry of Tourism Crisis 
Management Unit would exercise only a nominal coordinating function. By contrast, there 
was said to be some degree of cooperation once crises began to diminish, as the GATD and 
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the Federation of Chambers of Tourism began to play an important role in facilitating 
interactions among stakeholders.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure  5.2: Factors affecting stakeholders’ cooperation at different stages of crises 
The next question was formulated to elicit information about the means and frequency of 
communication among stakeholders. Most respondents answered that they contacted one 
another from time to time, using both modern technology and traditional means of 
communication, as these three responses show: 
“Our contact with travel agencies outside Egypt is through email, to send programmes 
and tourism offers... Tourism companies are our customers, so there is close cooperation 
with them” (CRP21).  
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“It is typical contact by using the usual means of communication such as email, phone, 
fax and others... Of course, most communications are concerned with bookings and 
organizing celebrations... We contribute to the financing of some events” (SRP27). 
Two important common features of these examples of communication given by stakeholders 
were that they were limited to handpicked counterparts with whom they had most in common 
and that contact was made only when the need arose, rather than on a regular basis. As one 
respondent said: 
“Our contact is largely confined to those people with whom we are linked by common 
interests... There are also some meetings with the relevant agencies, such as some 
airlines, but just when the need arises, or when one of the parties requests it” (CRP22).  
Similarly, another stakeholder stated:  
“We use all modern communication channels. Direct contact through meetings and 
things like that... Our contact is, however, with people who are linked with us in common 
interests, but regarding the others, contact will take place if there is a need” (CRP16).  
Given these features, it is apparent that the relative infrequency and the nature of 
communication would be unlikely to facilitate effective and comprehensive cooperation 
among the multiple tourism stakeholders in Egypt.  
5-4 Methods and techniques of crisis management 
The main aim of the third section was to understand better how terrorism crises are managed 
in the tourism industry in Egypt by asking respondents various questions about their 
perceptions regarding the strategies and techniques they adopted to deal with crises. 
Following the research theoretical framework, this section was divided into two subsections, 
covering the prevention and recovery methods used in this regard.  
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5-4-1 Preventive methods 
As discussed in section 2-3 of the literature review chapter, a number of methods are used in 
tourism crisis management to prevent crises. The application of these methods in turn gives 
an indication of the extent to which the stakeholders concerned act in a reactive or proactive 
manner. The preparation of contingency plans and the training of personnel were identified as 
two important methods which could be used to help prevent crises.  
The first question to interviewees on the topic of prevention asked about contingency plans 
for managing terrorism crises. The results reveal that the CMU in the Ministry of Tourism 
had formulated a series of plans setting out the tasks of each stakeholder in the event of 
certain crises (CPP6). For instance, one respondent stated:  
“To my knowledge there is a department or unit for crisis management in the Ministry of 
Tourism, and one of its main tasks is to formulate preventive plans to manage a crisis. In 
fact, I do not know its details, but there is a plan for sure” (CPP4).  
Another, representing the airline industry, noted: 
“Yes, there are plans. Each tourism site has a plan. For example, at the airport, we have 
a plan about how to deal with skyjacking. In terms of terrorism crises, especially Sharm 
El Sheikh 2005, we made use of a plan that had been used on a previous occasion” 
(SRP19). 
However, respondents referred to a number of shortcomings associated with this approach, 
stating for example that the plans were not disseminated adequately to all stakeholders, most 
of whom were unaware of the existence of such plans and preventive measures. They also 
criticized the plans as narrow and selective, giving a poor fit to some types of crisis and 
making them particularly inappropriate to terrorism crises. One respondent declared:  
“As far as I am concerned there have been some preventive plans, especially in the health 
and emergency services. For example, in the recent terrorism crisis (Dahab 2006), the 
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sector was totally prepared to cope with the crisis by rapid treatment of injuries and 
wounds … there was also financial help available to reimburse the losses to some 
services. However, there was no comprehensive plan for terrorism crisis management” 
(SPP13). 
Another respondent confirmed the existence of such a plan, but stressed its ineffectiveness 
because it took for granted the cooperation of stakeholders with one another: 
“Some plans have been formulated in advance. However, they fall short of efficiency in 
practice in confrontation to the crisis. ... In fact, each stakeholder works separately when 
a crisis takes place. Things are mixed up... confusion occurs both at the individual and 
organization level” (CPP5).  
Perhaps the most severe challenge identified as facing these contingency plans and their 
implementation was lack of finance. Since fiscal planning is an integral part of any 
contingency plan, the next set of questions addressed the issue of the budget for such plans. 
There was almost complete consensus among respondents that there was no such budget. One 
said:  
“There is no specific budget for crises....  but as soon as a crisis takes place, it will be 
estimated and allotted” (CPP2).  
Another stated:  
“There is no specific budget for confronting terrorist attacks, but according to my 
knowledge, it is possible for the Tourism Minister to allot the budget of other resources to 
the crisis, an emergency measure which results in the suspension of other projects” 
(CPP4). 
The next question asked whether and how organizations prepared themselves for a possible 
terrorism crisis through simulations and training. The results reveal a lack of such training 
among tourism stakeholders, for tourists and citizens in general in Egypt. However, the most 
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intriguing aspect of the responses here was the negative perception of Egyptian tourism 
stakeholders of the necessity and usefulness of such training. The only respondent who did 
not deny its merits was from the CMU; she maintained that the lack of interest among 
Egyptian stakeholders in training was a result of a shortage of funds:  
“No, we are not undertaking training to prepare to confront such terrorist crises, largely 
because it is very costly for the tourism industry in Egypt… Tourism companies’ expenses 
are very high. It is supposed that the expenses will come from the company’s profit... 
Many travel agents in Egypt are in debt to banks as a result of overstaffing” (CPP1). 
Some respondents argued that training was unnecessary because maintaining security was 
beyond their power and authority. They considered that this kind of activity should remain 
exclusively in the hands of police and security sector. One respondent stated: 
“We are not warriors to protect against terrorists. We are the staff of a hotel. A hotel is 
like a home. All the people working here and tourists love peace and living in peace. 
Tourists are looking for enjoyment and workers are looking for a living” (SRP25). 
Similarly, another respondent asked: 
“When security escorts are present everywhere in the city, why we should bother to take 
unnecessary courses to prepare ourselves for potential attack?” (CRP17).  
Other respondents attributed the uselessness of training to the very nature of terrorist attacks. 
In their view, such attacks cannot be anticipated or prevented. One stated:  
“Regarding tourism companies, I believe that they have taken preparedness measures, 
but the problem is that terrorism incidents are unexpected crises or are beyond their 
control. For example, a crisis has already happened in Sharm El Sheikh in the past, when 
heavy rain blocked the main route to the airport and this caused a muddle in passports 
and among tourist arrivals and their accommodation.... Once again, at Sharm El Sheikh 
Airport when its water supply was cut off. All these unexpected crises... Yes, we expect a 
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terrorism crisis but do not expect many such crises, which may seem to be simple, but 
their impacts and damage are significant” (SRP18).  
Figure 5.3 illustrates the relationships among a number of factors that were found to have 
contributed to the inefficiency or lack of major preventive strategies. As noted above, 
contingency plans were available but were not effectively executed because knowledge of 
them was not adequately disseminated and made available to all stakeholders. Furthermore, 
interviewees considered them to be narrow and selective, thus failing to fit well with many 
types of potential crisis. Another shortcoming of these strategies appears to have been 
insufficient attention being given to coordination between the diverse stakeholders involved 
in the tourism sector. It also appears that the financial resources required for the formulation 
and implementation of such a programme were not available. Finally, training in preventive 
strategies was reported not to have been generally provided, largely because of widespread 
negative perceptions as to the efficacy of such training programmes. These factors can be 
seen as having combined to produce poor preventive strategies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  5.3: Factors associated with poor preventive strategies 
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5-4-2 Recovery strategies  
Several questions were formulated to elicit data concerning the recovery methods. The 
central concern of this subsection of the interview protocol was to obtain a clear 
understanding of the strategies adopted and steps taken after a crisis to restore the image of a 
destination or the industry as a whole from the negative impact of terrorism. Drawing on the 
conceptual framework of the study, four distinctive groups of such strategies were identified: 
information dissemination, reassurance campaigns, marketing schemes and financial 
assistance.  
Interestingly, the findings of the research are that the recovery strategies used in Egypt were 
very much consistent with the latest developments in such techniques in other parts of the 
world. This may have been partly because the Egyptian government had paid specific 
attention to the enhancement of the most enduring qualities of the national tourist industry 
and to keeping pace with modern marketing techniques. One respondent explained how such 
techniques had been improved and modernized in Egypt by resorting to foreign experts and 
encouraging the private sector:  
 “As a result of the terrorist crises in the nineties, we entered into contracts with a foreign 
public relations company for training on how to deal with media and answer journalists’ 
questions. It was very helpful... but I believe that the private sector in Egypt has a greater 
capacity and strategies to recover rapidly from crisis” (CPP5).  
Another respondent also emphasised the role of the private sector in improving modern 
campaigning techniques:  
“Marketing campaigns fall within the responsibility of the GATD through its internal and 
external offices, which make contracts with foreign agencies, but we should not overlook 
the role of the private sector in marketing Egypt around the globe” (SPP9). 
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Interviewees reported that several strategies were followed at this stage. The first concerned 
measures for the dissemination of accurate and updated information. As an interviewee 
explained: 
“There is also follow-up of the situation in the foreign press, especially in the target 
markets. We make sure that there is no incorrect information transmitted; this often 
happens in the absence of information about a crisis. Where there is no true information 
about a crisis, the circulation of false information becomes easier... All journalists want 
to fill space in their papers or TV programmes; therefore, you must give correct and 
updated information” (CPP1).  
An additional mechanism, undertaken by the GATD, consisted of coordinated publicity and 
public relations activities, aimed at creating positive public opinion among the media, local 
community and customers. The director of the GATD in Sharm El Sheikh stated:  
“We are part of everything here. We have to pass information and statements to the high 
level immediately after any incident...  everything related to air traffic, statistics on 
victims in hospitals, compensation inquiries such as shop owners, stores and restaurants 
affected by the crisis. They come here to register their names as victims eligible for 
compensation... There is an important step taken by the minister and the Supreme 
Council for Tourism, which was held for the first time after the events of the Sharm El 
Sheikh and represented by the President of the Republic” (SPP9).  
Other PR methods commonly mentioned by interviewees included press interviews, 
conferences and television advertisements. One explained: 
“There were TV advertisements for internal and external tourists... normally, there was 
also a campaign at all levels to educate people (shop owners, taxi drivers and others) to 
highlight the importance of tourism to the country and their own benefit” (SRP25). 
In addition to these information dissemination and PR measures, various reassurance 
campaigns were reported to have been run following crises in Egypt. One common measure 
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was on-site visits by senior figures in authority. This strategy was thought to give importance 
and credibility to the crisis management team and extend the message that everything was 
under control. The presence of the President at destinations targeted by terrorists was 
intended to achieve such goals (SPP9).  
Another measure involving senior political figures was foreign diplomatic trips by the 
Minister of Tourism. One respondent said:  
 “After the incident, there was an overwhelming concern among Italian nationals, who 
represent around 30-40% of the tourists at Sharm El Sheikh; the same percentage of 
Italian tourists were present there during the crisis. The Italian authorities warned 
Italian tourists to avoid travelling to Sharm El Sheikh and this caused a sharp reduction 
in the number of tourists visiting Sharm El Sheikh after the events. This forced the 
Egyptian Tourism Minister to travel to Italy to persuade the Italian government that 
things were back to normal in Sharm El Sheikh” (SPP10). 
Another respondent described additional diplomatic efforts in this vein: 
 Egyptian Embassies around the world also make distinctive efforts in marketing Egypt 
around the globe after a crisis. They cooperate with international travel agencies in 
marketing Egypt in these countries” (CPP3).  
The reassurance campaigns described as being used in crisis management in Egypt varied 
widely. Another commonly reported by interviewees was to invite journalists or other media 
people to visit affected destinations, as explained in the following response:  
“We welcome all media delegations, either radio or television, important personalities 
who have an important role in their societies. We accompany these delegations to inform 
them of the security situation after the incidents, especially in areas that have been 
targeted by terrorist acts. This is mainly because we want to show these people on behalf 
of their respective communities and audiences that the situation is now normal” (SPP11).  
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Similarly, a Cairo-based public servant said:  
“We organize regular visits (called van trips) for media and tourism companies. These 
visits continue until business recovers after the incident” (CPP1).  
Referring to the main task of GATD, a local respondent stated:  
“They used their external tourism offices effectively. To my knowledge, these offices used 
several means such as holding press conferences, inviting journalists and those interested 
in tourism to visit Egypt and get a firsthand account of the situation...” (SPP13).  
A person from the tourism chamber made a similar point:  
“Tourism chambers play an important role in the transmission of positive information 
when officials from tourist-exporting countries visit Egypt after any crisis, to show them 
that the situation is normal and that the whole country, especially tourism destinations, is 
completely safe and secure” (CPP3). 
These statements reveal the extensive efforts of tourism stakeholders in undertaking these 
recovery strategies.  
Another group of strategies used by Egyptian stakeholders to accelerate the recovery process 
was marketing schemes. The most common of these methods was reported as focusing on 
new markets. One respondent stated: 
“After the Sharm El Sheikh events, we faced a considerable reduction of tourism from 
markets such as France, Britain and Italy; as such we drew attention to the Arab 
countries and the Gulf States. ... In fact, it was since the Sharm El Sheikh crisis that we 
discovered lucrative markets such as the Gulf, other Arab countries and Scandinavia” 
(CRP21). 
In parallel with such strategies, stakeholders encouraged domestic tourists to travel to 
Egyptian destinations (CPP3), while substituting other tourism destinations in Egypt for the 
affected places, as the following interviewee explained:  
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 “Temporarily, we removed Sharm El Sheikh from our packages, while focusing on other 
areas such as Luxor, Cairo and Aswan. Afterwards, we started gradually to offer Sharm 
El Sheikh in our tourism packages when normal life returned to Sharm El Sheikh and 
security improved” (CRP16).  
Another effective marketing scheme undertaken by Egyptian stakeholders in the private 
sector was to reduce prices while offering very attractive packages. Two such interviewees 
said: 
“Travel and tourism companies presented new offers with discounted prices. This 
reduced our income, but to recover from the crisis and return to normal, we had no 
choice” (SRP18).  
 “We reduced our tourism package prices as much as we could, but we did our best not to 
discriminate against employees in their redundancy payments. We only reduced the 
profitability of the tourism packages by asking hotels to give us a discount to help 
Egyptian tourism products after the crisis” (CRP16).  
The reductions in some cases were as much as fifty percent, as the following respondents 
reported:  
 “We reduced prices by 40%, which helped travel agencies to sell our packages at a 
discount in a competitive market. By this method, we were able to overcome the crisis” 
(CRP16).  
“The reductions made after crises are often deep. In some crises they tend to be over 
50%. This is our only weapon... It is really attractive prices... The cost of a trip to Egypt 
after a crisis can be one third of the cost of the trip at normal times” (SRP27).  
The final group of strategies identified and recommended in the literature is financial 
assistance. Surprisingly, many respondents stated that no financial assistance was available 
from the government. One said:  
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“Despite the fact that we were in desperate need of financial help, we did not receive any 
assistance from any source” (SRP21).  
A similar complaint was this:  
 “We as a company did not get paid and do not know if there is support or not. It should 
be allotted by the state, but as a private sector organization we did not receive any 
support or loans. I could control the crisis with my employees by reducing the 
profitability of our tourism packages... It was not easy to overcome the crisis, but we were 
patient and were able to manage” (CRP16).  
The only financial help available was said to be in the form of bank loans, which were 
difficult to obtain when needed:  
 “Sometimes the loan process is a lengthy one, as the banks wait until they are sure that 
the situation has returned to normal, so it is difficult to obtain a loan shortly after a 
crisis. This is a big problem... I do not know what I can say to you, but it is not easy for 
any party to receive a loan. It needs a long procedure and many guarantees” (CRP17).  
Given the lack of available funds to compensate for the damage caused terrorist attacks, it can 
be concluded that terrorism crises will tend to have serious effects on the lives of Egyptians 
for whom the tourism industry represents a major source of income, whether directly or 
indirectly. This issue is discussed further in section 5-6 of this chapter.    
The findings of the present section on crisis recovery strategies in the Egyptian tourism 
industry are summarized in Figure 5-4. As discussed above, the combined efforts of public 
and private sector stakeholders appears to have led to success in the formulation and 
implementation of these strategies. In particular, the dissemination of accurate and updated 
information, efficient and coordinated PR techniques, effective reassurance campaigns and 
suitable marketing schemes were reported to have contributed positively to effective recovery 
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strategies. The only factor working against this trend appeared to be the lack of sufficient 
public sector finance for such recovery strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  5.4: Factors associated with efficient recovery strategies 
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Since organizational culture is a very broad and inclusive concept, drawing on Schwartz and 
Davis (1981: 33), it was defined for participants as: “a pattern of beliefs and expectations 
shared by the organization’s members, resulting in the norms that shape the behaviour of the 
individuals in the organization”. First, respondents were asked to describe the culture of their 
organization based on the definition they were offered. Almost all respondents said that they 
believed in the importance of tourism as the guiding principle determining their behaviour. 
One said: 
“We are fully convinced of the importance of tourism for the country and for every 
individual working in tourism and I think that every Egyptian knows that tourism is 
beneficial to Egypt” (CPP1).  
Another elaborated on this theme:  
 “Of course, everyone is aware of the importance of tourism to the country. They also 
realize the effects of crisis on the country. Tourism has moved the country to a good 
position in the world... Tourism has proved to contribute to the economic recovery of the 
country in general and every individual’s lifestyle in particular. There is an important 
point, which is that tourism is not limited to a certain category; tourism is for all, from 
the highest level, such as hotels and company branches, to the lowest level, such as street 
traders” (SPP15). 
This core belief was termed by many ‘tourism culture’ or ‘tourism thinking’. One respondent 
said:  
“In my opinion, Egypt as a tourist country primarily needs to enhance the tourism culture 
among all citizens ... I mean that everyone should be aware of the importance of tourism 
for the country in general and for every individual in particular, whether working in 
tourism or in another area... Simple farmers and shepherds must know that they also have 
benefits from tourism, both in the marketing of agricultural products and marketing sheep 
as meat to tourists and restaurants, hotels and so on” (SRP29). 
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Regardless of this wide awareness of the importance of tourism in every aspect of Egyptian 
daily life, there were also many cultural barriers that appeared to hinder efficient crisis 
management in tourism. Some respondents argued that these cultural barriers were not 
limited to tourism organizations but rooted in the culture of the country itself. One said:  
 “It is a national culture that has prevailed in the country for ages, so it is difficult to 
change or adopt another country’s culture. The managers, senior staff and workers all 
share it. The existing culture obviously covers tourism organizations” (SVP36).  
Similarly, another respondent said:  
“It is our current culture. Most of the staff here come from this country, therefore our 
culture is not very different from the dominant culture in the country” (CRP19).  
Interviewees were then asked to give their opinions regarding the different dimensions of 
national culture affecting stakeholders’ crisis management. Although the dimensions of 
national culture were not elicited explicitly from respondents, their answers interestingly 
represent ideas which are very consistent with these dimensions. The most important cultural 
obstacle, according to many respondents, was individualism, described by them as the 
egoistic and dictatorial culture. This is distinct from the concept of individualism as opposed 
to collectivism. One respondent explained this problem as follows: 
“Unfortunately, we are still suffering from a culture of egotism, self-centredness and 
dictatorship in decision-making.  I am afraid to say that it is the dominant culture in our 
administration” (CPP8). 
This problem was described by another respondent as “individual-based” decision-making 
(CPP7). A consequence of such a cultural orientation was what others called “the culture of 
secrecy” and “lack of confidence”. It is also inconsistent with the concept of uncertainty 
avoidance. One said: 
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“An enduring problem in Arab administrations is a culture of secrecy. Secrecy is always 
predominant, precluding cooperation and hindering communication between different 
parties working in tourism... In fact, there is no satisfactory cooperation, which is really 
required... Decisions are always taken individually” (SPP12). 
The same problem was ascribed by another respondent to a lack of confidence:  
“There are too many negatives in the culture. There is a lack of confidence in official 
statements and there is also a lack of confidence in official statements about crises...” 
(SVP34). 
Perhaps the most infuriating cultural obstacle described by stakeholders is what they termed a 
“culture of reaction”. This concept also reminds us of short-term orientation. This cultural 
feature was described by one respondent as follows: 
“A culture of reaction dominates in the chambers of tourism, tour companies and travel 
agencies. In fact, not only there ... but at all levels. There are angry and emotional 
outbursts at moments of crisis, as it is known that the Egyptian people are emotional 
people. You can observe the Egyptian people’s warmth and kindness in the street and at 
the same time they are very hot blooded, especially when a crisis or a problem occurs. 
Stress and anger intensify in a crisis, but they soon calm down. After a short period of 
time, everything is forgotten and nobody bothers to think about problems” (CPP23). 
Two other respondents offered contributions which were consistent with this:  
“It is our prevalent culture that everyone at a moment of crisis is excited and overreacts 
... After that they all forget what happened until the situation returns to normal” (CPP6).  
“There is little doubt that the dominant culture is to work by reaction. This culture is 
dominant in most Arab countries; we have to be wiser during crises, not forget former 
crises even if they happened a long time ago....” (SPP15).  
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Indeed, this problem was referred to by many stakeholders, using different expressions. For 
instance, another one said:  
“Unfortunately, there exists a reaction culture at times of crisis, which disappears shortly 
after the crisis. Egyptians have short memories about what happened in the past. 
Therefore, a crisis occurs suddenly, which leads to confusion, serious panic and 
individual decisions” (CRP17).  
The next group of questions in this section was about the possible impact of organizational 
structure, the distribution of power and decision-making procedures on the handling of 
terrorism crises. One respondent stressed the importance of structure, stating: 
 “Yes, organizational structure, especially division of labour and job duties and 
responsibility, have a very great impact on managing crises. In my opinion, the 
professionalization and complexity of organizations is of great importance for crisis 
management” (SPP10).  
Another respondent, while agreeing that organizational structure was important, felt that 
managerial competence was a more significant factor: 
 “Although organizational structure has a great impact in dealing with crises, I believe 
that tourism organizations that have a competent senior management will deal with crises 
effectively” (CPP6). 
Two further respondents made similar points:  
  “Yes, it plays a very important role. There should also be trained and well qualified 
people to deal with crises” (CPP3).  
“I completely agree that the size and shape of the organization, distribution of authority 
and the method of decision-making help greatly in the way an organization deals with 
crises. I also think that the competence of top leaders of the organization has a great 
impact in preparing for crises” (CVP32).  
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Another respondent raised the issue of the size of the organization:  
 “From my point of view, it does not depend on the size of organization, but on the 
efficient way of working and the competence of the people in the organization. 
Experience has proved that large tourist organizations fail to deal with crises effectively, 
compared to small tourist organizations” (CPP4).  
Another respondent (CPP5) put emphasis on the establishment of a central body dedicated to 
dealing with crisis management.  
To sum up, consistently with the dimensions of national culture identified in the literature 
review chapter (section 2-6-2), three important cultural barriers were identified by respondent 
as the main obstacles to conducting an efficient crisis management strategy. These were 
uncertainty avoidance, described by respondents as “the culture of secrecy” and “lack of 
confidence”, short-term orientation, which they called a “culture of reaction”, and power 
distance, described by interviewees in terms of the difficulty arising from organizational 
structures and the allocation of individual functions within organizations.  
The next question addressed whether and how the organizations represented by interviewees 
should change their culture in order to become more effective in dealing with crises. 
Although the majority of respondents agreed on the need for cultural changes, they differed 
as to what changes should take place and how these goals should be achieved. One 
respondent gave priority to democratic values as the fundamental cultural alternative:  
“We need a transparency culture and employee participation. We need to enhance our 
tolerance and respect others’ opinions, rather than ignoring them...” (SPP9).  
Similarly, another respondent said:  
“We need a culture of acceptance and understanding of others’ views, even if different 
from ours” (CPP3). 
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A third interviewee put emphasis instead on respect for professionalization as the main 
fundamental issue for change: 
“The important tasks should be left to the experts, who are able to deal with a crisis and 
are aware of the strengths and weaknesses of crisis management” (SPP11).  
Another respondent agreed:  
 “We need to believe in specialization, following experts’ advice rather than making 
decisions individually, understanding the importance of training, educating young 
people” (CVP1). 
The following contribution presented related arguments: 
“We cannot deny the importance of advertising and marketing campaigns. However, 
human capital is of more importance. Ongoing training and employing qualified 
employees in tourism must be the top priority of the public sector. The top managerial 
posts must be occupied by qualified people as well. This will  help a lot to change the 
current prevailing culture and it will be replaced by a culture of understanding and 
taking the opinion of specialists rather than selling short the opinions of others working 
in the field” (CPP6).  
However, there were other respondents who believed that cultural change was not required. 
One such person said:  
 “I do not think we need to change the culture – we need to develop its performance, but 
given that we are living in this country we have to hire people from this context. As such 
we have to adapt ourselves to them rather than fight against them” (SVP35).  
Another respondent agreed that change was needed, but not within private sector 
organizations:  
“Yes, we need cultural change, but it is the police and public officials who are 
responsible for managing the incidents who must be changed. The private sector 
196 
 
operators know their jobs. In spite of initiating chaos and anxiety, they must leave 
everyone to perform their work” (SRP26).  
As for the mechanisms of change, many stakeholders believed that changes could occur 
through training, but they had different views on how this should take place. One respondent 
said:  
“The culture should be changed from the basics, first from the Ministry of Education and 
also through religious scholars; they have an important role in directing public opinion” 
(SPP15).  
An alternative suggestion was this:  
“The World Tourism Organization has a great role in clarifying the importance of 
tourism to all states and could play a distinctive role in related training” (CPP3). 
5-6 Social and economic impacts of terrorism  
The main goal of the last section of the interview was to investigate the social and economic 
effects of terrorism incidents, or more particularly, its impact on the tourism industry and 
especially on the life of local communities. The analysis of the data gathered in this section is 
complementary to the evidence based upon official statistics presented in Chapter Three, 
concerning the reduction in the numbers of tourists and financial losses to the tourism 
industry. Given that Egypt relies largely on tourism as one of the main national sources of 
income, any damage to this sector would result in major disruption to the lives of a large 
number of Egyptians. One of the participants said:  
“The tourism industry has come to be considered as the economic lifeblood of Egypt .... 
there exist many industries which are not affiliated to tourism yet have benefited 
considerably from it. Take the agricultural sector – although farmers do not work in 
tourism, their main customer is the tourism industry” (CPP 2).  
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Indeed, many people and organizations within both public and private sectors are bound to the 
tourism industry. Another participant observed: 
“Employment in the tourism industry in Egypt is hardly limited to one level or 
organization. A wide range of Egyptians, from high level managers working for huge 
tourism companies and well-known hotels to low income people such as boot boys have 
something to do with tourism” (CRP3). 
To show the intense impact of crises on local stakeholders compared with central ones, one of 
the participants said: 
“Look, the impacts of crises on tourist towns like Sharm El Sheikh are much more than 
on the other towns or even on the capital city, because as you know everything here is for 
tourists, so more than 90% of the customers are tourists. For example, if there are two 
restaurants, one in Cairo and the other in Sharm El Sheikh, after the crisis and decline in 
tourists, the one in Cairo will lose about 50% of its customers because the other 50% of 
customers are residents, whereas the one in Sharm El Sheikh will lose more that 90% of 
its customers, because the residents are fewer and prices are targeted at tourists... they 
are high” (SRP 30).  
He also gave another example:  
“Hotel clients in Cairo come to the town for different reasons, including tourism, 
whereas most hotel clients in a tourist town like Sharm El Sheikh come for tourism and a 
very few other clients come for other reasons” (SRP 30).    
The results of this field research were intriguing. In sharp contrast to the official remarks of 
central government, the local community appeared to have been severely affected. One 
respondent used the term karab buoot (  تويب بارخ ), meaning ‘devastation’, to describe the 
impact of terrorist attacks. Another persuasively argued: 
  “To be sure, the crisis had an extreme impact on the local community in Egypt. It is also 
certain that it influenced in many ways the vulnerable citizens who depend heavily on the 
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tourism industry, as well as the rich travel companies, airlines and hotels. However, its 
impact on the low-income people grappling with poverty is always ignored and 
overlooked” (SRP12). 
This respondent was considering the negative impact of the crisis as establishing the causes 
of other problems which society would face in the years to come. He stated:  
“The very direct impact of the crisis, i.e. unemployment, led to negative consequences, 
increased crime rate and other social problems usually associated with unemployment 
and poverty… This point is very important… Unemployment and poverty in a destination 
country put tourism safety and security at risk and thus have negative effects on tourism, 
resulting in a drop in the number of tourists” (SRP12).  
Another participant from the public sector referred to a study conducted in 1999 of those 
affected by crises in tourism: 
  “We conducted a study in 1999 of those suffering from tourism crises. The result was that 
there were 57 industries where a large part of their income came from tourists and 
tourism. Therefore, if the tourism industry undergoes a crisis, they will all be affected. 
The industries affected by crisis range from related sectors such as  air conditioning, 
boats, wood used in hotels, to any goods and services offered to tourism companies, 
hotels and transportation. All were affected severely by this crisis when it happened. In 
short, a record number of people will be affected in one way or another by tourism 
crises” (CPP 5). 
A pertinent question was the estimated cost of providing alternatives for tourists who had 
already booked their trips to affected areas. There was almost complete consensus among 
participants that these costs had been very high and in some cases had led to business failure. 
One participant in Sharm El Sheikh commented: 
“For many tourists Sharm El Sheikh is a major destination to visit. It may represent the 
second most important destination after Cairo... I remember that a number of journeys 
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scheduled to Sharm El Sheikh were cancelled or postponed. In order to minimize the cost 
we had to shift the passengers to other destinations, which cost us a fortune” (SRP 27). 
Another participant referred to the high cost of stopping operations in destinations already 
included in products and the temporary relocation of clients whose visits had begun. 
Another question in this section addressed the impact of the recent terrorism crisis on the 
quality of installations and services in cases where employees were made redundant and 
funds for regular maintenance were not available. The answers indicated that the quality of 
installations and services had been little degraded and that professional and permanent staff 
were safe and secure, but that the rank and file and temporary staff suffered significantly. In 
other words, the main victims of the crisis were the most vulnerable staff. One respondent 
noted: 
“Since recovery is a time-consuming process we have no choice but to require some staff 
to look for temporary work elsewhere or to take a long holiday without salary while we 
are in touch with them and as soon as the tourists return... we will ask them to return to 
their work” (SRP26).  
Another respondent stated: 
“Yes, some projects were cancelled, the company had to slow down its activities for some 
time to make sure that the situation returned to normal .... We had to reduce the number 
of tourist buses, of course, including the drivers and tourist guides... the contracts of 
temporary staff were not renewed” (SRP18). 
A further question in this regard was related to transnational tourism companies, mainly 
international hotel and restaurant chains, whose representatives were asked if they tended to 
cease their operations in security affected destinations. The responses indicated that this was 
the case in the past and in recent terrorism crisis in Egypt. One respondent noted:  
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“It happened during the Luxor crisis 1997; our company stopped its tourism project for 
two years at Taba (North Sinai) as a result” (CRP21).  
Another interviewee replied:  
“This did not happen during Sharm El Sheikh 2005 but this is very possible, especially as 
the terrorist operations continue... No sooner do we get over one crisis than we face 
another” (CRP24). 
 
5-7 Summary 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the rich data gathered by means of face-to-face 
interviews with thirty-six key stakeholders in Cairo and Sharm El Sheikh, reflecting the 
structure of the interview schedule set out in Appendix three. In particular, the findings can 
be divided into three levels of analysis: the macro level, comprising the cultural dimensions, 
the meso level, consisting of the way stakeholders interact with one another, and the micro 
level, i.e. the actual strategies undertaken by stakeholders at different stages of crisis 
management. As Figure 5-5 demonstrates, the factors at different levels of analysis appear as 
barriers to effective crisis management techniques. The only successful part is the recovery 
strategies, which stakeholders appeared to have adopted very effectively. 
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Figure  5.5: Summary of findings 
The data and their analysis are summarised and discussed interpretively in Chapter Seven, 
having been integrated with those of the quantitative part of the data collection process. It is 
the analysis of this questionnaire data that is addressed now, in Chapter Six. 
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Chapter 6 Quantitative Data Analysis 
 
6-1 Introduction 
Following the analysis of qualitative data in Chapter Five, this chapter presents an analysis of 
the quantitative data gathered by means of the questionnaire survey. The questionnaire used 
to collect data had two major sections. The first consisted of three questions concerning the 
independent categorical variables of respondents’ characteristics: their location, their 
affiliation to stakeholder categories and their work experience. There were four locations in 
which respondents were based, viz. Cairo and the three terrorism-affected tourism 
destinations of Sharm El Sheikh, Dahab and Taba, and thirteen categories of respondent 
stakeholders: Central/ local government, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of the Interior 
(Tourism Police), General Authority for Promoting Tourism, Hotels/Hotel Association/ 
resorts, General Authority for Tourism Development, Tourism companies/ Travel agencies, 
Tourism chambers, Airlines and cruise lines, Religious scholars (imams), International media 
and National media. As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, in the Egyptian context the most 
important distinction among the stakeholders is that between local and central stakeholders. 
Therefore, the distinction between local and central stakeholders constitutes the main 
independent variable whose impact the work reported in this chapter seeks to test on the 
dependent variables measured by the second section of the questionnaire.  
The second section, covering dependent continuous variables, had two main sub-sections, the 
first comprising nine questions based on prior theories and designed to elicit information 
regarding the salience of stakeholders and interactions among them. A list of stakeholders 
was provided and respondents were asked to tick the box corresponding to their perception of 
each stakeholder (see the format of the questions in Appendix One). To compile the list of 
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these stakeholders, a tentative draft was initially developed, based on the classifications used 
by UNWTO and the standard lists appearing in major tourism textbooks. This was modified 
by the data collected during interviews with stakeholders in Cairo and Sharm El Sheikh in a 
pilot qualitative analysis. Each question in this sub-section had two parts, referring to the 
situation before and after the occurrence of a crisis.   
The second sub-section included three main questions about the perceptions of stakeholders 
regarding various measures and strategies for responding to terrorist attacks on the tourism 
industry. Respondents were given a list of the strategies most widely followed in managing 
terrorism crises in tourism destinations and were asked to tick boxes corresponding to their 
perceptions of the relevant strategies for each question asked (see the format of the questions 
in Appendix One). The list was based on the work of Pizam (1999) and of Mansfield and 
Pizam (2006), revised in light of the qualitative analysis of data collected during pilot 
interviews with stakeholders in Cairo and Sharm El Sheikh. As discussed in earlier chapters, 
crisis management in tourism destinations targeted by terrorist attacks is a complex 
phenomenon, so that there are likely to be multiple and diverse perceptions of strategic and 
practical responses among the different tourism stakeholders.  
The work reported in this chapter used a number of statistical techniques to test the impact of 
independent categorical variables on the dependent continuous ones. These include 
parametric techniques, ranging from basic statistical techniques such as means, standard 
deviation and t-tests, to advanced statistics like multivariate analysis of variance. This chapter 
starts with an overview of respondents’ profiles. Given that parametric statistical procedures 
should meet general and specific requirements, the next section examines the normality of 
dependent and independent variables to ensure that they meet the general requirements of 
parametric tests. The rest of chapter is devoted to the analysis of the data gathered in the 
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quantitative survey. It first seeks to offer a general descriptive view by organizing and 
summarizing the findings in terms of mean scores in a tabular format, then turns to more 
advanced statistical tools such as the t-test, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) where appropriate, to determine the impact of the 
independent variables on the dependent ones. The tables corresponding to these more 
advanced tools are to be found in the appendix Seven. 
6-2 Profile of respondents 
A total of 578 questionnaires were mailed to stakeholders: 228 in Cairo, 100 in Taba, 150 in 
Sharm El Sheikh and 100 in Dahab. A total of 396 forms were returned: 158 from Cairo, 64 
from Taba, 103 from Sharm El Sheikh and 71 from Dahab, giving response rates of 69%, 
64%, 68.6% and 71% respectively. Some of the questionnaires returned could not be used 
due to missing data and incomplete responses. After these had been eliminated, the final 
sample consisted of 130 questionnaires from Cairo, 52 from Taba, 97 from Sharm El Sheikh 
and 49 from Dahab. Table 6.1 summarizes responses received from participants in each 
location. The final sample size was 328, which represents a 53% response rate.  
Table  6.1: Distribution of responses by location 
Location No. distributed No. returned % returned No. valid % valid 
Cairo 228 158 69.3 130 82.2 
Taba 100 64 64 52 81.2 
Sharm El Sheikh 150 103 68.6 97 94.1 
Dahab 100 71 71 49 69 
Total 578 396 68.5 328 78.3 
 
The breakdown of responses in each location by major stakeholder groups (shown in Table 
6.2) indicates that in Cairo 37 respondents were from the Ministry of Tourism, eight from 
central or local government, 11 from airlines and cruise lines, 29 from chambers of tourism, 
13 from tourism companies or travel agencies and 11 from hotels, hotel associations, 
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restaurants or restaurant associations. Responses were also received from imams, the national 
and international media, and international tourism organisations. In Taba, 14 respondents 
were from the Ministry of Tourism, two from central or local government, nine from tourism 
companies or travel agencies and nine from the hotel and restaurant sector. Additional 
responses came from airlines and cruise lines, imams, the state media and some community-
based organizations. In Sharm el Sheikh, 32 respondents were from the Ministry of Tourism, 
six from central or local government, 17 from tourism companies or travel agencies and 15 
from the hotel and restaurant sector. There were also responses from airlines and cruise lines, 
imams and the state media. Finally, in Dahab, 12 responses came from the Ministry of 
Tourism, two from central or local government, 10 from tourism companies or travel 
agencies and 14 from the hotel and restaurant sector. Additional responses came from airlines 
and cruise lines, imams and the state media.  
As mentioned before, no forms were sent to the Ministry of the Interior, which was reluctant 
to participate because of security concerns. Tourism bodies and chambers were 
predominantly based in Cairo and responses from their members were limited to the capital. 
Initially it was intended to distribute the questionnaires among a sample of stakeholders 
representing foreign generating markets; however, it was not possible to do so because of 
constraints on time and resources.  
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Table  6.2: Number and percentage of valid responses by location and stakeholder type 
 
Cairo Sharm El Sheikh Dahab Taba 
N % N % N % N % 
Central/ local government 8 2.4 6 1.8 2 .6 2 .6 
Ministry of Tourism 37 11.3 32 9.8 12 3.7 14 4.3 
Ministry of Interior 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tourism bodies and chambers 29 8.9 1 .3 0 .0 5 1.5 
Tourism companies/ Travel agencies 13 4.0 17 5.2 10 3.1 9 2.8 
Hotels/Hotel association/ Resorts 11 3.4 15 4.6 14 4.3 9 2.8 
Airlines and cruise lines 11 3.4 7 2.1 3 .9 5 1.5 
National media 7 2.1 6 1.8 3 .9 2 .6 
International media 3 .9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Imams 4 1.2 9 2.8 3 .9 2 .6 
Governments of generating markets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Regional and international tourism organizations 1 .3 1 .3 0 0 0 0 
Other 4 1.2 2 .6 2 .6 3 .9 
Total 129 39.4 97 29.7 49 15.0 52 15.9 
 
Data on the work experience of respondents (shown in Table 6.3) indicates that 64.5% of 
them had 11 years experience or more and that 20.2% had 6 to 10 years, while 14.7% of 
respondents had 5 years or less work experience in the tourism industry. This indicates that 
respondents can be considered on the whole to have had adequate prerequisite knowledge and 
experience to answer the questions meaningfully. 
Table  6.3: Work experience of respondents in the tourism industry 
Work experience Frequency Valid Percent 
0 2 .6 
5 years or less 48 14.7 
6-10 years 66 20.2 
11 years or more 211 64.5 
Total 327 100.0 
 
6-3 Assessment of normality 
As noted above, when applying parametric statistical techniques, a number of assumptions 
should be met, the most significant being that the distribution of variables to be used in the 
analysis should be normally distributed (Hair et al, 2006; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2008). 
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There are a number of cases in the social science field where scores on the dependent variable 
are not normally distributed. There are a number of techniques to determine whether a 
variable is normally distributed. The most common method is to superimpose a normal curve 
on a histogram of the variable, which SPSS will do by producing normal probability plots, 
but a related problem is that there are no commonly agreed criteria for determining how far it 
is acceptable for data to deviate from normality (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2008).  
Another method often used to examine normality is to examine skewness and kurtosis.    
According to Hair et al (2006, p.37), skewness refers to the “measure of symmetry of a 
distribution; in most instances the comparison is made to a normal distribution,” while 
kurtosis refers to the “measure of the peakedness or flatness of distribution when compared 
with a normal distribution”. SPSS offers these tests for any given variable along with 
standard error measures. In this formulation, both skewness and kurtosis should be zero for a 
perfectly normally distributed variable; authors vary in the rules of thumb they propose to 
determine the extent to which these measures can deviate from perfect normality. Some 
researchers are satisfied to accept variables with skewness and kurtosis values in the range +2 
to -2 as near enough normally distributed for most purposes, while values outside this range 
indicate a normality problem. Others are slightly stricter and use a +1 to -1 range (Hair et al, 
2006). Still other scholars (e.g. Brown, 1997) argue that to assess whether a distribution is 
normal one should consider not only the values of skewness and kurtosis but more 
importantly their respective standard errors. Thus, if kurtosis or skewness exceeds twice the 
absolute value of the standard error of skewness/kurtosis, the normality of the data is 
problematic.  
SPSS version 19 was used to check both skewness and kurtosis, showing that the absolute 
values were within acceptable levels (Table 6.4) and that there was univariate normality. The 
final descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used in this section are also indicated in 
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Table 6.4. The dependent variables passed the test of normality, because neither skewness nor 
kurtosis values were outside the +2 to -2 range. Therefore, there was no need to make any 
adjustments such as a transformation of the data (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2008). 
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Table  6.4: Test of normality for dependent variables 
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Stakeholders’ salience        
The importance of stakeholders 323 46.57 3.55 -.289 .136 .488 .271 
Stakeholders’ power before crises 328 42.07 3.97 -.437 .135 .395 .268 
Stakeholders’ power after crises 328 36.93 3.77 -.089 .135 -.163 .268 
Legitimacy of stakeholders before crises 328 43.23 4.41 -.358 .135 .065 .268 
Legitimacy of stakeholders after crises 328 39.24 4.39 -.069 .135 -.357 .268 
Stakeholders’ management strategies        
Ability to cooperate before crises 328 44.64 4.69 -.431 .135 .404 .268 
Ability to cooperate after crises 328 41.17 5.34 -.305 .135 -.443 .268 
Potential to pose obstacles before crises 328 30.53 5.33 .401 .135 -.310 .268 
Potential to pose obstacles after crises 328 33.32 4.87 .339 .135 -.467 .268 
Frequency of interaction        
Frequency of interaction before crises 328 17.36 7.47 .520 .135 .726 .268 
Frequency of interaction during crises 328 44.78 8.10 -.813 .135 .095 .268 
Frequency of interaction after crises 328 24.98 10.41 .945 .135 -.027 .268 
Strategies for managing terrorism 
crises in tourism  
       
Preventive strategies        
Strategies specific to security sector 328 27.58 3.81 -.103 .135 -.227 .268 
Strategies specific to private sector 328 8.97 2.28 .264 .135 -.364 .268 
Strategies specific to tourists 328 4.28 1.28 .535 .135 .074 .268 
Strategies specific to citizens 327 10.69 2.46 .341 .135 -.054 .269 
Recovery strategies        
Reassurance campaign 328 5.60 1.13 .365 .135 .417 .268 
Marketing scheme 328 19.86 2.35 -.713 .135 .342 .268 
Financial measures 328 11.41 1.47 -.072 .135 .293 .268 
Strategies specific to participation of 
stakeholders in crisis management 
       
Involvement of the security sector with 
other stakeholders 
328 11.75 1.85 .733 .135 1.403 .268 
Involvement of public/ private 
stakeholders with citizens 
328 12.36 2.20 .054 .135 -.137 .268 
Valid N (listwise) 322       
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While not identical to the dependent variables, the basic logic of meeting the normality 
assumption remains the same for the independent variables. It is widely accepted that very 
unequal group sizes of respondents’ categories, particularly if the group sizes are small, 
would make it inappropriate to run some analyses such as ANOVA (Pallant, 2011). 
Therefore, the two major independent categorical variables of location and stakeholder 
category were recoded so that location was either local (the three tourist destinations) or 
central (Cairo) and the categories were based on a sectorial division into public, private and 
non-for-profit stakeholders. Skewness and kurtosis scores were again used to determine the 
normality of distribution of these variables. As the figures in Table 6.5 indicate, there was no 
deviation from normality.  
 
Table  6.5: Test of normality for independent variables  
 Geographical 
Division 
Sectorial 
Division 
N 
Valid 328 324 
Missing 111 115 
Mean 1.60 1.81 
Median 2.00 2.00 
Mode 2 1 
Std. Deviation .490 .763 
Skewness -.426 .338 
Std. Error of Skewness .135 .135 
Kurtosis -1.830 -1.214 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .268 .270 
 
This result was confirmed by the visual assessment of normal probability plots, which 
indicated no serious deviation from normality (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). All the values clustered 
around the line.   
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Figure  6.1: Visual test of normality for geographical division of respondents 
 
 
Figure  6.2: Visual test of normality for sectorial division of respondents 
The abovementioned tests indicate that the variables met the general assumption of 
normality; thus the parametric t-test, ANOVA and MANOVA could be used if they also met 
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the specific requirements of these statistical tests. These specific assumptions, such as 
homogeneity, are discussed individually for each test below, as appropriate.  
6-4 Stakeholders’ salience 
The first goal of this study was to explore the salience of stakeholders in tourism destinations 
and the extent to which their salience changed after being affected by a crisis. Three 
questions (4-6) were formulated to determine salience. Question 4 simply asked respondents 
to rank the importance of stakeholders on a 5-point Likert scale, while questions 5 and 6 took 
a more theoretical tone by utilizing the Mitchell et al (1997) concepts of power and 
legitimacy as a typology to analyse stakeholder salience (Table 6.6). 
Table  6.6: Questionnaire items on stakeholder salience 
 
6-4-1 The importance of stakeholders 
The results of question 4, listed in Table 6.7, indicate that the Ministry of the Interior 
(Tourism Police) was perceived as the most important stakeholder, with a mean (M) of 4.71 
and standard deviation (SD) of 0.893, followed by the Ministry of Tourism (M=4.58, 
SD=.888), central/ local government (M=4.46, SD=.874), tourism chambers (M=4.11, 
SD=.952), international media (M=4.10, SD=1.091), hotels, restaurants and their associations 
(M=3.94, SD=1.047) and tourism companies/ travel agencies (M=3.91, SD=1.090). These 
findings offer only a general view of the importance of stakeholders. To examine the issue in 
greater detail, questions 5 and 6 were designed to elicit perceptions of two major attributes of 
Purpose Research Questions  Measures 
Used 
Theoretical 
foundation 
To identify 
stakeholders 
perceived as key in 
tourism before and 
after crises 
Who are perceived to be the most important stakeholders? Question 4  
Who are perceived to be powerful before and after crises? Question 5 
 
 
Mitchell et 
al. (1997) 
Who are perceived to be legitimate before and after crises? 
Question 6 
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stakeholder salience, viz. power and legitimacy, using the definitions proposed by Mitchell et 
al (1997). 
Table  6.7: Respondents’ assessments of stakeholder importance  
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 327 4.71 .839 
Ministry of Tourism 328 4.58 .888 
Central/ local government 328 4.46 .874 
Tourism bodies / chambers 327 4.11 .952 
International media 328 4.10 1.091 
Hotels/ associations 328 3.94 1.047 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 327 3.91 1.090 
National media 326 3.63 .931 
Airlines and cruise lines 328 3.56 1.027 
Regional and international tourism organizations 328 3.25 1.138 
Imams 327 3.22 1.086 
Governments of generating markets 328 3.08 1.054 
Valid N (listwise) 323   
 
6-4-2 The power of stakeholders 
Question 5 drew on the definition of power by Mitchell et al (1997) as the extent to which a 
stakeholder has or can gain access to resources (physical, financial and symbolic). To address 
this concept, respondents were asked about the extent of power that they perceived 
stakeholders to have over others, before and after crises, using a five-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (very powerful) to 5 (very weak). The mean and SD of scores for each 
stakeholder are given in Tables 6.8 and 6.9, for power before and after crises respectively.  
6-4-2-1 Stakeholders’ power before crises  
To test how respondents perceived the power of stakeholders in normal situations, descriptive 
statistics were first run to ascertain their mean values. The Ministry of Tourism was revealed 
as the most powerful stakeholder with a mean rating of 4.46 and SD of .848, while central/ 
local government came second with a mean of 4.32. The respondents gave almost equal 
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weight to tourism bodies/ chambers and airlines and cruise lines. Hotels/ associations and 
tourism companies/ travel agencies took fourth and fifth places respectively. It is important to 
note that the Tourism Police was ranked sixth once respondents perceived the power of 
stakeholders in normal situations. International media, imams, regional and international 
tourism organizations, national media and governments of generating markets were seen as 
not very powerful, scoring only 2.87, 2.87, 2.75, 2.59 and 1.89 respectively (Table 6.8).  
Table  6.8: Perceptions of stakeholders as powerful before crises 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Ministry of Tourism 328 4.46 .848 
Central/ local government 328 4.32 .948 
Tourism bodies / chambers 328 4.29 1.094 
Airlines and cruise lines 328 4.28 1.069 
Hotels/ associations 328 4.13 1.138 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 328 4.10 1.072 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 328 3.54 1.292 
International media 328 2.87 1.331 
Imams 328 2.87 1.375 
Regional and international tourism organizations 328 2.75 1.300 
National media 328 2.59 1.195 
Governments of generating markets 328 1.89 .899 
Valid N (listwise) 328   
 
So far, basic descriptive statistics have been used to give a general idea of stakeholders’ 
power. From now on, bivariate statistical techniques are used to determine the impact of 
different categories of stakeholders based on location, as explained above, on the perceptions 
of respondents of their power in normal times.  
To determine the equality of variances or homogeneity (specific assumption for t-test), 
Levene’s test was conducted. The result was .992, which is larger than the required cut-off of 
.05 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2008). This means that the assumption of equal variances was not 
violated and it was then possible to conduct an independent-samples t-test to compare local 
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respondents’ perceptions of stakeholders’ power scores before crises with those of central 
respondents. There was a significant difference in scores between central (M=42.68, 
SD=4.158) and local stakeholders (M=41.66, SD=3.802); t(326)=2.296, p=0.022, two-tailed. 
The p (2-tailed value) is .022, which is less than required cut-off of .05 (Field, 2009). 
6-4-2-2 Stakeholders’ power after crises 
Table 6.9 shows the perceptions of respondents of the power of stakeholders in times of 
crisis. The Tourism Police took the place of the Ministry of Tourism as the most powerful 
stakeholder, with a mean rating of 4.26, while Ministry of Tourism dropped to second place 
with a mean rating of 4.13, followed by central/ local government (M=4.12). The respondents 
identified tourism bodies / chambers as the fourth most powerful stakeholder during crises, 
while tourism companies/ travel agencies and hotels/ associations took fifth and sixth places 
respectively. International media, regional and international tourism organizations and 
airlines and cruise lines were seen as not very powerful, scoring 2.73, 2.65 and 2.61 
respectively. 
Table  6.9: Perceptions of stakeholders as powerful after crises 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 328 4.26 1.048 
Ministry of Tourism 328 4.13 .926 
Central/ local government 328 4.12 .941 
Tourism bodies / chambers 328 4.06 .872 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 328 3.34 1.219 
Hotels/ associations 328 3.16 1.155 
International media 328 2.73 1.213 
Regional and international tourism organizations 328 2.65 1.140 
Airlines and cruise lines 328 2.61 1.157 
Governments of generating markets 328 2.14 1.064 
Imams 328 2.05 1.009 
National media 328 1.67 .617 
Valid N (listwise) 328   
 
As with perceptions of stakeholders’ power in normal times, discussed in section 7-4-2-1, the 
influence of respondents’ location on their perceptions of stakeholders’ power in times of 
crisis was examined. To determine the equality of variances or homogeneity (specific 
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assumption for t-test), Levene’s test was conducted. The result was .013, which is larger than 
the required cut-off of .05 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2008). This means that the assumption of 
equal variances was not violated and it was possible to conduct an independent-samples t-test 
to compare central with local respondents as to their perceptions of stakeholders’ power 
during times of crisis. There was no significant difference between scores for central 
(M=36.9923, SD=4.21789) and local respondents (M=36.8939, SD=3.46613); t(326)=.230, 
p=.230, two-tailed. This p-value is greater than the required cut-off of .05 (Field, 2009). 
In addition, a one-way between-groups MANOVA was performed to investigate location 
differences in the respondents’ perceptions of stakeholders’ power before and after crises. 
Thus the two dependent variables were stakeholders’ power before and after crises, while the 
independent variable was respondents’ location. Preliminary assumption testing was 
conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity 
of variance-covariance matrices, and multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted. 
There was a statistically significant difference between local and central stakeholders on the 
combined dependent variables: F (2, 325)=3.004, p=.051, Wilks’ lambda=.982, partial eta 
squared=.018. An inspection of the mean scores indicated that central respondents reported 
slightly higher levels of stakeholders’ power before crises (M=42.68, SD=.346) than did 
central respondents (M=41.66, SD=.28). 
6-4-3 Legitimacy of stakeholders before crises 
Question 6 was based on the concept of legitimacy, defined by Mitchell et al (1997) as the 
extent to which the action of a stakeholder is legally or morally appropriate in the tourism 
industry. To address this concept, the respondents were asked how legitimate they thought 
the various stakeholders were compared to others, before and after crises, using a five-point 
Likert scale ranging from ‘very legitimate’ to ‘very illegitimate’. In line with the presentation 
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above of data on perceptions of power, Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show the mean and SD of scores 
that each stakeholder was given for legitimacy before and after crises respectively. 
6-4-3-1 Stakeholders’ legitimacy before crises 
The reported perceptions of respondents of the legitimacy of stakeholders in normal 
situations are presented in Table 6.10. Participants judged the Ministry of Tourism to be the 
most legitimate stakeholder (M=4.09, SD=1.127), followed by tourism bodies and chambers 
(M=4.07, SD=1.192), central/ local government and tourism companies/ travel agencies both 
having means of 4.01. Next came national media and hotels/ hotel associations, to which 
respondents allocated almost equal legitimacy (M=4.07, SD=1.192 and 1.262). Interestingly, 
the Ministry of the Interior was seen by respondents in tourist towns as having less legitimacy 
(M=3.73, SD=1.30) than all of the above, including imams.  
Table  6.10: Perceptions of stakeholders as legitimate before crises 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Ministry of Tourism 328 4.09 1.127 
Tourism bodies / chambers 328 4.07 1.192 
Central/ local government 328 4.01 1.176 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 328 4.01 1.040 
National media 328 3.88 1.192 
Hotels/ associations 328 3.88 1.262 
Airlines and cruise lines 328 3.84 1.172 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 328 3.73 1.309 
Imams 328 3.59 1.178 
Regional and international tourism organizations 328 2.90 1.125 
International media 328 2.65 1.205 
Governments of generating markets 328 2.59 1.094 
Valid N (listwise) 328   
 
An independent-samples t-test was also conducted to compare local with central respondents’ 
perceptions of stakeholders’ legitimacy scores before crises. The results showed no 
significant difference: for central respondents, M=42.71, SD=4.44 and for local respondents, 
M=43.57, SD=4.37; t(326)=-1.731, p=0.084, two-tailed. This p-value is greater than the 
required cut-off of .05 (Field, 2009). 
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6-4-3-2 Legitimacy of stakeholders after crises 
Responses regarding the legitimacy of stakeholders in managing terrorism crises after they 
had occurred are summarized in Table 6.11. The results were significantly different from 
those regarding stakeholders’ legitimacy before crises. Central/ local government was 
perceived as the most legitimate stakeholder during a crisis, followed by the Ministry of the 
Interior, with mean ratings of 4.26 and 4.10 respectively. The Ministry of Tourism dropped to 
third place (M=4.02, SD=1.036), followed by Tourism bodies / chambers (M=4.05, 
SD=1.14). Respondents identified the national media, imams and hotels/ associations as the 
fifth, sixth and seventh most legitimate post-crisis stakeholders respectively. 
Table  6.11: Perceptions of stakeholders as legitimate after crises 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Central/ local government 328 4.16 1.027 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 328 4.10 1.009 
Ministry of Tourism 328 4.02 1.036 
Tourism bodies / chambers 328 4.05 1.142 
National media 328 3.16 1.199 
Imams 328 3.02 1.166 
Hotels/ associations 328 2.92 1.292 
Airlines and cruise lines 328 2.89 1.184 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 328 2.88 1.294 
Regional and international tourism organizations 328 2.86 1.110 
International media 328 2.62 1.196 
Governments of generating markets 328 2.57 1.061 
Valid N (listwise) 328   
An independent-samples t-test was also conducted to compare the local and central 
respondents’ perceptions of stakeholders’ legitimacy scores after crises. There was a 
significant difference in these scores: for central stakeholders, M=38.64, SD=4.52 and for 
local stakeholders M=39.64, SD=4.26; t(326)=-2.016, p=0.045, two-tailed. This p-value is less 
than the required cut-off of .05 (Field, 2009).  
A one-way between-groups MANOVA was also performed to investigate location 
differences in respondents’ perceptions of stakeholders’ legitimacy before and after crises. 
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The dependent variables were stakeholders’ legitimacy before and after crisis and the 
independent variable was the location of the respondents. Preliminary assumption testing was 
conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity 
of variance-covariance matrices and multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted. No 
statistically significant difference was found between local and central respondents on the 
combined dependent variables, F (2, 325)=2.310, p=.101; Wilks’ lambda=.986; partial eta 
squared=.014. 
Finally, in order to visually analyze the importance of stakeholders based on the two elements 
of power and legitimacy, a quadrant analysis was conducted (Zikmund and Babin, 2006). The 
legitimacy and power means for each stakeholder were plotted on a four-quadrant grid whose 
y-axis represented the power scale and whose x-axis represented the legitimacy scale. Each 
quadrant of the grids shown in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 thus represent the degree of stakeholders’ 
importance based on the elements of power and legitimacy defined by Mitchell et al (1997), 
before and after crises respectively. The four quadrants are classified as I (high power, low 
legitimacy), II (high power, high legitimacy), III (low power, low legitimacy) and IV (low 
power, high legitimacy). The locations of the stakeholders on the grid represent their relative 
importance.    
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Figure  6.3: Stakeholders’ importance before crises 
1=Central/ local government, 2=Ministry of Tourism, 3=Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police), 4=Tourism 
bodies / chambers, 5=National media, 6=Imams, 7=Hotels/ associations, 8=Airlines and cruise lines, 9=Tourism 
companies/ travel agencies, 10=Regional and international tourism organizations, 11=International media, 
12=Governments of generating markets 
 
 
Figure 6.3 shows that before crises, most stakeholders (7 of 12) fell within quadrant II, 
indicating high power and high legitimacy. This distribution was changed after crises, when 
only four stakeholders fell within quadrant II, while there were now six (half of the total) in 
quadrant III, representing low power and low legitimacy (Figure 6.4).  
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Figure  6.4: Stakeholders’ importance after crises 
1=Central/ local government, 2=Ministry of Tourism, 3=Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police), 4=Tourism 
bodies / chambers, 5=National media, 6=Imams, 7=Hotels/ associations, 8=Airlines and cruise lines, 9=Tourism 
companies/ travel agencies, 10=Regional and international tourism organizations, 11=International media, 
12=Governments of generating markets 
 
6-5 Stakeholders’ management strategies  
To examine the management strategies of stakeholders and how they changed after a crisis, a 
series of research questions were proposed. Following the definition of Savage et al (1991) of 
types of strategy and stakeholder management strategies, applied by Sheehan and Ritchie 
(2005) to tourism stakeholders and by Savage et al (2004) to crisis management, three 
questions were formulated (Table 6.12). The central premise of Savage et al (1991) concerns 
stakeholders’ potential to threaten and to cooperate. Questionnaire items 7 and 8 comprised 
two groups of questions based on these theories, while question 9 addressed the frequency of 
interaction based largely on Rowley (1997). The frequency of interaction at each stage of 
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crisis management (before, during and after) can be used as an indicator of the extent to 
which stakeholders were proactive or reactive in dealing with a crisis.  
Table  6.12: Questionnaire items on management strategies 
Purpose Research Questions  
Measures 
Used 
Theoretical foundation 
To identify  the 
management 
strategies that 
stakeholders followed 
to interact 
Do stakeholders have the ability to 
cooperate or pose obstacles before and 
after crises? 
Questions 
7-8 
Savage et al. (1991) & 
Savage et al. (2004) 
How often do stakeholders interact at 
different stages of crisis management?  
Question 9 Rowley (1997) 
 
6-5-1 Ability to Cooperate  
Question 7 asked respondents about potential cooperation from other stakeholders, by 
inquiring about their level of agreement (on a 5-point Likert scale) that each of a list of 
stakeholders had the potential to cooperate in efforts to manage a terrorism crisis in the 
tourism industry. The aggregated results in the form of means and standard deviation of 
responses scores are presented in Tables 6.13 and 6.14.  
Table  6.13: Degree of agreement that stakeholders were likely to cooperate before a 
crisis 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Airlines and cruise lines 328 4.05 1.168 
Tourism bodies / chambers 328 4.04 1.034 
Ministry of Tourism 328 3.98 1.056 
Imams 328 3.91 1.032 
Hotels/ associations 328 3.89 1.150 
Governments of generating markets 328 3.88 1.261 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 328 3.88 1.068 
National media 328 3.79 1.204 
Regional and international tourism organizations 328 3.76 1.260 
Central/ local government 328 3.71 1.282 
International media 328 3.09 1.237 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 328 2.66 1.292 
Valid N (listwise) 328   
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Table  6.14: Degree of agreement that stakeholders were likely to cooperate after a crisis 
 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Hotels/ associations 328 3.90 1.070 
Airlines and cruise lines 328 3.83 1.043 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 328 3.81 1.117 
Ministry of Tourism 328 3.75 1.105 
Regional and international tourism organizations 328 3.60 1.302 
Governments of generating markets 328 3.59 .972 
Imams 328 3.59 1.320 
National media 328 3.52 1.089 
Tourism bodies / chambers 328 3.19 1.273 
Central/ local government 328 2.99 1.160 
International media 328 2.77 1.262 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 328 2.63 1.266 
Valid N (listwise) 328   
 
In a normal situation, respondents identified airlines and cruise lines as the most cooperative 
stakeholders (M=4.05, SD=1.168), followed by tourism bodies/ chambers (M=4.04, 
SD=1.034). Interestingly, the Ministry of Tourism and imams were also perceived as 
cooperative stakeholders, ranking third and fourth most cooperative stakeholders in normal 
times. Of the other stakeholders, the least likely to cooperate was perceived to be the Ministry 
of the Interior, which received particularly low scores from respondents (M=2.66, 
SD=1.292). After a crisis, however, the level of perceived cooperation changed: 
hotels/associations (M=3.90, SD=1.07), airlines and cruise lines (M=3.83, SD=1.04) and 
tourism companies/ travel agencies (M=3.81, SD=1.11) were perceived as the most 
cooperative stakeholders, while the least cooperative remained the Ministry of the Interior 
(M=2.63, SD=1.26) and the international media (M=2.77, SD=1.26). These descriptive 
statistics help to shed light on the extent to which different stakeholders appear cooperative in 
managing terrorism crises in tourism in Egypt.  
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An independent-samples t-test was also conducted to compare the local and central 
respondents’ perceptions of stakeholders’ ability to cooperate. The results show a significant 
difference between the scores for the perceptions of local and central respondents. Indeed, 
there were more significant differences in perception between local and central respondents 
regarding the level of cooperation of stakeholders after a crisis than before it. With respect to 
cooperation before crises, the scores for central respondents were M=45.27, SD=4.80 and for 
local ones M=44.23, SD=4.58; t(326)=1.97, p=0.050, two-tailed. This p-value is equal to the 
required cut-off (Field, 2009). In respect of cooperation after a crisis, however, the scores for 
central respondents were M=42.22, SD=4.92 and for local respondents M=40.47, SD=5.50; 
t(326)=2.92, p=0.004, two-tailed. This p-value is considerably less than the required cut-off of 
.05 (Field, 2009) and this implies a considerable difference.  
In addition, a one-way between-groups MANOVA was performed to investigate location 
differences in respondents’ perceptions of stakeholders’ cooperation before and after crises. 
Thus, the dependent variables were stakeholders’ cooperation before and after a crisis, while 
the independent variable was respondent’s location. Preliminary assumption testing was 
conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity 
of variance-covariance matrices and multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted. There 
was a statistically significant difference between local and central stakeholders on the 
combined dependent variables, F (2, 325)=4.392, p=.013; Wilks’ lambda=.974; partial eta 
squared=.026. An inspection of the mean scores indicated that central respondents perceived 
slightly higher levels of stakeholder cooperation after crisis (M=42.22, SD=.464) than did 
local respondents (M=40.48, SD=.376). 
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6-5-2 Potential to pose obstacles  
Question 8 elicited respondents’ level of agreement (on a 5-point Likert scale) to the 
proposition that each of the list of stakeholders had the potential to pose obstacles, in normal 
situations and after a crisis. As for question 7, the aggregated results in the form of means and 
SDs of response scores are presented, in Tables 6.15 and 6.16.  
Table  6.15: Degree of agreement that stakeholders were likely to pose obstacles before a 
crisis 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 328 3.82 1.119 
Central/ local government 328 2.98 1.152 
Tourism bodies / chambers 328 2.63 1.106 
Governments of generating markets 328 2.61 1.058 
International media 328 2.57 1.373 
Hotels/ associations 328 2.36 1.055 
National media 328 2.34 1.015 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 328 2.34 .944 
Regional and international tourism organizations 328 2.29 .947 
Airlines and cruise lines 328 2.23 .996 
Imams 328 2.23 1.094 
Ministry of Tourism 328 2.15 1.110 
Valid N (listwise) 328   
 
Table  6.16: Degree of agreement that stakeholders were likely to pose obstacles after a 
crisis 
 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 328 3.90 1.032 
Central/ local government 328 3.53 1.152 
Governments of generating markets 328 3.50 .971 
International media 328 3.43 1.053 
National media 328 2.65 1.132 
Tourism bodies / chambers 328 2.54 1.135 
Imams 328 2.46 1.198 
Regional and international tourism organizations 328 2.41 1.156 
Hotels/ associations 328 2.25 1.137 
Ministry of Tourism 328 2.24 1.160 
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Airlines and cruise lines 328 2.24 1.061 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 328 2.19 1.001 
Valid N (listwise) 328   
 
In normal situations (i.e. before a crisis), respondents indicated that the Ministry of the 
Interior was the most obstructive stakeholder (M=3.82, SD=1.119), followed by central/ local 
government (M=2.98, SD=1.152), while all other stakeholders were perceived by clear 
majorities of respondents as posing fewer obstacles. After a crisis, however, there were some 
dramatic changes in the perceptions of both sets of respondents. Now, the international media 
and the governments of generating markets were perceived as most likely to pose obstacles to 
efforts at managing the crisis. The Ministry of the Interior was still perceived as the most 
obstructive stakeholder, whereas the least obstructive stakeholder in a crisis was perceived to 
be the Ministry of Tourism. Others seen as particularly unlikely to pose obstacles were 
tourism bodies and chambers, tourism companies/ travel agencies, hotels/ associations and 
airlines/ cruise lines.  
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare local and central respondents’ 
perceptions of stakeholders’ potential to pose obstacle before crises. There was a significant 
difference between scores for central (M=42.56, SD=5.18) and local respondents (M=40.50, 
SD=5.29); t(312)=3.390, p=0.001, two-tailed. This p-value is less than the required cut-off of 
.05 (Field, 2009). When the same test was applied to compare local and central respondents’ 
perceptions of stakeholders’ potential to pose obstacles after a crisis, however, no significant 
difference was found between scores for central (M=35.47, SD=4.48) and local respondents 
(M=34.79, SD=4.53); t(318)=1.317, p=0.189, two-tailed. This p-value is again less than the 
required cut-off of .05 (Field, 2009). 
A one-way between-groups MANOVA was also performed to investigate location 
differences in respondents’ perceptions of stakeholders’ potential to pose obstacles before 
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and after crises. Thus, the dependent variables were stakeholders’ potential to pose obstacles 
before and after a crisis, while the independent variable was again the location of the 
respondents. Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, 
univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices and 
multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted. A statistically significant difference was 
found between local and central respondents on the combined dependent variables: F (2, 
304)=11.112, p=.000; Wilks’ lambda=.932; partial eta squared=.068. An inspection of the 
mean scores indicated that central respondents perceived stakeholders as slightly more likely 
to pose obstacles before a crisis (M=42.69, SD=.476) than did local respondents (M=40.51, 
SD=.386). 
Finally, in order to analyze visually the management strategies of stakeholders in terms of 
their ability to cooperate and potential to pose obstacles, a quadrant analysis was undertaken. 
As with the scatterplots discussed in section 6-4-3-1 in relation to importance, the means for 
each stakeholder were plotted on a four-quadrant grid whose y-axis represented their ability 
to cooperate and the x-axis their potential to pose obstacles. Each quadrant of the grids shown 
in Figures 6.6 and 6.7 for the situation before and after crises respectively thus represents the 
assessment of stakeholders’ management strategies based on the definitions of Savage et al 
(1991). The four quadrants are classified as I (high ability to cooperate, low potential to pose 
obstacles), II (high ability to cooperate, high potential to pose obstacles), III (low ability to 
cooperate, low potential to pose obstacles) and IV (low ability to cooperate, high potential to 
pose obstacles). The location of each plot on the grid represents the type of management 
strategies of the stakeholder concerned.     
 
 
228 
 
 
4.03.53.02.52.0
4.00
3.75
3.50
3.25
3.00
2.75
2.50
Threat
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
12
11
10
9
8
7
65
4
3
2
1
Scatterplot of Cooperation vs Threat Before Crises
Quadrant I
Quadrant II
Quadrant III Quadrant IV
 
Figure  6.5: Stakeholders’ management strategies before crises 
1=Central/ local government, 2=Ministry of Tourism, 3=Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police), 4=Tourism 
bodies / chambers, 5=National media, 6=Imams, 7=Hotels/ associations, 8=Airlines and cruise lines, 9=Tourism 
companies/ travel agencies, 10=Regional and international tourism organizations, 11=International media, 
12=Governments of generating markets 
 
Figure 6.5 shows that a strong majority of ten of the twelve stakeholders fell within quadrant 
I (high ability to cooperate, low potential to pose obstacles) before a crisis. This distribution 
was changed slightly after a crisis (Figure 6.6), when only a small majority (seven of twelve) 
stakeholders remained in quadrant I, while two (central/ local government and tourism 
companies/ travel agencies) moved to quadrant IV (low ability to cooperate, high potential to 
pose obstacles) and one (international media) to quadrant II (high ability to cooperate, high 
potential to pose obstacles).  
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Figure  6.6: Stakeholders’ management strategies after crises 
1=Central/ local government, 2=Ministry of Tourism, 3=Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police), 4=Tourism 
bodies / chambers, 5=National media, 6=Imams, 7=Hotels/ associations, 8=Airlines and cruise lines, 9=Tourism 
companies/ travel agencies, 10=Regional and international tourism organizations, 11=International media, 
12=Governments of generating markets 
 
6-5-3 Frequency of interaction 
As discussed in sections 2-3 and 5-4-1, the extent to which players are proactive or reactive 
as a crisis emerges is crucial to crisis management in terrorism and tourism. Question 9 was 
formulated to address this concern by asking the stakeholders their frequency of interaction at 
three stages of crisis management. The poor frequency of interaction before and after a crisis 
or alternatively the concentration of interaction during the crisis would give an indication of 
how reactive or proactive the stakeholders were. Specifically, respondents were asked to 
indicate the frequency, on a scale from 1 (usually) to 5 (never), of their interactions with each 
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of the listed stakeholder groups at each of the three main stages of crisis management: before, 
during and after a crisis. 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare scores on the frequencies 
of interactions with statistics tests at stage 1 (prior to crisis), stage 2 (during crisis) and stage 
3 (after crisis). There was a significant effect for stages of crisis, Wilks’ lambda=.080, F (2, 
326)=1875.375, p<.0005, multivariate partial eta squared=.920.  
Table  6.17: Descriptive Statistics for the frequencies of interactions with statistics test 
scores for stages 1, 2 and 3 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Stage 1 18.7226 7.90884 328 
Stage 2 44.7805 8.10712 328 
Stage 3 24.9817 10.41287 328 
 
Table 6.17 reveals that interactions were on the whole reported to be much more frequent 
during the crisis phase (M=44.7805, SD=8.10712) than during either the pre- (M=18.7226, 
SD=7.90884) or post-crisis (M=24.9817, SD=10.41287) phases, when reported interactions 
with other stakeholders were few and far between. This trend is also well presented in Figure 
6.7. 
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Figure  6.7: Frequency of stakeholders’ interaction before, during and after crises 
Again, a one-way between-groups MANOVA was performed to investigate location 
differences in respondents’ perceptions of stakeholders’ frequency of interaction at three 
stages of crisis management. The dependent variables were stakeholders’ interaction at three 
stages of crisis management, while the independent variable was respondent’s location. 
Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate 
and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices and multicollinearity, 
with no serious violations noted. No statistically significant difference was found between 
local and central respondents on the combined dependent variables: F (3, 324)=1.799, 
p=.147; Wilks’ lambda=.984; partial eta squared=.016. 
6-6 Techniques employed in managing terrorism crises 
Another purpose of this study was to understand the perceptions of stakeholders regarding the 
employment of effective crisis management techniques during different stages of crisis. In 
chapter 2 (section 2-3-4, Table 2.3), a comprehensive list of such techniques currently 
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employed in the field of tourism security was presented, as identified by Mansfield and 
Pizam (2006). This list was utilized during the present research by asking respondents to 
indicate the extent to which they agreed that these techniques were adopted in managing 
terrorism crises in Egypt. The question was divided into two groups of strategies, the first 
consisting of those considered effective in prevention, reduction and/or mitigation plans, 
while strategies in the second group have to do with effective recovery methods. A series of 
techniques was also placed within a subgroup of police actions to distinguish the key role of 
these stakeholders from their counterparts. Table 6.18 sets out the relevant research questions 
and identifies the associated questionnaire items. 
Table  6.18: Questionnaire items on crisis management techniques 
Purpose Research Questions Measures used 
Theoretical 
foundation 
To promote deeper 
understanding of the crisis 
management techniques 
that stakeholder employ 
What strategies do stakeholders 
employ in prevention, reduction, 
and/or mitigation plans? 
Question 10  
(Pizam, 1999; 
Pizam and 
Mansfield, 2006) 
 
 
What strategies do the law 
enforcement and police employ 
during crises? 
Question 11 
What strategies do stakeholders 
employ in the recovery phase? 
Question 12 
 
 Responses are analyzed below according to different sub-groups within each of the two main 
categories identified above. The main sub-groups within the prevention category were 
strategies specific to the security sector, to government, to the private sector, to tourists and to 
local citizens. Within the recovery strategies, four sub-groups of strategies were identified: 
information dissemination, reassurance campaigns, marketing schemes and financial 
measures. Having reviewed the data regarding these sub-groups, this section addresses two 
important questions concerning these strategies: the extent to which they were seen to be 
proactive or reactive and the extent to which they required the involvement of the different 
stakeholders. The results and descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 6.19 and 6.20.  
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The most important conclusion is that on average the recovery strategies received higher 
scores than the preventive strategies. Eight of the 12 strategies in the recovery category had 
mean scores of 4 or above, while only three of the 22 preventive strategies did so.  
Table  6.19: List of preventive strategies 
Preventive strategies N
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Assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks for employees 328 4.59 .584 
Offering rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those who 
commit serious crimes against tourists 
328 4.37 1.053 
Maintaining many visible security measures 328 4.32 1.161 
Increasing the presence of uniformed officers in tourist zones 328 3.70 1.420 
Using crime prevention/reduction methods—such as security hardware and 
security policies 
328 3.16 1.129 
Training police officers in tourism issues 328 3.15 .967 
Being visible, accessible and friendly police to tourists 328 3.09 .986 
Considering the function of security important to the success of their business 328 2.40 .923 
Making tourists aware of the possibility of becoming victimized by criminals and 
instructing them in crime prevention methods 
328 2.33 .871 
Educating citizens on the serious impact that crime against tourists can have on 
their communities 
327 2.29 .953 
Encouraging tourism enterprises to adopt crime prevention/reduction practices 
(installation of electronic room locks, surveillance cameras, room safety deposit 
boxes, employing full-time security officers, etc.) 
328 2.13 .891 
Engaging citizens in neighbourhood watch schemes   328 2.12 1.085 
Developing and implementing tourist education programmes aimed at reducing 
the risk of being victimized 
328 1.96 .891 
Allocating a significant portion of their financial and human resources to security 328 1.93 1.083 
Establishing a partnership between the leaders of the local community and the 
national and local governments 
328 1.90 .933 
Advising and training tourism industry employees in crime prevention techniques 328 1.84 .689 
Formulating a comprehensive contingency plan 328 1.81 .820 
Working closely with the community and tourism industry representatives 328 1.79 .854 
Housing tourists in gated all-inclusive resorts to separate them from local residents 328 1.58 .774 
Incorporating the principles of crime prevention through environmental design  328 1.48 .770 
Establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, tourism 
enterprises, the community at large and the tourists themselves. 
328 1.41 .583 
Within preventive strategies, the most common strategies were those specific to the security 
sector, such as “assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks for 
employees”, which was ranked first with a mean rating of 4.59, while “maintaining many 
visible security measures” achieved the third highest score with a mean of 4.32. “Increasing 
the presence of uniformed officers in tourist zones”, “training police officers in tourism 
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issues” and “being visible, accessible and friendly police to tourists” took the fourth, sixth 
and seventh positions respectively. It is important to note that these strategies fall within the 
traditional approaches identified in section 2-4-2 in fighting against terrorism, drawing on 
suppression and criminalisation. The rest of the strategies, having to do with community-
based policing and counter-terrorism strategies, are seen as not very usual in the Egyptian 
context, as all received mean scores below two.  
Those strategies which have to do with tourist and citizens also achieved comparatively high 
scores; thus, “making tourists aware of the possibility of becoming victimized by criminals 
and instructing them in crime prevention methods” and “educating citizens on the serious 
impact that crime against tourists can have on their communities” scored means of 2.40 and 
2.33 respectively. With respect to strategies specific to the private sector, the highest score 
was given to “using crime prevention/reduction methods—such as security hardware and 
security policies”, with a mean rating of 3.16, followed by “considering the function of 
security important to the success of their business”, with a mean of 2.40. “Allocating a 
significant portion of their financial and human resources to security” and “incorporating the 
principles of crime prevention through environmental design” ranked third and fourth with 
means of 1.93 and 1.48 respectively.  
Within the recovery category, the most common strategy identified by respondents was 
“reducing prices and offering a variety of incentives (e.g. package deals)” with a mean of 
4.56 and SD of .775, the second highest score overall. This was followed by “identifying and 
developing new market segments abroad” (M=4.46, SD=.819) and “undertaking 
comprehensive marketing campaigns initiated by the  Ministry of Tourism in cooperation 
with other NGOs and governmental agencies” (M=4.35, SD=.828). Reducing operational 
costs by laying off a proportion of their employees (M=4.33, SD=.814) and “postponing 
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major expenditure on maintenance and renovation” (M=4.27, SD= .855) ranked fourth and 
fifth. The lowest scores were given to those strategies to do with government financial 
assistance.  
Table  6.20: List of recovery strategies 
Recovery strategies N
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Reducing prices and offering a variety of incentives (e.g. package deals) 328 4.56 .775 
Identifying and developing new market segments abroad 328 4.46 .819 
Undertaking comprehensive marketing campaigns initiated by the Ministry of 
Tourism in cooperation with other NGOs and governmental agencies 
328 4.35 .828 
Reducing operational costs by laying off a proportion of their employees 328 4.33 .814 
Postponing major expenditure on maintenance and renovation 328 4.27 .855 
Establishing a mechanism for sharing information and coordination of publicity 
and PR activities aimed at creating positive public opinion among the media, local 
community and customers 
328 4.10 .965 
Appealing to domestic tourists 328 4.06 .962 
Undertaking intensive marketing campaigns to convince the general public that 
things are back to normal 
328 3.99 1.014 
Scheduling of special events to attract local residents and out-of-town tourists 328 2.43 1.082 
Encouraging area residents within a short drive of the affected destination to visit 
their region or hometown by appealing to their sense of local patriotism 
328 1.61 .778 
Providing government grants for financing the promotion of their destination 328 1.42 .725 
Offering financial assistance (grants, tax holidays, subsidized loans, etc.) from 
local, state and/or national governments 
328 1.40 .576 
 
Another conclusion to be drawn from these descriptive statistics is that those strategies 
requiring the involvement of different stakeholders in managing crises received the lowest 
scores on the whole. A notable exception is “establishing a mechanism for sharing 
information and coordination of publicity and PR activities aimed at creating positive public 
opinion among the media, local community and customers”. Among these strategies, those 
requiring the involvement of the police and security sector with other stakeholders received 
the lowest scores; for example, “establishing a partnership between law enforcement 
agencies, tourism enterprises, the community at large and the tourists themselves” had a 
mean of 1.41 and SD of .583. 
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As with the analyses presented earlier in this chapter, a one-way between-groups MANOVA 
was performed to investigate location differences in the respondents’ perceptions of the 
strategies used in combating terrorism crises in the tourism industry. The dependent variables 
were the listed preventive and recovery methods, while the independent variable was 
respondent’s location. Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, 
linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices 
and multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted. There was, however, no statistically 
significant difference between local and central respondents on the combined dependent 
variables: F (33, 293)=1.730, p=.010; Wilks’ lambda=.873; partial eta squared=.163. This 
means that respondents from both groups identified almost the same methods as being 
employed in managing terrorism.  
 
6-7 Summary 
This chapter has presented and descriptively analysed the quantitative data gathered by means 
of a questionnaire survey administered to key tourism stakeholders in Cairo and in three 
Egyptian tourist destinations affected by recent terrorism crises. The perceptions explored 
have been shown to have been affected variously by factors including the location of the 
respondents (central or local) and the stage of the crisis cycle. The findings show that there 
are statistically significant differences between the perceptions of respondents as to the power 
of stakeholders before crises, the legitimacy of stakeholders after crises and the way 
stakeholders interact before and after crisis. The analysis has addressed the main goals of the 
research and linked these to the theoretical basis for the major elements of the conceptual 
framework set out above in Figure 2.16. It is now possible to integrate these findings with 
those presented in Chapter Five, which is the purpose of the discussion that follows in 
Chapter Seven.   
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Chapter 7 Discussion  
7-1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an interpretation of all the data collected. The research questions are 
answered by interpreting the analyses discussed in the previous chapters. The discussion 
includes the interpretation of the following issues in the context under study: the overall 
impact of terrorism on the tourism industry, the salience of stakeholders and the way their 
importance may change after a crisis, the strategies for managing key stakeholders and the 
ways they communicate with one another during the different phases of a crisis, the crisis 
management techniques employed in managing terrorism crises and finally, the role of 
contextual factors in determining the effectiveness of the strategies adopted.  
It was indicated in Chapter Four that the main research design adopted here is a mixed-
methods one involving the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data. It was also 
explained that although there was a tendency towards collecting the quantitative and 
qualitative data in parallel, they were in practice collected and analysed dynamically, taking 
insights from one type of data to modify or enhance the other throughout the stages of the 
study. In addition, it was argued that broadly equal weighting should be given to each type of 
data, but that in some instances, more emphasis would be placed on a specific data collection 
method because it was more appropriate to address a particular research question. For 
instance, to explain the role of contextual factors in the effectiveness of the strategies adopted 
by stakeholders, the qualitative data proved to be more helpful than the quantitative. To 
address the overall impact of terrorism on the tourism industry, the data regarding the 
perceptions of stakeholders collected through interviews were compared and contrasted with 
the facts and figures based on official statistics. Nonetheless, the data were finally merged 
into a single interpretation. 
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The remainder of this chapter comprises five main sections, dealing in turn with stakeholders’ 
salience, their management strategies, the impact of national culture, crisis management in 
action and the overall impact of terrorism crises on the tourism industry in Egypt, followed 
by a concluding summary.  
7-2 Stakeholders’ salience  
The first main research question is concerned with the identification of the key stakeholders 
in terrorism crisis management in the Egyptian tourism industry and the way their importance 
changes as a result of the occurrence of a crisis. The qualitative and quantitative analyses 
contributed to the identification of these stakeholders, while the descriptive results of the 
qualitative analysis helped to understand the main stakeholders and their importance. These 
results revealed that it was not easy to make sharp distinctions among stakeholders, because 
the tourism industry was found to be the major national source of income for a wide variety 
of citizens, so that numerous people and organizations in the public and private sectors were 
associated with the industry in one way or another. It was also difficult to identify them 
because in Egypt the boundary between the private and public sectors is blurred. As with 
many developing countries, the primacy of the public sector is evident and private sector 
organizations are overshadowed by an influential and powerful governmental apparatus 
(Hatem, 1994). It is also notable that non-profit and community organizations appeared not to 
have consolidated a significant role in the Egyptian tourism industry. Notwithstanding these 
difficulties, the findings of the qualitative analysis show a sectorial division in the Egyptian 
context similar to that proposed by Kapur and Weisbrod (2000) for the tourism industry. 
Table 7.1 classifies the most important tourism stakeholders in Egypt in this way.  
Table  7.1: Sectorial classification of tourism stakeholders in Egypt  
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Sectorial Division Stakeholders  
Public 
Central/ local government 
Ministry of Tourism 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 
State media 
Private 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 
Hotels and restaurants 
Airlines and cruise lines 
Non-profit 
Tourism chambers 
Imams and clerical establishment 
International media 
International tourism organizations 
 
The most crucial finding in the classification of stakeholders was that in the Egyptian context 
a functional distinction can be drawn between local and central stakeholders, the former 
being responsible for making major decisions and the latter for implementing those decisions, 
reporting to the central authorities and providing consultation services to them. Broadly 
speaking, the public and central stakeholders were found to play more important roles than 
their local and private counterparts. However, the importance of stakeholders was found to 
change when a crisis emerged. Indeed, a crisis might introduce new stakeholders that the 
organization had not anticipated. It was also shown that during a crisis the security sector 
would play a dominant role, to be replaced at the recovery stage by the GATD. As a result, 
the criteria for identifying stakeholders after a crisis were likely to be noticeably different 
from those which apply in normal conditions. This is a very important point, which 
emphasizes the importance of identifying stakeholders at all stages of crisis management.  
To address the question of stakeholder salience, two concepts, of power and legitimacy, were 
chosen. The results of the quantitative analysis of data collected from respondents in local 
tourist destinations which had suffered terrorist attacks and from the authorities in Cairo 
showed the power and legitimacy which they perceived the various stakeholders to have. 
These respondents listed central/ local government and tourism bodies / chambers as the most 
legitimate and powerful stakeholders in normal situations, followed by the Ministry of 
Tourism, then the national media, imams, hotels/ associations and finally the Ministry of the 
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Interior (Tourism Police). However, after a crisis, they had different perceptions of the power 
and legitimacy of other stakeholders: the only ones to have high power and legitimacy were 
central/ local government, tourism bodies / chambers, the Ministry of Tourism and the 
Ministry of the Interior, while those perceived as having low power and legitimacy were now 
hotels/ associations, airlines and cruise lines, tourism companies/ travel agencies, regional 
and international tourism organizations, international media and governments of generating 
markets, as Table 7.2 shows. 
Table  7.2: Importance of stakeholders in Egypt before and after a crisis 
The findings of the quantitative analysis are corroborated by the qualitative results. 
According to these findings, the most salient stakeholders in crisis situations were central and 
local government. The qualitative results also explain that the main decisions on any potential 
crises that the country might face were made by the National Committee of Crisis 
Management. The members of the Committee hold the highest positions in the country and 
include the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Tourism, the Minister of the 
Interior and the Chairman of Egypt Air. The committee is chaired and coordinated by the 
Prime Minister himself.  
 Before Crisis After Crisis 
High power, 
low legitimacy 
 
National media,  
Imams 
High power, 
High legitimacy 
 
 
Central/ local government 
Tourism bodies / chambers,  
Ministry of Tourism, 
National media,  
Imams,  
Hotels/ associations 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police), 
Central/ local government,  
Ministry of Tourism, 
Tourism bodies / chambers 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police), 
 
Low power, 
Low legitimacy 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies, 
International media,  
Governments of generating markets 
Hotels/ associations,  
Airlines and cruise lines,  
Tourism companies/ travel agencies,  
Regional / international tourism organizations,  
International media,  
Governments of generating markets 
Low power, 
High legitimacy 
Airlines and cruise lines,   
Regional / international tourism 
organizations 
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The Tourism Police within the Ministry of the Interior was ranked as both powerful and 
legitimate after crises. The qualitative analysis suggests that this stakeholder was very 
uncooperative but performed a dominant role in the reactive stage of crisis management. 
Knowledge of the exact techniques adopted by the police is rudimentary, because they were 
very reluctant to give information. Therefore, seven questions based on best crisis 
management practice were formulated and put to the other respondents in order to elicit their 
perceptions of the role of the police. The results revealed the existence of a special unit called 
the Tourism Police, whose officers were trained in tourism issues and were considered to be 
highly visible, accessible and friendly to tourists. Thus, in the periods shortly after a crisis 
every tourist would be expected to notice the ubiquitous presence of uniformed officers in 
tourist zones. In addition, the police and security sector was found to be strongly involved in 
assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks on employees. 
Although, because of the politically and administratively centralist nature of public decision-
making in Egypt, the key decisions on crisis management issues are made at a very high level 
of government, the Ministry of Tourism and its affiliated departments are often involved in 
making decisions. Different departments of the Ministry of Tourism are engaged in crisis 
managements activities. It has a Crisis Management Unit charged with the formulation and 
implementation of crisis management policies. The main task of this unit, however, is 
advisory and it often acts as coordinator among different stakeholders. Another important 
unit of the Ministry of Tourism is the General Authority for Tourism Development, which is 
responsible for marketing campaigns throughout the world, through its internal and external 
offices. The GATD is also in close partnership with the private sector and Egyptian 
embassies abroad (Egyptian Ministry of Tourism, 2008).  
The Egyptian Tourism Federation was found to be another powerful and legitimate 
stakeholder before and after crises, representing various private sector tourism bodies in 
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Egypt. During a crisis, its members (the heads of chambers of tourism) would meet with the 
Minister of Tourism. Like the Ministry of Tourism, it would act as a hub for private sector 
organizations, coordinating their activities with those of the public sector, during and after a 
crisis. 
Among the stakeholders in the Egyptian tourism industry, the media were found to be the 
most controversial. The results of the quantitative analysis indicate that they were seen as a 
comparatively legitimate stakeholder group whose legitimacy decreased after a crisis, while 
the qualitative results corroborate to some extent this assessment of their importance. 
Although most of the participants indicated that religious scholars or imams did not play a 
significant role in tourism industry, some still emphasized the importance of the role that 
imams could play in raising awareness of the importance of tourism and its contribution to 
the national economy and to public prosperity. Since most Egyptians are religious and have 
considerable respect for religious scholars, they can play an influential role in the public 
perception of tourists and tourism (Al-Awa, 2006).    
7-3 Stakeholders’ management strategies  
The second research question addressed strategic management and the relationships among 
stakeholders before and after a crisis. The results of qualitative analysis revealed that most 
respondents were in agreement about the poor cooperation among tourist stakeholders during 
terrorism crises and they identified several major barriers to efficient cooperation among 
them in managing such crises. These included inherent features of the tourism industry, 
which consists of many organizations, institutions and sub-industries, making relations and 
compromise among them very contentious. This lack of cooperation was seen to worsen 
whenever a crisis arose. In this context,  the security sector would take the upper hand during 
crises and have the last word, while the Ministry of Tourism Crisis Management Unit would 
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exercise only a minimal coordinating function. By contrast, there was said to be some degree 
of cooperation once crises began to diminish, as the GATD and the Federation of Chambers 
of Tourism began to play an important role in facilitating interactions among stakeholders. 
Respondents further suggested that when a crisis occurred, some stakeholders would become 
more uncooperative than in normal times. The lack of contingency plans intensified this sense 
of uncooperativeness.   
To address this question, the study adopted the model of stakeholders’ capacity and 
willingness to threaten or cooperate in their relationships proposed by Savage et al (1991). 
The results of quantitative analysis were consistent with those of the interviews and precisely 
show that at both pre- and post-crisis stages those stakeholders affiliated to private sector 
organisations such as airlines and cruise lines had the greatest potential for cooperation and 
the least potential for posing obstacles, followed by the Ministry of Tourism and tourism 
bodies; therefore they can be classified under the category of supportive relationships, 
according to the Savage et al (1991) model. This is partly due to the close relationship with 
the Ministry of Tourism and the clarity of its plans to the stakeholders. Central/ local 
government had also the greatest potential for cooperation and less potential for threats 
before a crisis and therefore should be categorized as a supportive, but after a crisis its 
potential for threat increased and its potential for cooperation decreased and as result it 
should be regarded as non-supportive. The results of the qualitative analysis reveal that this is 
largely because in times of crisis the central government would work closely with police and  
security sector the issue.   
Another conclusion which can be drawn is that the Ministry of the Interior was regarded at 
both pre- and post-crisis stages as the least cooperative and most threatening partner. The 
result of qualitative analysis corroborates this finding. Several interviewees indicated that 
they saw the Ministry, which provided tourist security, as ‘the most difficult people to 
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cooperate with’ and ‘the most uncooperative partners’, among others. What is more, the 
results of qualitative and quantitative analysis confirm that the tourism police became more 
uncooperative during a crisis. Working under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, they 
failed to build a partnership with the tourism sector in general and the Ministry of Tourism in 
particular. For example, despite the presence of tourism police at each hotel gate for security 
purposes, there was said to be no meaningful interaction between the police and the hotels.  
Another intriguing conclusion which can be drawn from this analysis is that the international 
media changed and began to pose obstacles once a destination was affected by a crisis, 
according to the analysis of quantitative data collected through the survey. There are several 
reasons for this alteration in the strategic relationship of these stakeholders. For one thing, as 
discussed before, the tourism industry is very sensitive to the media, especially when 
nationals of other countries are involved. The international media give extensive coverage to 
violent events and at the same time they bypass government censorship (Sonmez, 1998; 
Weimann and Winn, 1994). Indeed the foreign media were more concerned about their 
business and thus about reaching the largest possible audience than about portraying the facts 
accurately.  
Another factor is perhaps the fact that Egyptian perceptions tend to be dominated by 
conspiracy theories. As indicated by the qualitative analysis, participants viewed foreigners 
with cynicism and believed that the causes of their troubles emanated from abroad. One 
interviewee, for example, claimed that the rivalry between Egypt and neighbouring countries, 
especially Israel and Jordan, over attracting more tourism was responsible for fomenting 
crises and supporting terrorism. Another conclusion to be drawn is the importance of imams, 
as the results of the quantitative analysis reveal them to be supportive before and after a 
crisis. This means that they were perceived to play an active role against terrorism.  
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There was a statistically significant difference between the attitude of respondents in the local 
tourist towns and those in Cairo. Central respondents perceived slightly higher levels of 
stakeholder cooperation after a crisis and saw them as more likely to pose obstacles before a 
crisis than did local respondents. Table 7.3 summarizes this section by tabulating 
stakeholders’ pre- and post-crisis management strategies.  
Table  7.3: Stakeholders’ management strategies before and after a crisis 
high low 
7-4 The impact of national culture  
The second group of factors determining the crisis management behaviour of stakeholders 
was assumed to be related to national culture and the third research question was formulated 
on the basis of this assumption. The results indicated that tourism stakeholders in Egypt had a 
 Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
 
 
 
Cooperation  
Threat 
Supportive 
Relationships 
Central/ local government,  
Ministry of Tourism,  
Tourism bodies / chambers,  
National media,  
Imams,  
Hotels/ associations,  
Airlines and cruise lines,  
Regional and international tourism 
organizations,  
International media,  
Governments of generating markets 
 
 
Ministry of Tourism,  
National media,  
Imams,  
Hotels/ associations,  
Airlines and cruise lines,  
Regional and international tourism 
organizations,   
Governments of generating markets 
 
 
Cooperation  
Threat 
Mixed blessing 
relationships 
 
 
 
International media 
Cooperation  
Threat 
Non-supportive 
relationships 
 
Ministry of Interior 
 
 
Central/ local government 
Ministry of Interior 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 
 Cooperation  
Threat 
Marginal 
relationships 
 
 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 
 
Tourism 
bodies / chambers 
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common perception regarding the significance of tourism. Despite this common belief, they 
indicated a number of other cultural barriers rooted in general national culture that could be 
said to account for the failure of stakeholders to operate efficient crisis management. Key 
among these barriers were several consistent with the dimensions of national culture 
identified Hofstede (2001), Hofstede & Hofstede (2005) and Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars (2000), including uncertainty avoidance, described by respondents as “the 
culture of secrecy” and “lack of confidence”, short-term orientation, which they called a 
“culture of reaction”, and power distance, described by interviewees in terms of the difficulty 
arising from organizational structures and the allocation of individual functions within 
organizations. These barriers contributed to inadequate stakeholder cooperation, which in 
turn led to poor implementation of crisis management strategies.  
Also of importance to this section was how the organizational culture should be modified in 
order for the organization to become more efficient in managing crises. Although the bulk of 
respondents agreed on the need for cultural changes, they differed on what changes should 
take place and how these goals should be achieved. Some respondents regarded democratic 
values as the fundamental alternative culture, whilst others gave pre-eminence to 
professionalization as the most fundamental condition of change. The majority of respondents 
believed that changes could be achieved through training, but there was also consensus that 
there was a long way to go and that success would not happen overnight. Some participants 
believed that the whole political system needed to be changed and that this would help to 
remove cultural barriers. For them, the elimination of these barriers would allow the best 
qualified people to occupy management positions. Respondents in the local tourist towns 
were more sceptical of the likelihood of any significant changes in the culture in the near 
future than were respondents in Cairo.  
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7-5 Crisis management in action  
The fourth goal of this study was to gain an understanding of the crisis management 
techniques that stakeholders employed in managing terrorism-related crises in the Egyptian 
tourism industry. The rationale behind this goal was the need to make sense of actual crisis 
management efforts in action and to compare and contrast these with the findings of the first 
part of our analysis, which was mainly based on stakeholder theories. An extensive series of 
data were collected through interviews and survey questions and the results of their analysis 
can be divided into two broad categories: the extent to which crisis management was seen to 
be proactive or reactive and the extent to which different stakeholders interacted with one 
another and participated in crisis management. 
7-5-1 Proactive vs. reactive crisis management 
In discussing the role of national culture, it was indicated that one important characteristic of 
Egyptian organizational culture is reactive thinking. This dominant trait was perceived to 
have a direct impact on stakeholders’ strategies during a crisis. An important indication of the 
extent to which stakeholders are reactive or proactive is their frequency of interaction at the 
three stages of crisis management. The results of qualitative analysis show that in normal 
times, stakeholders in this study were in contact with one another on a regular basis, through 
both modern technology and traditional means of communication. However, participants 
stressed that these contacts had nothing to do with the preventive measures of crisis 
management but were limited to their day-to-day business. Then, once a crisis occurred, 
everything changed dramatically. Analysis of the quantitative data also indicates a low 
frequency of pre-crisis interaction and a marked increase during crises, for the purposes of 
crisis management. Based upon these results, it can be argued that tourism stakeholders in 
Egypt may be regarded as reactive.  
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This conclusion is supported by responses to other questions regarding the strategies 
undertaken by stakeholders in crisis management. Mansfield and Pizam (2006) argue that the 
advanced formulation of contingency plans for managing crises is an indication of proactive 
crisis management. Interviewees were asked about the existence of contingency plans. The 
initial results revealed that the Crisis Management Unit of the Ministry of Tourism had 
formulated a series plans to face a variety of crises and circulated these among the 
stakeholders. However, this circulation does not appear to have been sufficiently wide, as 
most respondents claimed to be unaware of the existence of such plans and preventative 
measures. Responses to the questionnaire confirm this lack of awareness. Some interviewees 
indicated that they were aware of these programmes, but considered them to be narrow and 
selective, thus failing to fit well with many types of potential crisis. Another shortcoming of 
these strategies appears to have been insufficient attention being given to coordination 
between the diverse stakeholders involved in the tourism sector. It also appears that the 
financial resources required for the formulation and implementation of such a programme 
were not available. Finally, training in preventive strategies was reported not to have been 
generally provided, largely because of widespread negative perceptions as to the efficacy of 
such training programmes. Indeed, the respondents perceived such training to be useless and 
unnecessary. These factors can be seen as having combined to produce poor preventive 
strategies.  
These findings were corroborated by the quantitative results, showing that on average the 
recovery strategies received higher scores than the preventive ones. Within preventive 
strategies, the most common strategies were those specific to the security sector, such as 
“assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks on employees”, followed by 
“maintaining many visible security measures”, then by “increasing the presence of uniformed 
officers in tourist zones”, “training police officers in tourism issues” and “making the police 
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visible, accessible and friendly to tourists”. These strategies all fall within the traditional 
approaches identified in section 2-4-2 in fighting against terrorism, drawing on suppression 
and criminalisation. The rest of the strategies, having to do with community-based policing 
and counter-terrorism strategies, are seen as not very usual in the Egyptian context, as all 
received mean scores below two.  
Those strategies which have to do with tourists and citizens also achieved comparatively high 
scores, including “making tourists aware of the possibility of becoming victimized by 
criminals and instructing them in crime prevention methods” and “educating citizens on the 
serious impact that crime against tourists can have on their communities”. With respect to 
strategies specific to the private sector, the highest score was given to “using crime 
prevention/reduction methods, such as security hardware and security policies”, followed by 
“considering the function of security important to the success of their business”, then 
“allocating a significant portion of their financial and human resources to security” and 
“incorporating the principles of crime prevention through environmental design”.  
7-5-2 Stakeholders’ engagement and participation in crisis management 
Interestingly, there was almost complete consensus among respondents that the extent of 
engagement of stakeholders had a great effect on the efficiency of crisis management. The 
words and expressions they used to stress the importance of stakeholder engagement included 
‘essential and very important’, ‘integral part of any crisis management’, ‘the essence of the 
proper solution to the crisis’ and ‘the  basic action of any successful work’. However, in 
practice there was little sign of participation by a wide range of stakeholders in the pre-crisis 
and reactive stages of crisis management. These results confirm those discussed above 
regarding the reactive nature of crisis management strategies in this context. With respect to 
the pre-crisis stage, four questions were formulated in the quantitative analysis to discover the 
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extent to which different stakeholders were involved at this stage in managing terrorism 
crises. These questions have to do with the strategies which were based on the participation 
of stakeholders, including the education of citizens on the impacts of crime, the engagement 
of citizens in neighbourhood watch schemes, establishing partnerships among law 
enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the community at large and the tourists 
themselves, and finally establishing a partnership between the leaders of the local community 
and the national and local governments.  
The results of quantitative analysis also revealed that these strategies were not followed in the 
Egyptian context during a crisis. A number of questions were formulated to explore such 
engagement at the crisis stage, mainly based on the partnership and cooperation of the 
tourism stakeholders with the police and security sector and with one another. There was 
consensus among the respondents in local tourist towns and in Cairo that these strategies 
were not adopted sufficiently. The notable exceptions reported to be implemented actively in 
this context were that the police assisted the tourism industry to conduct background checks 
on employees and the establishing of a mechanism for sharing information and coordination 
of publicity and PR activities, aimed at creating positive perceptions among the media, the 
local community and customers. Among these strategies, those requiring the involvement of 
the police and security sector with other stakeholders received the lowest scores; for example, 
“establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the 
community at large and the tourists themselves” was perceived as the strategy least 
frequently undertaken by stakeholders in Egypt to manage tourism crises.  
7-6 Overall impact of terrorism crises on tourism in Egypt  
Chapter Three, on tourism and terrorism in Egypt, reviewed recent trends in travel and 
tourism in Egypt to ascertain how major terrorist attacks have affected tourism flows. The 
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qualitative data analysed above, based on the perceptions of stakeholders, show that many, 
especially those living in local destinations, had suffered greatly soon after terrorist attacks. 
In fact, local communities were found to have been deeply affected in the short term; 
however, the facts presented in section 3-4 show that Egyptian tourism had recovered fully 
from the severe damage done by terrorism, enjoying robust growth in the last few years in 
tourist arrivals. This is illustrated most clearly in figures showing that while international 
visitor arrivals to Egypt fell after terrorist attacks, they soon increased again (Figure 3.1). It 
can therefore be suggested that the current tourism boom in Egypt is explained in part by the 
effectiveness of crisis management efforts undertaken by tourism stakeholders. 
7-7 Summary 
This chapter has offered an interpretation of the data collected during this study and presented 
in earlier chapters, addressing the research questions in turn by confronting them with 
triangulated data from the qualitative and quantitative arms of the field study, supported by 
documentary evidence and aligned with the literature-based conceptual framework set out in 
Chapter Two. It has identified the stakeholders seen as most salient before and after crises 
and categorised them according to their roles in decision making, coordination and 
implementation, adding the symbolic role of the media in building destination image and the 
imams in improving the tourism culture. It next outlined the relationships among stakeholders 
and their use of crisis management strategies. When the effects of national and organizational 
culture were examined, they were found to be largely negative, characterised by secrecy, lack 
of confidence and uncertainty avoidance. While agreement was reported on the need for 
cultural change, no such consensus was forthcoming as to the means to achieve it. Then, 
when crisis management techniques were explored, they were found to be more reactive than 
proactive. Notwithstanding the criticisms of culture, strategy and methods expressed by many 
participants, the final section of this chapter has considered evidence suggesting that tourism 
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stakeholders in Egypt are at least partly effective in countering the effects of terrorism by 
means of crisis management.  
The final chapter summarises the main points of the thesis, draws conclusions and offers 
pertinent recommendations. 
  
253 
 
Chapter 8 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations  
8-1 Introduction 
The main aims of this study were twofold: to propose a framework of analysis based on the 
application of stakeholder theory in the management of security crises in the tourism industry 
and to explore the terrorism crisis in Egypt within this framework. The following pages 
address a series of important issues: the contribution of the study, both theoretical and 
managerial, its limitations, areas for further research and a concluding summary.   
8-2 Contribution of the study 
A variety of conclusions can be drawn from this study, which contributes to knowledge in 
several ways. These conclusions are divided into two groups: theoretical and managerial. 
This research has also contributed to knowledge through its innovative methodology applied 
in a closed context such as Egypt. This contribution is explained in section 8-3 on the 
limitations of the research.  
8-2-1 Theoretical contribution 
First, this study contributes to the development of stakeholder theory as utilized in the 
management field. Existing studies predominantly draw on stakeholder salience and strategic 
management as practised in a private sector context; there is limited evidence concerning 
how it operates in the public context and particularly in the management of tourism crises. 
This research provides an opportunity to understand how stakeholder salience and strategic 
management operate in a public context. This is significant, given the potentially wider range 
of stakeholders and different relationships prevailing in the public sector, particularly the 
dominant role played by powerful state actors: central and local government and the police.  
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Another theoretical contribution of the present study was to examine systematically the 
salience of stakeholders in the tourism industry and how their importance changed when a 
crisis emerged. The main contribution of this study in this regard is the identification of an 
obvious distinction between stakeholders based in Cairo and those operating locally in 
tourism destinations, the former being responsible for making major decisions and the latter 
for implementing those decisions, reporting to the central authorities and providing 
consultation services to them. Due to the politically and administratively centralised nature of 
public decision-making in Egypt, a functional distinction can be drawn between local and 
central stakeholders. It was also shown that a crisis might produce new stakeholders that the 
organization had not anticipated. As a result, the criteria for identifying stakeholders after a 
crisis were likely to be noticeably different from those which apply in normal conditions. 
This is a very important point, and emphasizes the importance of identifying stakeholders at 
all stages of crisis management. To assess the significance of stakeholders, two criteria, of 
legitimacy and power, were defined and applied to the context of tourism crisis management 
during terrorism crises. 
In addition, this study adds to theory by showing how different stakeholders interacted with 
one another before and after a crisis, some tending to pose obstacles, while others had the 
potential to cooperate. To address this issue, the study adopted the model of stakeholders’ 
capacity and willingness to threaten or cooperate in their relationships proposed by Savage et 
al (1991). Four management strategies proposed by Savage et al (1991)—supportive, non-
supportive, mixed and marginal relationships—were applied to crisis management in the 
context of terrorism against tourist destinations and it was evident that different stakeholders 
undertook different strategies at different stages of crisis management. In this way, the part of 
the conceptual framework concerning the procedural aspects of stakeholder theory was 
validated.  
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Perhaps the most important contribution of the study to stakeholder theory, however, is that it 
has taken into consideration the effect of national and organizational culture on the behaviour 
of stakeholders in crisis management. Indeed, the different contexts necessitate modification 
of the crisis management models and in turn they extend those models by taking account of 
cultural influences. In this respect, Hofstede (1979; 1980; 1983; 1984; 2001) and Hofstede & 
Hofstede (2005) dimensions of culture proved useful. In particular, “the culture of secrecy” 
and “lack of confidence” identical to uncertainty avoidance concept, “culture of reaction” 
identical to short-term orientation concept and the difficulty arising from organizational 
structures and the allocation of individual functions within organizations identical to the 
power distance concept were identified as significant cultural barriers complicated the 
efficient crisis management efforts. It could further be argued that the issue of willingness to 
engage in proactive planning for potential crises versus post-hoc reactivity gives salience to 
the notion of long versus short-term orientation.  
8-2-2 Managerial contribution 
This study has largely taken into account the potential application of managerial and practical 
aspects of stakeholder theory to operational crisis management processes. Previous 
applications of stakeholder theory to crisis management have been predominantly descriptive. 
It has highlighted the fact that the management of stakeholders does not take place in a 
vacuum; nor is it something that can be applied in exactly the same way in all places, cultures 
and societies. To be effective, the managing of the stakeholders in crisis management must be 
open to adaptation to the specific considerations of each context. The practical and 
managerial conclusions drawn from the case studies can be summarized as follows: First, 
different stakeholders performed major roles in Egyptian tourism and were active in a wide 
range of crisis management activities. The conventional division between private and public 
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stakeholders is hardly applicable to the Egyptian tourism industry, largely because of the 
strong domination of the public sector. The Ministry of Tourism was identified as the most 
legitimate and powerful stakeholder in normal conditions; however, after a crisis, central and 
local government replaced it as the most powerful stakeholder. Interestingly, central/ local 
government, which was identified as the most powerful stakeholder in a crisis, was found to 
be responsible for making key decisions, while the Ministry of Tourism had only an advisory 
role. The Ministry and the Egyptian Tourism Federation performed coordinating roles and 
were both considered highly legitimate stakeholders. During the implementation phase the 
maintenance of security was found to be wholly in the hands of the Tourism Police, while the 
marketing campaigns were initiated by the General Authority for Tourism Development in 
the Ministry of Tourism, with the cooperation of other stakeholders. The religious scholars 
identified as relatively legitimate stakeholders especially before crises.  
Secondly, it was argued that stakeholders interacted differently after a crisis and that their 
interaction strategies differed. The Ministry of Tourism, tourism bodies/ chambers, national 
media and imams were identified as engaging in supportive relationships before and after 
crises, being perceived as less threatening and more cooperative. The Ministry of the Interior 
was identified as the least cooperative stakeholder before a crisis, with the greatest potential 
to pose a threat, while after a crisis Central/ local government was added to the list of non-
supportive stakeholders. International media was the only stakeholder which was perceived 
as highly cooperative and highly threatening once crises occurred, i.e. a mixed blessing in the 
terminology of Savage et al (1991).  
Thirdly, the peculiarities of the Egyptian case highlighted a number of cultural issues 
complicating the interactions among stakeholders in particular and crisis management efforts 
in general. Two characteristics of Egyptian culture, the ‘culture of secrecy’ and the ‘culture of 
reaction’ were identified as the main barriers to cooperation and communication among the 
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various parties working in tourism (Hatem, 1994). This allowed an appraisal of the degree to 
which the strategies adopted by stakeholders in the Egyptian tourism industry in managing 
terrorism crises were active or reactive. As with findings drawn from national culture, the 
particular strategies associated with proactive crisis management were absent in the Egyptian 
case. For instance, there was no effort to formulate in advance any contingency plans for 
managing a crisis or to prepare for a possible terrorist incident through simulations and 
training. Furthermore, those strategies which involve the participation of a wide range of 
stakeholders were taken for granted in the Egyptian case. This persuasively challenges the 
conventional wisdom which argues that the participation of all stakeholders is necessary at all 
stages of crisis management. Because of the peculiarities of terrorism crises, which are 
regarded as constituting a major security issue, the participation of a good number of 
stakeholders at most stages of crisis management does not necessarily lead to effective and 
efficient crisis management. Instead, as the case study indicated, a crisis management model 
in which the crisis stage is dominated by police and security forces, while at the recovery 
stage the participation of most stakeholders was ensured, proved to be efficient and 
successful.  
At this point, a question arises as to the applicability of the findings of this study to other 
countries, industries and types of crisis. In this regard, caution should be exercised. It has 
been shown that the Egyptian response to terrorism crises has been influenced by structural 
and cultural factors which may differ from one country to another; for example, the degree of 
centralization of public decision making. As regards industry, tourism may have different 
stakeholders from other industries, or their salience may differ. Tourism is particularly 
susceptible to media influence, for instance, while some other industries may be less so. As 
for the types of crisis, terrorism has special features that may make co-operation particularly 
difficult, being linked as it is to highly sensitive issues of national security. Thus, it cannot be 
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assumed that stakeholders in other contexts will or should behave as described in the study. 
What this research has achieved, however, is to highlight a range of factors that interact to 
affect  crisis management, which may provide some insights to inform debates, planning and 
analysis in other contexts. In this respect, a more appropriate concept than generalizability is 
that of transferability (Guba and Lincoln, 1989).  
 
8-3 Limitations 
The limitations of this study can be divided into substantive/conceptual and contextual/ 
methodological ones. With respective to substantive/conceptual limitations, the most evident 
issue was the novelty of the research approach. This study sought to propose a conceptual 
framework applying the managerial aspects of stakeholder theory to the practical methods 
and strategies undertaken in the management of crisis in tourism industry. To do so, the 
research attempted to merge three previously separated strands of literature: crisis 
management, tourism studies and stakeholder theory. Synthesising these virtually distinct 
fields was neither easy nor straightforward, largely because of the dearth of literature. The 
most significant barrier to this study, however, may be attributed to contextual/ 
methodological limitations. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, there was little information 
available to the public regarding terrorism-related issues in the tourism industry. The risk and 
potential harm that respondents thought they would face if they contributed to the research 
was another barrier that prevented potential respondents in Egypt from giving information to 
the researcher. To overcome this problem, a series of practical and methodological measures 
was undertaken, ranging from building rapport to local researchers to convincing the 
respondents by producing a variety of permission documents, and to appealing to informal 
links to give participants assurances of confidentiality. In addition, the scope of samples was 
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expanded. Initially, it was intended to focus on one case (tourism destinations in Sharm El 
Sheikh) and use semi-structured interviews to collect the data. However, when work on a 
pilot study began in the field, it became evident that this method would fail to yield plausible 
and trustworthy results, mainly because contextual constraints and the sensitivity of the topic 
prevented informants from offering satisfactory responses. Therefore, two further cases (Taba 
and Dahab) were added to the analysis and a questionnaire was also designed to collect data 
from a wide range of respondents within the three destinations and in Cairo. As a result, the 
design of the research changed to the mixed methods, in which the quantitative and 
qualitative research were given emphasis by obtaining these two different and 
complementary types of data. This design proved to be more appropriate to research 
conducted on a sensitive issue in a closed society.  
8-4 Further research 
There are some areas which were beyond the scope of this study. For one thing, this research 
did not incorporate explicitly counterterrorism techniques into crisis management strategies 
in the tourism industry. This is an interesting and worthwhile aspect which emerged during 
the empirical research and deserves further independent research. Another potential area for 
further studies is to take into account the important role that peculiar stakeholders such as 
imams play in determining the efficiency of crisis management. Given the findings in the 
study as to the influence of the national context and political system on stakeholder behaviour 
in a crisis situation, further investigation of these issues, both within individual countries and 
comparatively across cultures, would be informative. Specific areas of focus could include 
the impact of the political system on the interaction among tourism stakeholders, the impact 
of culture and potential of cultural change to enhance crisis management, and the specific 
strategies most effective in different cultures and political contexts. Another matter requiring 
further investigation is the applicability of the conceptual model developed here to other 
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industries and types of crisis. It is recommended that future research should address these 
issues. 
8-5 Summary 
To sum up and to highlight the value of this study, it should be emphasised once again that it 
incorporates a number of novel features, as follows:  
The research breaks new ground by examining the potential application of managerial aspects 
of stakeholder theory to operational crisis management processes in a public context, which 
may have different stakeholders and relationships from those of private contexts and where 
power relations may operate differently. Moreover, the innovatory systematic application of 
stakeholder theory to terrorism crisis management in the tourism industry is timely, given the 
reliance of many states on tourism income and the severe impact of terrorism crises in recent 
years. 
A significant contribution is made by examining the management of terrorism crises in the 
tourism industry within a culturally different context and applying a modified framework 
appropriate to this context. National dimensions have been shown to be useful and relevant in 
this respect. Thus, the research develops and enriches stakeholder theory by emphasizing the 
role of culture in crisis management behaviour. Previous studies have not offered an in-depth 
analysis of terrorism crisis management specifically in Egypt, a country where the tourism 
industry has often been the target of terrorism attacks. This study therefore contributes to 
filling this gap in the literature. Moreover, whilst it is not claimed that the findings are 
generalisable to all other countries, the rich contextual information provided affords a basis 
for assessment of the appropriateness of transfer.  
In this respect, a valuable contribution of the study is its examination of the application to a 
non-Western context of a wide range of crisis management techniques developed in the West 
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and hitherto associated with Western crisis management. The transfer of Western-derived 
concepts, theories and practices to non-Western contexts has become increasingly 
controversial and is often challenged by non-Western writers. This study provides a more 
balanced contribution to the debate by showing a broad level of applicability of Western 
stakeholder theory in Egypt, whilst also taking account of context-specific cultural issues. 
Finally, the research findings challenge the conventional wisdom that the participation of all 
stakeholders is necessary if crisis management is to be efficient, thereby contributing both to 
theory and to managerial practice.    
While the above summary illustrates that this study has taken an important initial step, it is 
nonetheless recognized that further research is needed to understand better the nature of 
stakeholders’ interactions in managing terrorism crises in the tourism industry in different 
contexts. Only when this final recommendation for future study has been addressed will the 
full potential of stakeholder theory in this domain become apparent.  
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Appendix One: Questionnaire (English) 
Q1. What city/town are you based in?   
 
1.   
2. Sharm El Sheikh  
3.   
4.  
 
Q2. Which of these tourism stakeholder categories best describes your organization? (Please 
tick √ the appropriate box).                                                                                           
1. Central/ local Government.  
2. Ministry of Tourism.  
3. Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)  
4. General Authority for Promoting Tourism.               
5. Hotels/Hotel Association/ Resorts   
6. General Authority for Tourism Development.                        
7. Tourism Companies/ Travel Agencies  
8. Tourism Chambers.  
9. Airlines and Cruise Lines.  
10. Religious Scholars (Imams).  
11. International Media.  
12. National Media.  
13. The Governments of Generating Markets.  
14. Others (please specify)................................... 
 
       Q3. Please indicate your experience in the tourism sector:     
1. 5 years or less.        
2. 6 – 10 years.           
3. 11 years or more.   
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Q4. Please indicate what you consider to be the importance of following stakeholders in 
managing the terrorism crisis in the tourism industry in Egypt. (Please tick √ the appropriate 
box for each of the following stakeholders). 
 
Q5. Some stakeholders might have more power than others. Power is defined as the extent to 
which a stakeholder has or can gain access to the resources (physical, financial and 
symbolic.) How much power do you think the following stakeholders have over others in pre-
and post crisis phases? (Please tick √ the appropriate box for each of the following 
stakeholders). 
Stakeholders Very 
important 
Important Neutral Un-
important 
Very 
Unimportant 
Central/ local Government      
Ministry of Tourism      
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)      
Tourism Bodies and Chambers      
Tourism Companies/ Travel 
Agencies 
     
Hotels/Hotel Association/      
Airlines and Cruise Lines      
National Media      
International Media      
Religious Scholars ( Imams )      
Governments of Generating Markets      
Regional and international 
tourism organization 
     
 
 
Stakeholders 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
V
ery
 po
w
erfu
l
 
p
o
w
erfu
l
 
N
eu
tral
 
w
eak
 
V
ery
 W
eak
 
V
ery
 po
w
erfu
l
 
p
o
w
erfu
l
 
N
eu
tral
 
w
eak
 
V
ery
 W
eak
 
Central/ local Government           
Ministry of Tourism           
Ministry of Interior 
(Tourism Police) 
          
Tourism Bodies and 
Chambers 
          
Tourism Companies/ 
Travel Agencies 
          
284 
 
 
Q6. Some stakeholders might have more legitimacy than others. Legitimacy is defined as the 
extent to which the action of a stakeholder is legally or morally is appropriate in tourism 
industry in Egypt. How much do you think the following stakeholders have legitimacy over 
others in pre-and post crisis phases? (Please tick √ the appropriate box for each of the 
following stakeholders). 
Hotels/Hotel Association/            
Airlines and Cruise Lines           
National Media           
International Media           
Religious Scholars 
(Imams ) 
          
Governments of 
Generating Markets 
          
Regional and international 
tourism organization 
          
 
 
Stakeholders 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
V
ery
 
L
eg
itim
ate
 
L
eg
itim
ate
 
N
eu
tral
 Illeg
itim
ate
 
V
ery
 
Illeg
itim
ate
 
V
ery
 
L
eg
itim
ate
 
L
eg
itim
ate
 
N
eu
tral
 Illeg
itim
ate
 
V
ery
 
Illeg
itim
ate
 
Central/ local Government           
Ministry of Tourism           
Ministry of Interior 
(Tourism Police) 
          
Tourism Bodies and 
Chambers 
          
Tourism Companies/ 
Travel Agencies 
          
Hotels/Hotel Association/            
Airlines and Cruise Lines           
National Media           
International Media           
Religious Scholars 
(Imams ) 
          
Governments of 
Generating Markets 
          
Regional and international 
tourism organization 
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Q7. To what extent do you think that the following stakeholders are likely to cooperate in the 
tourism industry? (Please tick √ the appropriate box for each of the following stakeholders). 
 
Q8. To what extent do you agree that the following stakeholders are likely to pose obstacles 
in tourism industry? (Please tick √ the appropriate box to each of the following stakeholders). 
 
 
 
Stakeholders 
 
 
 
 
Pre- Crisis 
 
Post-Crisis 
 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 ag
ree
 
 
A
g
ree
 
N
eith
er ag
ree 
o
r d
isag
ree
 
D
isag
ree
 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 
d
isag
ree
 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 ag
ree
 
A
g
ree
 
N
eith
er ag
ree 
o
r d
isag
ree
 
D
isag
ree
 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 
d
isag
ree
 
Central/ local 
Government 
          
Ministry of Tourism           
Ministry of Interior 
(Tourism Police) 
          
Tourism Bodies and 
Chambers 
          
Tourism Companies/ 
Travel Agencies 
          
Hotels/Hotel Association/            
Airlines and Cruise Lines           
National Media           
International Media           
Religious Scholars 
(Imams) 
          
Governments of 
Generating Markets 
          
Regional and 
international tourism 
organization 
          
 
 
 
 
Pre- Crisis 
 
Post-Crisis 
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Q9. How often do you communicate with the following before, during and after terrorism 
crises? (Please tick √ the appropriate box for each of the following stakeholders). 
Stakeholders 
 
 
 
 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 ag
ree
 
 
A
g
ree
 
N
eith
er ag
ree 
o
r d
isag
ree
 
D
isag
ree
 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 
d
isag
ree
 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 ag
ree
 
A
g
ree
 
N
eith
er ag
ree 
o
r d
isag
ree
 
D
isag
ree
 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 
d
isag
ree
 
Central/ local 
Government 
          
Ministry of Tourism           
Ministry of Interior 
(Tourism Police) 
          
Tourism Bodies and 
Chambers 
          
Tourism Companies/ 
Travel Agencies 
          
Hotels/Hotel 
Association/  
          
Airlines and Cruise 
Lines 
          
National Media           
International Media           
Religious Scholars 
(Imams) 
          
The Governments of 
Generating Markets 
          
Regional and international 
tourism organization 
          
 
 
Stakeholders 
 
 
Before crisis 
 
During crisis 
 
After crisis 
 
u
su
a
lly
 so
m
etim
es
 no
t v
er
y
 o
ften
 
ra
re
ly
 
n
ev
er
 u
su
a
lly
 so
m
etim
es
 no
t v
er
y
 o
ften
 
ra
re
ly
 
n
ev
er
 u
su
a
lly
 so
m
etim
es
 no
t v
er
y
 o
ften
 
ra
re
ly
 
n
ev
e
r
 
Central/ local 
Government 
               
Ministry of Tourism                
Ministry of Interior 
(Tourism Police) 
               
Tourism Bodies and 
Chambers 
               
Tourism Companies/ 
Travel Agencies 
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Q10. To what extent do you agree that the stakeholders have adopted the following measures 
and strategies in recent terrorist attacks in tourism in Egypt? (Please tick √ the appropriate 
box for each of the following measures and strategies). 
Measures and Strategies 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 
a
g
ree
 
A
g
ree
 
N
eith
er 
a
g
ree o
r 
d
isa
g
ree 
D
isa
g
ree
 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 
d
isa
g
ree 
Formulating and implementing crisis and 
contingency plans in advance  
     
Housing the tourists in gated all-inclusive resorts 
to divide off tourists and local residents. 
     
 Maintaining too many visible security measures.      
Offering rewards for information leading to the 
arrest and conviction of those who commit 
serious crimes against tourists. 
     
Incorporating the principles of Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental Design  
     
Considering the function of security important to 
the success of their business 
     
Allocating a significant portion of their financial 
and human resources to security purpose. 
     
Making their tourists aware of the possibility of 
becoming victimized by criminals and instruct 
them in crime prevention methods. 
     
Using crime prevention/reduction methods—
such as security hardware and security policies.  
     
Educating the citizens on the serious impacts that 
crime against tourists can have on their 
communities  
     
Engaging citizens in a neighbourhood watch 
scheme  
     
Hotels/Hotel 
Association/  
               
Airlines and Cruise 
Lines 
               
National Media                
International Media                
Religious Scholars 
(Imams) 
               
Governments of 
Generating Markets 
               
Regional and 
international tourism 
organization 
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Establishing a partnership between law 
enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the 
community at large, and the tourists themselves.  
     
Establishing a partnership between the leaders of 
the local community and the national and local 
governments 
     
Q11. To what extent do you agree that the law enforcement agencies and police have adopted 
the following measures and strategies in recent terrorist attacks in tourism in Egypt? (Please 
tick √ the appropriate box for each of the following measures and strategies). 
 
Q12. To what extent do you agree that the stakeholders have adopted the following measures 
and strategies in recent terrorist attacks in tourism in Egypt? (Please tick √ the appropriate 
box for each of the following measures and strategies). 
Recovery Methods 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 
a
g
ree
 
A
g
ree
 
N
eith
er 
a
g
ree o
r 
d
isa
g
ree 
D
isa
g
ree
 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 
d
isa
g
ree 
Reducing their operational costs by laying off a 
proportion of their employees. 
     
Appealing to domestic tourists      
Identifying and developing new market segments      
Activities 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 
a
g
ree
 
A
g
ree
 
N
eith
er 
a
g
ree o
r 
d
isa
g
ree 
D
isa
g
ree
 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 
d
isa
g
ree 
Train their officers in tourism issues      
Are visible, accessible, and friendly to tourists      
Work closely with the community and tourism 
industry representatives 
     
Advise and train tourism industry employees in 
crime prevention techniques 
     
Assist the tourism industry by conducting 
background checks for employees 
     
Encourage tourism enterprises to adopt crime 
prevention/reduction practices (i.e., installation 
of electronic room locks, surveillance cameras, 
room safety deposit boxes, employing full-time 
security officers, etc.) 
     
Develop and implement tourist education 
programs aimed at reducing the risk of being 
victimized  
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abroad. 
Undertaking intensive marketing campaigns to 
convince the general public that things are back to 
normal; 
     
Scheduling of special events to attract local 
residents and out-of-town tourists. 
     
Reducing prices and offer a variety of incentives 
(e.g., package deals)  
     
Offering financial assistance (i.e., grants, tax 
holidays, subsidized loans, etc.) from their local, 
state, and/or national governments. 
     
Providing governmental grants for financing the 
promotion of their destination  
     
Undertaking comprehensive marketing campaigns 
initiated by Ministry of Tourism in cooperation 
with other NGOs and governmental agencies  
     
Encouraging area residents within a short drive of 
the affected destination to visit their region or 
hometown by appealing to their sense of local 
patriotism. 
     
Establishing a mechanism for sharing information 
and coordination of publicity and PR activities 
aimed at creating positive public opinion among 
the media, local community, and customers. 
     
Postponing the major expenditures on maintenance and renovation      
 
Do you have any comments or suggestions about any of the issues covered in this 
questionnaire?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 092
 
 )cibarA( eriannoitseuQ :owT xidneppA
  ما المدينة التي تقيم فيها؟:  1س
 القاهرة  -1
 شرم الشيخ  -2
 دهب    -3
 طابا -4
  : الي أي من الجهات السياحية التالية ترتبطون؟ 2س
     وزارة السياحة  -2                       الحكومة   المركزية / المحلية   -1         
    الغرف السياحية  -4                     وزارة الداخلية (شرطة السياحة)  -3         
 هيئة تنشيط السياحة   -6                                   هيئة التنمية السياحية  -5        
  الخطوط الجوية والبحرية  -8                               شركات ووكالات السياحة  -7        
   وسائل الإعلام المحلية  -11                                  الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق   -9        
  ---------------------------------------------------جهة أخرى، اذكرها  -11     
 لسياحي  يرجى بيان مدة خبرتك في القطاع ا 3س
 سنة أو اقل  )5(                           
 سنة  )11-6(                       
 سنة أو أكثر  )11(                               
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في السيطرة والتغلب على العمليات الإرهابية التي حدثت في  (الموضحة في الجدول أسفل)ما مدى أهمية الجهات  4س 
  في الخانة المناسبة أمام كل جهة).√ احي المصري مؤخراً؟ (ضع علامة القطاع السي
 غير هام إطلاقا   غير هام متوسط هام هام جدا   الجهات المعنية
      الحكومة   المركزية / المحلية.
      وزارة السياحة.
      وزارة الداخلية ( شرطة السياحة).
      هيئات وغرف السياحة.
      ت السياحة.شركات /وكالا
      الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق. 
      الخطوط الجوية والبحرية.
      وسائل الإعلام المحلية.
      وسائل الإعلام الدولية.
      علماء الدين (خطباء المساجد /المفتون).
      حكومات الدول المصدرة للسياح. 
      المنظمات السياحية الإقليمية والدولية.
 
(يعرف النفوذ بالمدى قد يكون لها نفوذ/ سلطة أكثر من غيرها.  (الموضحة في الجدول أسففل)بعض الجهات السياحية  5س
مفن وجهفة نكفرما مفا مفدى  الذي يكون للجهة القددر  و ستدسعيا الولدول  لدم الملدادر الماديدة او الماليدة او المعنويدة 
زمة ؟ (ضفع علامفة  و بعد وقوع الأ قبل ات في معالجة العمليات الإرهابيةالنفوذ والسلطة التي تمتلكها كل جهة من الجه
 .وفي كل مرحلة ) في الخانات المناسبة أمام كل جهة√ 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   وقوع الأزمة قبل بعد وقوع الأزمة
 
 
 الجهات المعنية
جدا
ف 
ضعي
 
ف
ضعي
 
ط
س
متو
 
ي
قو
جدا 
ي 
قو
جدا 
ف 
ضعي
 
ف
ضعي
 
ط
س
متو
 
ي
قو
جدا 
ي 
قو
 
      لمركزية / المحليةالحكومة   ا          
 وزارة السياحة          
 وزارة الداخلية ( شرطة السياحة)          
 هيئات وغرف السياحة          
     شركات /وكالات السياحة          
 الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق          
 الخطوط الجوية والبحرية          
 وسائل الإعلام المحلية          
 وسائل الإعلام الدولية          
 علماء الدين (خطباء المساجد /المفتون)          
 حكومات الدول المصدرة للسياح          
 المنظمات السياحية الإقليمية والدولية          
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.  ي التعامل مع العمليات الإرهابيةف(الموضحة في الجدول اسفل) ما درجة مشروعية الإجراءات التي تتخذها الجهات   6س 
.  الإرهابية) (السلطة الشرعية تعني مدى قانونية ومشروعية الإجراءت التي تتخذها تلك الجهة في مواجهة العمليات
 باعتقادم ما مدى مشروعية كل جهة من الجهات في التعامل مع العمليات الإرهابية؟ 
 هة وفي كل مرحلة)في الخانات المناسبة امام كل ج√ (ضع علامة 
 
لدديها الدددرع ى دى التعدالن ل سدي رع   (الموضحة في الجفدول أسففل)إلى أي مدى ترى أن الجهات السياحية المعنية  7س
ففي الخانفات المناسفبة أمفام كفل √ (ضفع علامفة  ي المصدري ى ى العم يات الإرهابية التي تحدث لد اع السدياح
 جهة وفي كل مرحلة).
   وقوع الأزمة قبل بعد وقوع الأزمة
 
 
 الجهات المعنية
س لها 
لي
عية
ر
ش
ضة 
خف
 من
ط
س
متو
جدا   
عالية  
 
جدا  
عالية  
 
س لها 
لي
عية
ر
ش
ضة 
خف
 من
ط
س
متو
جدا   
عالية  
 
جدا  
عالية  
 
     الحكومة   المركزية / المحلية          
 وزارة السياحة          
  الداخلية ( شرطة السياحة) وزارة          
 هيئات وغرف السياحة          
     شركات /وكالات السياحة          
 الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق          
 الخطوط الجوية والبحرية          
 وسائل الإعلام المحلية          
 وسائل الإعلام الدولية          
المساجد علماء الدين (خطباء           
 /المفتون)
 حكومات الدول المصدرة للسياح          
 المنظمات السياحية الإقليمية والدولية          
   وقوع الأزمة قبل بعد وقوع الأزمة
 
 
 الجهات المعنية
ق
لا أواف
 
 
شدة
ب
ق 
لا أواف
 
ى
ق إل
 أواف
 
حد ما
 
ق
أواف
شدة 
ق ب
أواف
 
ق
لا أواف
 
 
شدة
ب
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لا أواف
 
ى
ق إل
 أواف
 
حد ما
 
ق
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شدة 
ق ب
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      المركزية / المحلية  الحكومة           
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ق ل د اع السدياحي إلى أي مدى ترى أن الجهات السياحية المعنية (الملضحة في الجدلل أسفل)  قد تشكل ىائ  8س
في الخانات المناسبة أمام كل جهة لفدي  √المصري في التعامل مع الأزمات، قبل الأزمة لبعدها  (ضع ىلامة 
 كل مرح ة).
 
 
لإدارع العم يدات الإرهابيدة قبدل لأءندا   (الموضفحة ففي الجفدول أسففل)مع الجهدات المعنيدة كيف يكلن ىادع اتصالكم   9س
 المناسبة أمام كل جهة وفي كل مرحلة). الخاناتفي √ (ضع علامة لبعد حدلث الأزمة   
 وزارة السياحة          
 وزارة الداخلية ( شرطة السياحة)          
 هيئات وغرف السياحة          
     شركات /وكالات السياحة          
 الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق          
 الخطوط الجوية والبحرية          
  يةوسائل الإعلام المحل          
 وسائل الإعلام الدولية          
علماء الدين (خطباء المساجد           
 /المفتون)
 حكومات الدول المصدرة للسياح          
 المنظمات السياحية الإقليمية والدولية          
   وقوع الأزمة قبل بعد وقوع الأزمة
 
 
 الجهات المعنية
ق
لا أواف
 
 
شدة
ب
ق 
لا أواف
 
ى
ق إل
 أواف
 
حد ما
 
ق
أواف
شدة 
ق ب
أواف
 
ق
لا أواف
 
 
شدة
ب
 
لا أواف
ق
 
ى
ق إل
 أواف
 
حد ما
 
ق
أواف
شدة 
ق ب
أواف
 
     الحكومة   المركزية / المحلية          
 وزارة السياحة          
 وزارة الداخلية ( شرطة السياحة)          
 هيئات وغرف السياحة          
     شركات /وكالات السياحة          
 الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق          
 الخطوط الجوية والبحرية          
 وسائل الإعلام المحلية          
 وسائل الإعلام الدولية          
 علماء الدين (خطباء المساجد /المفتون)          
 حكومات الدول المصدرة للسياح          
 المنظمات السياحية الإقليمية والدولية          
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إلى أي مدى تلافدق ى دى أن الجهدات المعنيدة اتخدتت التددابير لايسدتراتيجيات التاليدة فدي التعامدل مدع الهجمدات   11س
 في الخانة المناسبة أمام كل جهة).√ (ضع علامة حة المصري  الإرهابية الأخيرع ى ى ق اع السيا
أوافق  الإستراتيجية
 بشدة
أوافق  أوافق
 إلى
  حد ما 
 لا أوافق لا أوافق
  بشدة 
و إستراتيجية مسبقة لمكافحة الإرهاب خطط طوارئ إعداد وتطبيق 
 بمشاركة مختلف الجهات المعنية بالسياحة.
     
لسياحية المغلقة لعزلهم عن السكان وضع السياح في المنتجعات ا
 المحليين.
     
      اتخاذ إجراءات أمنية مرئية كوضع الحواجز وغيرها
تخصيص جوائز لمن يدلي بمعلومات عن الأشخاص الذين يمارسون 
 أنشطة إرهابية.
     
أو )DETPC( إدراج مبادئ منع الجريمة من خلال التصميم البيئي 
  و البيئة المادية المناسبة. ي الملائم و الفعالاستخدام التصميم البيئ
     
     النظر إلى النواحي الأمنية باعتبارها عنصر هام لنجاح الاستثمار في 
 أثناء وقوع الأزمة بعد وقوع الأزمة
 
  قبل وقوع الأزمة
 
 
 
 الجهات المعنية
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 دائما  
الحكومة   المركزية /                
     المحلية
 وزارة السياحة               
وزارة الداخلية ( شرطة                
 السياحة)
 هيئات وغرف السياحة               
     شركات /وكالات السياحة               
 الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق               
 الخطوط الجوية والبحرية               
 وسائل الإعلام المحلية               
 وسائل الإعلام الدولية               
اء علماء الدين (خطب               
 المساجد /المفتون)
حكومات الدول المصدرة                
 للسياح
المنظمات السياحية                
 الإقليمية والدولية
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 السياحة.
      تخصيص جزء كبير من الموارد المالية والبشرية للأغراض أمنية
      تحذير السياح حول احتمال وقوعهم ضحية للأنشطة الإرهابية.
استخدام أساليب المنع والحد من الجريمة، مثل استخدم الأجهزة الأمنية 
 وسن تشريعات وقوانين أمنية
     
تثقيف المواطنين حول تأثير وخطر الأنشطة الإرهابية الموجهة للسياحة 
 على مجتمعاتهم.
     
      إشراك المواطنين في مراقبة الجيران.
انون والجهات السياحية والمجتمع إقامة شراكة بين سلطات تطبيق الق
 والسياح أنفسهم.
     
إقامة شراكة بين زعماء المجتمعات المحلية والحكومات المحلية 
 والوطنية .
     
 
إلى أي مدى تلافق ى ى أن س  ات تنفيت الددانلن لالشدر ة اتخدتت التددابير (الأنشد ة) لايسدتراتيجيات التاليدة   11س
ففي الخانفة المناسفبة أمفام كفل √ (ضفع علامفة الإرهابية الأخيرع ى ى ق داع السدياحة المصدري  في التعامل مع الهجمات 
 جهة).
 هام النشاط
  جدا   
هام إلي حد  هام
 ما
غير 
 هام
 غير هام إطلاقا
      تدريب رجال الأمن والموظفين علي التعامل مع القضايا السياحة.
واصل المباشر  معهم  ويتعاملون  بلطف هل هم متواجدين في الأماكن السياحية ويمكن الت
 مع السياح
     
      هل يعملون بشكل مباشر مع المجتمع المحلي وممثلي  القطاع السياحي
      تقديم المشورة وتدريب العاملين في قطاع السياحة على تقنيات منع الجريمة
       ة.تقييم القطاع السياحي عن طريق التأكد من خلفية وسيرة العاملين ب
تشجيع المؤسسات السياحية لتبني أساليب وقاية وتخفيف للحوادث الإرهابية مثل (تركيب 
أقفال إلكترونية للغرف، كاميرات مراقبة، أدوات  سلامة للغرف وتعيين حراسات أمنية 
 دائمة... إلخ).
     
       ائم.تطوير وتنفيذ برامج تعليم سياحية تهدف إلى الحد من خطر الوقوع ضحية للجر
 
إلدى أي مددى تلافدق ى دى أن الجهدات السدياحية التاليدة اتخدتت التددابير (الأنشد ة) لايسدتراتيجيات التاليدة فدي   21س
 في الخانة المناسبة أمام كل جهة).√ (ضع علامة التعامل مع الهجمات الإرهابية الأخيرع ى ى ق اع السياحة المصري  
 هام طرق التعافي من الأزمة
  جدا   
هام إلي حد   امه
 ما
غير 
 هام
 غير هام إطلاقا
      بتخفيض التكاليف التشغيلية عن طريق الاستغناء عن نسبة من الموظفين.
      التركيز على سياح الداخل
      اكتشاف وتطوير قطاعات سوقية جديدة.
      بالقيام بحملات تسويقية لإقناع الجمهور بأن الوضع قد عاد إلى حالته الطبيعية.
      بوضع جدول لمناسبات خاصة لجذب السياح المحليين و من هم خارج المدينة.
      تخفيض الأسعار عن طريق توفير مجموعة متنوعة من العروض السياحية.
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      طلب مساعدة مالية من الجهات الحكومية.
      تقديم منح حكومية للحصول على تمويل لتطوير السياحة.
ملات تسويقية شاملة من قبل وزارة الساحة بالتعاون مع الجهات الحكومية غير القيام بح
 والحكومية.
     
بالقيام بحملات تسويقية بهدف تشجيع المواطنين والمقيمين بالقرب من المنطقة المتضررة 
 بزيارة  منطقتهم أو مدينتهم السياحية المتأثرة وإظهار شعورهم بحب الوطن.
     
لتبادل المعلومات وتنسيق أنشطة الدعاية والعلاقات العامة بهدف خلق رأي عام إيجاد آلية 
 إيجابي بين وسائل الإعلام والمجتمع المحلي والعملاء.
     
      تأجيل الإنفاق على الصيانة والتجديد الرئيسة.
 
 هل لديك أي تع يدات أل اقتراحات حلل أي من الأملر المغ اع في هته ايستبانة 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix Three: Semi-Structured interview (English)  
Identifying Stakeholders 
 
A. First, I would like to ask a few questions about your organization and 
other stakeholders in tourism industry in Egypt. 
 
A.1. Could you tell me about your organization and its involvement in tourism in Egypt? 
A.2. Could you tell me the names of other organizations which are involved in the tourism 
industry in Egypt? 
A- Public Authorities 
- Local/Provincial Government 
- Police and Intelligence Authorities(Special branch For Tourism) 
- Central/Provincial/Local Tourism Department (DMO) 
- Chamber of tourism/ Commerce 
- Local Economic Development Authority 
- Central Government 
B- Private stakeholders 
- Hotels/Hotel Association 
- Restaurants/Restaurant Association 
- Airlines and Cruise Lines 
- Media Directors/Journalists 
- Travel Companies/Association 
- Retail Stores/Association 
- Religious Scholars (Imams) 
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- University/College 
C- External Stakeholders 
- The governments of generating markets 
- Regional and international tourism organization 
A.3. Which of these are most influential in the industry in general and tourism crisis 
management in particular? In what ways? 
Impacts 
B. Now I would like to turn to the impacts of the terrorism crisis in 
Egypt in 2005, on the tourism industry. 
 
B.4. Generally speaking, what were the effects of the Sharm El Sheikh terrorism crisis  in 
2005 on the Tourism Industry in Egypt in general and on your organization in particular? 
a. Decline in tourism 
b. Decrease in investment in tourism and other sectors which partly rely on 
tourism  
c. Negative affect on quality of life of the entire country 
B.5. What in your judgement are the main reasons why terrorist attack on tourism  
industry in Egypt? 
d. Cultural motivation 
e. Strategic motivation 
Management (Action) 
C. In this section I would like to ask some questions about what you 
have done in relation to the terrorism crisis in 2005. 
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(Preventative stage) 
C.6. Is there any contingency and crisis plan for managing terrorism crises? Please explain? 
C.7. In tourism industry in Egypt, is there a financial plan (budget) for managing such 
terrorism crises? If “yes” is it enough to restore the industry to normal situation? If no, why? 
C.8. Is any training is undertaken for the tourism stakeholders regarding to the crisis 
management? How important are these educational plans and these are undertaken? 
(Reactive stage based on stakeholders’ communication) 
C.9. How important is the participation of stakeholders in the management of terrorism crisis 
in the tourism industry in Egypt? 
C.10. Could you explain about the level of engagement among stakeholders on planning and 
implementation of crisis management operations? 
C.11.Could you explain if and how stakeholders does tend to cooperate with one 
another ? 
 
C.12. Could you give me a brief description about these headlines on the recent terrorist 
accident in Sharm El Sheikh, 2005? 
a. Presence of law enforcement or Security Police in tourist zones; 
b. The level of technologically based means of protection in and around tourism 
installations; 
c. The availability of dedicated tourist police units; 
d. The level of dedicated tourism policing; 
e. The level of visibility of security measures; 
f. The availability of rewards for information leading to arrests of offenders; 
g. Facilitation of tourist victims’ testimony in criminal cases; 
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h. Adoption of CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) 
principles in the design of tourism physical plants; 
i. Designating crime against tourists a major criminal offense; 
j. Maintaining a database of crimes against tourists; and 
k. Creating and maintaining safe roads. 
(Recovery stage) 
C.13. Could you tell me precisely, what steps did you take to rebuild the tourist industry after 
the Sharm El sheikh terrorism crisis 2005?  
C.14. Please explain the steps and strategies which were taken to rebuild the tourism industry 
after the terrorism attacks in Sharm El sheikh in 2005?  
C.15. Did you undertake marketing campaigns to convince the general public that things are 
back to normal? If so, how? 
C.16. Was there any coordination with travel advisories, local and national mass media, 
Ministry of Tourism for sending information to tourists after the Sharm El Sheik terrorism 
crisis in 2005? If so, how? 
C.17. To what extent did you send positive information to existing and potential tourists? 
National Culture 
D. Now I would like to ask some precise questions about the impact of 
national culture on the engagement of different stakeholders during 
terrorism crisis in the tourism industry in Sharm El Sheikh in 2005. 
 
D.18. If the organizational culture was defined as a pattern of beliefs and expectations shared 
by the organization’s members, resulting in the norm that shape the behaviour of the 
individuals in the organization, how would you describe the culture in your organization?  
D.19. What changes in the national culture should be take place if they are to be more 
effective in dealing with crisis?  
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D.02. In your opinion what are the cultural barriers which affect the interaction of 
stakeholders in managing the crisis? Please explain in detail? 
D.21.Could you please explain your role in decision making during the crisis?  
 
Recommendations 
E. Finally I would appreciate your suggestions/recommendations on 
managing terrorism attacks in the tourism industry in Egypt. (Such as 
cooperation of different parties working in tourism industry in Egypt) 
E.20. What kind of measures do you recommend to be taken by different stakeholders before 
over and after crisis to mitigate the crisis effects?  
E.23. What lessons were learned from the Sharm El Sheikh 2005 terrorism attacks, and how 
could these be used to help reduce the damage caused? 
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  )cibarA( weivretni derutcurtS-imeS :ruoF xidneppA
 جدول مقابلة أصحاب الحصص / المصالح
 تحديد أصحاب الحصص / المصالح
 
المصاالح  /أولا ، أود أن أطرح بعض الاسئلة عن منظمتكم وغيرها  من اصحاب الحصص . أ
 صر. في صناعة السياحة في م
 هل يمكن أن تحدثني عن منظمتكم ومشاركته في صناعة السياحة في مصر؟1. 
  . هل من الممكن أن تذكر أسماء المنظمات الأخرى التي تشكل القطاع السياحي في مصر؟2
 أصحاب الحصص / المصالح الجهة السياحية      
  السلطات العامة -ا
  الحكومة المحلية / الإقليمية -
  والاستخبارات (الفروع الخاصة بالسياحة) سلطات الشرطة -
  فروع وزارة السياحة المركزية/ المحلية/ القروية -
  الغرف التجارية -
  هيئات التطوير السياحي -
  الحكومة المركزية -
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  أصحاب الحصص / المصالح / القطاع الخاص  -ب
  الفنادق/ اتحاد الفنادق -
  المطاعم/ اتحاد المطاعم -
  لبحريةالخطوط الجوية/ ا -
  الشركات السياحية/ اتحاد الشركات السياحية -
  متاجر التجزئة/ رابطة متاجر التجزئة -
  علماء الدين (المفتون) -
  الجامعات/ الكليات  -
  أصحاب الحصص / المصالح خارجيين -ج
  حكومات الأسواق المولدة للسياح -
  المنظمات السياحة الإقليمية / الدولية -
 ت أكثر تأثرا بالأحداث بشكل عام وبإدارة الأزمات السياحية بشكل خاص؟ و إلي أي مدي؟. أي من هذه المنظما3
 
 التأثيرات
القطااع  علاي  5112ب.  الآن ارغب في العودة إلي التأثيرات الناجمة عن أزمة الإرهاب سانة 
 السياحي في مصر؟
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 صري بشكل عام و علي منظمتكم تحديدا؟علي القطاع السياحي الم 5112. ما هي آثار ازمة شرم الشيخ الإرهابية 4
  انخفاض عدد السياح -
  نقص في الاستثمار السياحي وفي القطاعات المرتبطة بالسياحة -
  تأثيرات سلبية علي حياة البلد بشكل عام  -
في رأيك ما هي أهم أسباب الهجمات الإرهابية على  .  ما هي دوافع الإرهابيين نحو صناعة السياحة في مصر؟5
 عة السياحة في مصر؟ صنا
 دوافع ثقافية  -
 دوافع إستراتيجية -
 الإدارة
 
ج.  في هذا الجزء أود أن اطرح بعض الأسئلة حول ما قامت بة منظمتكم حيال أزمة شرم الشايخ 
 ؟5112الإرهابية عام 
 (المرحلة الوقائية) 
  0220. هل كان هناك خطة ازمة او طواري لإدارة ازمات الإرهاب 6 ؟ كرما اشرح
فى القطاع السياحي في المصري، هل هناك ميزانيه لإدارة مثل هذه الازمات الارهابيه؟ اذا "نعم" هل هذه الميزانية . 7
 كافية لأستعاد الوضع الى طبيعته؟ اذا لا ، لماذا؟
ية خطاط . هل كان هناك تدريب للعاملين بالسياحة في الجهات السياحة المختلفة بشأن إدارة الازمات؟ ما مدى اهم8
 التدريب وتلك التي تم تطبيقها؟ 
 503
 
 
 (مرحلة رد الفعل المعتمدة على الاتصال بين اصحاب المصالح)  
  . ما مدي أهمية الاتصال بينكم و بين المنظمات الأخرى خلال أزمات الإرهاب في السياحة المصرية؟ 9
طيط وتنفيذ عمليات ادرة . هل ممكن ان تشرح مستوى التعاون بين اصحاب الحصص / المصالح في التخ20
 الأزمة؟
هل ممكن ان تشرح كيف يكون التعاون بين اصحاب الحصص / المصالح السياحية ليتعاونون فيما بينهم ان . 11
 وجد؟ 
هل لك ان تعطيني وصفا موجزا عن هذه العناوين عن الحوادث الارهابيه الأخيرة فى شرم الشيخ عام . 21
  ؟0220
  طة في المناطق السياحيةوجود شرطة او أمن الشر -
  مستوى تكنولوجيا وسائل الحماية في المنشآت السياحية وحولها -
  توفر وحدات الشرطة السياحية المكّرسة -
  مستوى مراقبة السياحة المكّرسة  -
  مستوى رؤية التدابير الأمنّية؛ -
  توفر الجوائز مقابل معلومات تؤّدي إلى اعتقالات الجانحين -
  الضحايا السياح في حالة الجرائمتسهيل شهادة  -
  اعتماد مبدي - DETPC(منع الجريمة من خلال التصميم البيئي) 
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(والهدف هو ضمان ان جميع جوانب البيئة الماديه (الشوارع والمباني والمساحات المفتوحة) تهدف الى خلق بيئات 
 آمنة).
  اعتبار الجريمة ضد السياح جريمة كبري -
  ات عن الجرائم ضد السياح الاحتفاظ بقاعدة بيان -
  انشاء وصيانة طرق امنه. -
  (مرحلة الانتعاش) 
. هل من الممكن أن تشرح لنا تحديدا, الخطوات التي تم اتخاذها لإعادة بناء صناعة الساياحة بعاد الهجماات 10
 ؟0220الإرهابية في شرم الشيخ في عام 
اتخاذها لإعادة بناء صناعة السياحة بعد هجمات شرم  . كرما, ممكن أن تشرح الخطوات والاستراتيجيات التي تم10
 ؟0220الإرهابية في  الشيخ
 . هل نفذتم وقمتم بحملة تسويقية لإقناع الجمهور بأن الأمور عادت إلى طبيعتها؟ إذا كان الأمر كذلك، كيف؟00
 معلوماتالسياحة, لإرسال . هل كان هناك أي تنسيق مع وكالات السفر, وسائل الإعلام المحلية والوطنية, وزارة 60
 ؟ إذا كان الأمر كذلك ، كيف؟0220إلى السياح بعد أحداث شرم الشيخ عام 
  . إلى أي مدى استطعتم أن ترسلوا معلومات ايجابية عن الوضع الحالي والمحتملة السياح؟71
 الثقافة المحلية
إدارة  وهيكال ة الخاصة بك ، د. والآن أود أن أطرح بعض الأسئلة الدقيقة عن تأثير الثقافة التنظيمي
 ؟5112الاتصال بين مختلف المنظمات أثناء أزمة شرم الشيخ الإرهاب في 
 703
 
. تعرف الثقافة التنظيمية بأنها نمط من المعتقدات والتوقعات التي يتقاسمها أعضاء المنظمة، مما يسفر عن 81
   في منظمتكم؟ إنتاج القاعدة التي تشكل سلوك الأفراد في المنظمة، كيف تصف الثقافة
 . ما هي التغييرات الثقافية التي تحتاجها منظمتكم لتصبح أكثر فاعلية في مواجهة الأزمات؟91
 
التعاون والتنسيق بين اصحاب الحصاص / المصاالح  . في رايك, ماهي العوائق الثقافية التي اثرت على فاعلية12
 ؟ كرما اشرح بالتفصيل؟ السياحية
  ة منظمتكم في اتخاذ القرار أثناء الأزمة؟ . هل ممكن أن تشرح طريق12
  
 التوصيات
أخيرا سوف أكون ممتن لسماع اقتراحاتك و توصياتك حول إدارة الهجمات الإرهابياة    فاي  ها.
السياحة المصرية. ؟ (مثل استراتيجيه شبكة الاتصالات وتعاون لمختلف الجهات العاملاة فاي 
 صناعة السياحة في مصر)  
ابير التي توصي باتخاذها من قبل مختلف أصحاب الحصص / المصالح قبل و أثناء و بعاد الأزماة . ما هي التد22
 لتقليل أثارها؟ 
وكيف يمكن استخدامها للمسااعدة فاي الحاد مان  5220. ما هي الدروس المستفادة من هجمات شرم الشيخ الإرهابية عام 30
 الأضرار الناجمة؟
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Appendix Five: List of Participants and Interview Coding 
Abbreviations: CPP- Cairo Public Participants. SPP- Sharm el Sheikh  Public Participants. CRP- Cairo Private Participants. 
SRP- Sharm el Sheikh Private Participants. CVP- Cairo Various participants. SVP- Sharm el Sheikh Various participants. 
 Position and Organisation /public Sector Name Interview 
Coding 
1 spokesman of the Minister of Tourism and Head 
of the crisis management unit in Egyptian 
Ministry of Tourism  
Ms Hala al-Khatib CPP 1 
2 Head of hotels and Tourism Resorts Sector in 
The Ministry of Tourism   
Mr Shokri Jaweesh 
 
CPP 2 
3 Public Relations Director of   the Egyptian 
General Authority for the revitalization of 
tourism  
Mr Adel Almasri CPP 3 
4 Egyptian Tourism Federation anonymous CPP 4 
5 General Secretary  of companies and  agencies 
of travel and tourism Chambers  
Mr Riyadh Kabeel CPP 5 
6 General Director of Planning and Follow-up of  
the Egyptian General Authority for the 
revitalization of tourism 
Ms Neven Halouani CPP 6 
7 Chief of the  EgyptAir Office,  Almohandeseen 
Branch  
Ms Rokayah CPP 7  
8 Misr Travel Company anonymous CPP8 
9 General Director of the General Authority for 
Tourism Development (GATD),  Sharm El-
Sheikh Office  
 Mr Tahir Ali 
Dekrony 
SPP 9 
10 head of the information centre at Sharm el-
Sheikh City Council 
Mr Mahmood 
Hammad  
 SPP 
10 
11 Chairman of the  Sharm El-Sheikh  city Council   Mr Mahmood Eissa SPP 11 
12 Director of Public Relations Office of Tourism 
Development Authority in Sharm El-Sheikh    
Mr Mohammed Ata SPP 12 
 
13 General Authority for Tourist Development anonymous SPP 13 
14 Sharm El Sheikh Airport, Public Relations  Mr  Ahmed 
Samir 
SPP 14 
15 Sharm El-Sheikh central Mosque anonymous SPP15  
 Private Sector    
 Tourism Company/ Travel agency/ Airlines   
16 The Tourism Manager of Kimidar Tours  Mr Peter Habib CRP16 
17 The Tourism Manager of Emeco travel  Mr Ilhami Zayyat CRP 17 
18 First City Group Tourism Company, Sharm El 
Sheikh  
anonymous SRP 18 
19 Director of sales and Marketing, Saudi Arabia 
Airlines    
Mr Mustafa Al-
Shenawi- 
CRP 19 
20 KLM Royal Dutch Airlines/ Sharm El Sheikh 
office  
 
anonymous SRP20 
 Hotels   
21 Director of sales, Cairo Marriott hotel   Ms Heba Eissa CRP 21 
22 Irea Director of Public, Cairo Semiramis - Ms Nabila Samak CRP 22 
309 
 
Intercontineintal Hotel,  
23 Cairo Noble Hotel  Mr  Ahmed Saleh CRP 23 
24 Public Relations Manager, Hilton Nile,  Ms Farida Mansour CRP 24 
25 The Sheraton Sharm El Sheikh Hotel & Resort, 
Public Relations  
anonymous SRP 25 
26 The Ghazala Gardens Hotel, Sharm El Sheikh                         anonymous  SRP 26 
27 Sharm El Sheikh Four Seasons Hotel, Public 
Relations 
anonymous SRP 27 
 Restaurants     
28 Egyptians Restaurant, Sharm El Sheikh anonymous SRP 28 
29 Hard Rock  Sharm el Sheikh Café anonymous SRP 29 
30 Kanzaman  Restaurant, Sharm El Sheikh anonymous SRP 30 
 Various participants   
31 Egyptian republic Newspaper, journalist   Mr  Nabeel Nor CVP 31 
32 Egyptian Al-Ahram Newspaper, Chairman of the 
Editorial Section  
Mr  Mustafa Alnaggar CVP 32 
33 Diving World, Operations Manager,  Sharm El 
Sheikh  
Mr  Andrea de 
Laurentiis 
SVP 33 
34 Western Union, Currency Exchange,   Sharm El 
Sheikh 
Mr Weil Awad   SVP 34 
35 Thrifty Car rental,  Sharm el Sheikh  anonymous SVP 35 
36 Egyptian Investor in Sharm El Sheikh  Ms Rasha Bba  SVP 36 
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Appendix Seven - Tables of statistics 
 
Stakeholders’ salience 
Stakeholders’ power before crises 
 
Group Statistics 
 Geographical Division N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Tpwpre Centre 130 42.68 4.158 .365 
Local 198 41.66 3.802 .270 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Tpwpre Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.000 .992 2.296 326 .022 1.023 .446 .147 1.899 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
2.254 258.526 .025 1.023 .454 .129 1.917 
 
Stakeholders’ power after crises 
Group Statistics 
 Geographical Division N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Tpwpost Centre 130 36.9923 4.21789 .36993 
Local 198 36.8939 3.46613 .24633 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Tpwpost Equal 
variances 
assumed 
6.238 .013 .230 326 .818 .09837 .42687 -
.74141 
.93814 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.221 238.101 .825 .09837 .44444 -
.77717 
.97391 
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Multivariate Tests 
 
Multivariate Tests
b
 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 
df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept Pillai's Trace .993 22845.867
a
 2.000 325.000 .000 .993 
Wilks' Lambda .007 22845.867
a
 2.000 325.000 .000 .993 
Hotelling's Trace 140.590 22845.867
a
 2.000 325.000 .000 .993 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
140.590 22845.867
a
 2.000 325.000 .000 .993 
CentrevsLocal Pillai's Trace .018 3.004
a
 2.000 325.000 .051 .018 
Wilks' Lambda .982 3.004
a
 2.000 325.000 .051 .018 
Hotelling's Trace .018 3.004
a
 2.000 325.000 .051 .018 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.018 3.004
a
 2.000 325.000 .051 .018 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Design: Intercept + CentrevsLocal 
 
 
 
Geographical Division 
Dependent Variable Geographical Division Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Tpwpre Centre 42.685 .346 42.004 43.366 
Local 41.662 .280 41.110 42.213 
Tpwpost Centre 36.992 .332 36.340 37.645 
Local 36.894 .269 36.365 37.423 
 
 
Legitimacy of stakeholders before crises 
Group Statistics 
 Geographical Division N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Tlegpre Centre 130 42.7154 4.43949 .38937 
Local 198 43.5758 4.37712 .31107 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Tlegpre Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.021 .885 -
1.731 
326 .084 -.86037 .49691 -
1.83792 
.11717 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-
1.726 
273.312 .085 -.86037 .49837 -
1.84150 
.12076 
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Legitimacy of stakeholders after crises 
Group Statistics 
 Geographical Division N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Tlegpost Centre 130 38.6462 4.52703 .39705 
Local 198 39.6414 4.26861 .30336 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Tlegpost Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.959 .328 -
2.016 
326 .045 -.99526 .49361 -
1.96632 
-
.02420 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-
1.992 
264.537 .047 -.99526 .49967 -
1.97910 
-
.01142 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Multivariate Tests
b
 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 
df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept Pillai's Trace .991 17931.174
a
 2.000 325.000 .000 .991 
Wilks' Lambda .009 17931.174
a
 2.000 325.000 .000 .991 
Hotelling's Trace 110.346 17931.174
a
 2.000 325.000 .000 .991 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
110.346 17931.174
a
 2.000 325.000 .000 .991 
CentrevsLocal Pillai's Trace .014 2.310
a
 2.000 325.000 .101 .014 
Wilks' Lambda .986 2.310
a
 2.000 325.000 .101 .014 
Hotelling's Trace .014 2.310
a
 2.000 325.000 .101 .014 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.014 2.310
a
 2.000 325.000 .101 .014 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Design: Intercept + CentrevsLocal 
 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable Geographical Division Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Tlegpost Centre 38.646 .384 37.892 39.401 
Local 39.641 .311 39.030 40.253 
Tlegpre Centre 42.715 .386 41.956 43.475 
Local 43.576 .313 42.960 44.191 
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Stakeholders’ management strategies 
Ability to cooperate before crises 
Group Statistics 
 Geographical Division N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Tcooppre Centre 130 45.2769 4.80635 .42154 
Local 198 44.2374 4.58636 .32594 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Tcooppre Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.255 .614 1.970 326 .050 1.03955 .52769 .00143 2.07766 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.951 266.886 .052 1.03955 .53286 -
.00959 
2.08869 
 
 
Ability to cooperate after crises 
Group Statistics 
 Geographical Division N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Tcooppost Centre 130 42.2231 4.92622 .43206 
Local 198 40.4798 5.50746 .39140 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Tcooppost Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.151 .143 2.922 326 .004 1.74328 .59660 .56960 2.91696 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
2.990 296.740 .003 1.74328 .58298 .59598 2.89058 
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Multivariate Tests 
 
Multivariate Tests
b
 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 
df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept Pillai's Trace .990 16065.937
a
 2.000 325.000 .000 .990 
Wilks' Lambda .010 16065.937
a
 2.000 325.000 .000 .990 
Hotelling's Trace 98.867 16065.937
a
 2.000 325.000 .000 .990 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
98.867 16065.937
a
 2.000 325.000 .000 .990 
CentrevsLocal Pillai's Trace .026 4.392
a
 2.000 325.000 .013 .026 
Wilks' Lambda .974 4.392
a
 2.000 325.000 .013 .026 
Hotelling's Trace .027 4.392
a
 2.000 325.000 .013 .026 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.027 4.392
a
 2.000 325.000 .013 .026 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Design: Intercept + CentrevsLocal 
 
Geographical Division 
Dependent Variable Geographical Division Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Tcooppre Centre 45.277 .410 44.470 46.083 
Local 44.237 .332 43.584 44.891 
Tcooppost Centre 42.223 .464 41.311 43.135 
Local 40.480 .376 39.741 41.219 
 
 
Potential to pose obstacles before crises 
Group Statistics 
 Geographical Division N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
TRposobs Centre 125 42.5600 5.18279 .46356 
Local 189 40.5079 5.29413 .38509 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
TRposobs Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.006 .936 3.390 312 .001 2.05206 .60527 .86113 3.24300 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
3.405 269.534 .001 2.05206 .60265 .86557 3.23856 
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Potential to pose obstacles after crises 
 
Group Statistics 
 Geographical Division N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Tposobspost Centre 127 35.4724 4.48600 .39807 
Local 193 34.7927 4.53901 .32673 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Tposobspost Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.005 .944 1.317 318 .189 .67969 .51624 -
.33598 
1.69537 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  
1.320 271.953 .188 .67969 .51498 -
.33417 
1.69356 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Multivariate Tests
b
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept Pillai's Trace .985 9983.176
a
 2.000 304.000 .000 .985 
Wilks' Lambda .015 9983.176
a
 2.000 304.000 .000 .985 
Hotelling's Trace 65.679 9983.176
a
 2.000 304.000 .000 .985 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
65.679 9983.176
a
 2.000 304.000 .000 .985 
CentrevsLocal Pillai's Trace .068 11.112
a
 2.000 304.000 .000 .068 
Wilks' Lambda .932 11.112
a
 2.000 304.000 .000 .068 
Hotelling's Trace .073 11.112
a
 2.000 304.000 .000 .068 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.073 11.112
a
 2.000 304.000 .000 .068 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Design: Intercept + CentrevsLocal 
 
 
Geographical Division 
Dependent Variable Geographical Division Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
TRposobs Centre 42.697 .476 41.760 43.633 
Local 40.519 .386 39.759 41.279 
Tposobspost Centre 35.385 .409 34.580 36.191 
Local 34.843 .332 34.189 35.497 
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Frequency of interaction 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Pillai's trace .920 1875.375
a
 2.000 326.000 .000 .920 
Wilks' lambda .080 1875.375
a
 2.000 326.000 .000 .920 
Hotelling's trace 11.505 1875.375
a
 2.000 326.000 .000 .920 
Roy's largest root 11.505 1875.375
a
 2.000 326.000 .000 .920 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frequencies. These tests are based on the linearly independent 
pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Tcommunipre 18.7226 7.90884 328 
Tcommuniduring 44.7805 8.10712 328 
Tcommunipost 24.9817 10.41287 328 
 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Multivariate Tests
b
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept Pillai's Trace .968 3245.213
a
 3.000 324.000 .000 .968 
Wilks' Lambda .032 3245.213
a
 3.000 324.000 .000 .968 
Hotelling's Trace 30.048 3245.213
a
 3.000 324.000 .000 .968 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
30.048 3245.213
a
 3.000 324.000 .000 .968 
CentrevsLocal Pillai's Trace .016 1.799
a
 3.000 324.000 .147 .016 
Wilks' Lambda .984 1.799
a
 3.000 324.000 .147 .016 
Hotelling's Trace .017 1.799
a
 3.000 324.000 .147 .016 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.017 1.799
a
 3.000 324.000 .147 .016 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Design: Intercept + CentrevsLocal 
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Frequency of interaction before crises 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Ministry of Tourism 328 1.86 1.269 
National media 328 1.78 1.117 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 328 1.78 .883 
Airlines and cruise lines 328 1.65 1.068 
Hotels/ associations 328 1.62 .859 
International media 328 1.59 .985 
Regional and international tourism 
organizations 
328 1.59 .904 
Tourism bodies / chambers 328 1.56 .953 
Central/ local government 328 1.45 .862 
Imams 328 1.37 .742 
Governments of generating markets 328 1.26 .587 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 328 1.22 .581 
Valid N (listwise) 328   
 
Frequency of interaction during crises 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Ministry of Tourism 328 4.67 .727 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 328 4.32 .956 
Hotels/ associations 328 4.23 .761 
Airlines and cruise lines 328 4.04 .808 
Tourism bodies / chambers 328 3.91 1.243 
Governments of generating markets 328 3.86 .987 
Imams 328 3.86 .863 
National media 328 3.84 1.373 
International media 328 3.72 .909 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 328 3.45 .988 
Central/ local government 328 3.36 1.367 
Regional and international tourism 
organizations 
328 1.53 .874 
Valid N (listwise) 328   
 
Frequency of interaction after crises 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Ministry of Tourism 328 2.49 1.496 
Airlines and cruise lines 328 2.41 1.074 
Tourism bodies / chambers 328 2.37 1.189 
Hotels/ associations 328 2.27 1.158 
Imams 328 2.09 1.106 
Tourism companies/ travel agencies 328 2.08 1.191 
Regional and international tourism 
organizations 
328 2.03 1.251 
Central/ local government 328 1.95 1.071 
International media 328 1.94 1.100 
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) 328 1.93 1.220 
National media 328 1.87 1.132 
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Governments of generating markets 328 1.55 .753 
Valid N (listwise) 328   
Preventive strategies 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mea
n 
SD  
1.1.2.5.Assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks for employees 328 4.59 .584 
1.5.1.Offering rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those who 
commit serious crimes against tourists 
328 4.37 1.053 
1.1.1.2.Maintaining many visible security measures 328 4.32 1.161 
1.1.1.3.Increase the presence of uniformed officers in tourist zones 328 3.70 1.420 
1.3.4.Using crime prevention/reduction methods—such as security hardware and 
security policies 
328 3.16 1.129 
1.1.2.1.Training police officers in tourism issues 328 3.15 .967 
1.1.2.2.Being visible, accessible, and friendly police to tourists 328 3.09 .986 
1.3.2.Considering the function of security important to the success of their business 328 2.40 .923 
1.4.1.Making tourists aware of the possibility of becoming victimized by criminals and 
instructing them in crime prevention methods 
328 2.33 .871 
1.5.2.Educating citizens on the serious impacts that crime against tourists can have on 
their communities 
327 2.29 .953 
1.1.2.6.Encouraging tourism enterprises to adopt crime prevention/reduction practices 
(installation of electronic room locks, surveillance cameras, room safety deposit 
boxes, employing full-time security officers, etc.) 
328 2.13 .891 
1.5.3.Engaging citizens in neighbourhood watch schemes   328 2.12 1.085 
1.4.2.Develop and implement tourist education programs aimed at reducing the risk of 
being victimized 
328 1.96 .891 
1.3.3.Allocating a significant portion of their financial and human resources to security 328 1.93 1.083 
1.5.4.Establishing a partnership between the leaders of the local community and the 
national and local governments 
328 1.90 .933 
1.1.2.4.Advising and training tourism industry employees in crime prevention 
techniques 
328 1.84 .689 
1.2.1.Formulating a comprehensive contingency plan 328 1.81 .820 
1.1.2.3.Working closely with the community and tourism industry representatives 328 1.79 .854 
1.1.1.1.Housing the tourists in gated all-inclusive resorts to divide off tourists from local 
residents 
328 1.58 .774 
1.3.1.Incorporating the principles of crime prevention through environmental design  328 1.48 .770 
1.1.2.7.Establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, tourism 
enterprises, the community at large, and the tourists themselves. 
328 1.41 .583 
Valid N (listwise) 327   
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Recovery strategies 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Me
an 
Std. 
Devi
ation 
2.3.4.Reducing prices and offering a variety of incentives (e.g. package deals) 32
8 
4.5
6 
.775 
2.3.2.Identifying and developing new market segments abroad 32
8 
4.4
6 
.819 
2.3.5.Undertaking comprehensive marketing campaigns initiated by Ministry of Tourism 
in cooperation with other NGOs and governmental agencies 
32
8 
4.3
5 
.828 
2.4.3.Reducing operational costs by laying off a proportion of their employees 32
8 
4.3
3 
.814 
2.4.4.Postponing major expenditure on maintenance and renovation 32
8 
4.2
7 
.855 
2.1.1.Establishing a mechanism for sharing information and coordination of publicity 
and PR activities aimed at creating positive public opinion among the media, 
local community and customers 
32
8 
4.1
0 
.965 
2.3.1.Appealing to domestic tourists 32
8 
4.0
6 
.962 
2.2.1.Undertaking intensive marketing campaigns to convince the general public that 
things are back to normal 
32
8 
3.9
9 
1.01
4 
2.3.3.Scheduling of special events to attract local residents and out-of-town tourists 32
8 
2.4
3 
1.08
2 
2.2.2.Encouraging area residents within a short drive of the affected destination to visit 
their region or hometown by appealing to their sense of local patriotism 
32
8 
1.6
1 
.778 
2.4.2.Providing governmental grants for financing the promotion of their destination 32
8 
1.4
2 
.725 
2.4.1.Offering financial assistance (grants, tax holidays, subsidized loans, etc.) from 
local, state and/or national governments 
32
8 
1.4
0 
.576 
Valid N (listwise) 32
8 
  
 
 
Strategies specific to security sector 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean SD 
1.1.2.5.Assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks for 
employees 
328 4.59 .584 
1.1.1.2.Maintaining many visible security measures 328 4.32 1.161 
1.1.1.3.Increase the presence of uniformed officers in tourist zones 328 3.70 1.420 
1.1.2.1.Training police officers in tourism issues 328 3.15 .967 
1.1.2.2.Being visible, accessible, and friendly police to tourists 328 3.09 .986 
1.1.2.6.Encouraging tourism enterprises to adopt crime prevention/reduction 
practices (installation of electronic room locks, surveillance cameras, room 
safety deposit boxes, employing full-time security officers, etc.) 
328 2.13 .891 
1.1.2.4.Advising and training tourism industry employees in crime prevention 
techniques 
328 1.84 .689 
1.1.2.3.Working closely with the community and tourism industry representatives 328 1.79 .854 
1.1.1.1.Housing the tourists in gated all-inclusive resorts to divide off tourists from 
local residents 
328 1.58 .774 
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1.1.2.7.Establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, tourism 
enterprises, the community at large, and the tourists themselves. 
328 1.41 .583 
Valid N (listwise) 328   
 
 
Strategies specific to private sector 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
1.3.4.Using crime prevention/reduction methods—such as security 
hardware and security policies 
32
8 
3.16 1.129 
1.3.2.Considering the function of security important to the success of their 
business 
32
8 
2.40 .923 
1.3.3.Allocating a significant portion of their financial and human resources 
to security 
32
8 
1.93 1.083 
1.3.1.Incorporating the principles of crime prevention through environmental 
design  
32
8 
1.48 .770 
Valid N (listwise) 32
8 
  
 
Strategies specific to tourists 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
1.4.1.Making tourists aware of the possibility of becoming victimized by 
criminals and instructing them in crime prevention methods 
32
8 
2.33 .871 
1.4.2.Develop and implement tourist education programs aimed at reducing 
the risk of being victimized 
32
8 
1.96 .891 
Valid N (listwise) 32
8 
  
 
 
Strategies specific to local citizens 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
1.5.1.Offering rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of 
those who commit serious crimes against tourists 
328 4.37 1.053 
1.5.2.Educating citizens on the serious impacts that crime against tourists 
can have on their communities 
327 2.29 .953 
1.5.3.Engaging citizens in neighbourhood watch schemes   328 2.12 1.085 
1.5.4.Establishing a partnership between the leaders of the local community 
and the national and local governments 
328 1.90 .933 
Valid N (listwise) 327   
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Recovery strategies  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
1.1.2.5.Assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks for 
employees 
328 4.59 .584 
2.1.1.Establishing a mechanism for sharing information and coordination of 
publicity and PR activities aimed at creating positive public opinion 
among the media, local community and customers 
328 4.10 .965 
2.3.3.Scheduling of special events to attract local residents and out-of-town 
tourists 
328 2.43 1.082 
1.1.2.6.Encouraging tourism enterprises to adopt crime prevention/reduction 
practices (installation of electronic room locks, surveillance cameras, 
room safety deposit boxes, employing full-time security officers, etc.) 
328 2.13 .891 
1.5.3.Engaging citizens in neighbourhood watch schemes   328 2.12 1.085 
1.5.4.Establishing a partnership between the leaders of the local community 
and the national and local governments 
328 1.90 .933 
1.1.2.4.Advising and training tourism industry employees in crime prevention 
techniques 
328 1.84 .689 
1.1.2.3.Working closely with the community and tourism industry 
representatives 
328 1.79 .854 
1.1.2.7.Establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, 
tourism enterprises, the community at large, and the tourists 
themselves. 
328 1.41 .583 
Valid N (listwise) 328   
 
